Border Spectacle: The European Union Trust Fund for Africa

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Abstract

This thesis assesses the extent to which The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF) can be understood as a Border Spectacle. A Border Spectacle can be understood to be a performative enactment of border management and policy; it is thus an expression of state power. This thesis argues that the EUTF can be understood as a Border Spectacle due to its underlying aim: to generate an image that the European Union has a coordinated response to the migration ‘crisis’. The key arena for the performance of this spectacle is within European policy circles. The key finding from this research is the funding streams which have been re-worked and ‘re-framed’. This has been achieved by uniting multifarious projects under the rubric of ‘root causes’ to allow them to be linked to migration. Many of these projects existed before the creation of the fund, however, only in recent years have been coded as migration projects. Thus, these projects have become part of the Border Spectacle. In addition to this, the Trust Fund operates through the creation of a ‘migration corridor’ which facilitates the geographical extension of European control over migration into the African continent. It argues that this is achieved through Spectacles of Compassion and Security which cohabitate in the EUTF.
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0.1 Abbreviations

AU- African Union
DAC- Development Assistance Committee
DCI- Development Cooperation Instrument
DG HOME- Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DG NEAR- The DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DG ECHO- The DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EC- European Commission
ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States
EC- European Council
EEA- European Economic Area
EEAS- European External Action Service
ENI- European Neighbourhood Instrument
EP- European Parliament
EU- European Union
EUTF- The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa
IOM- International Organisation for Migration
INTERPOL- International Criminal Police Organisation
MFF- Multiannual Financial Framework
MRRM- The Migrant Response and Resource Mechanism
ODA- Official Development Aid
TCF- Technical Cooperation Facility
SORUDEV- South Sudan Rural Development Programme
SSP- South Sudan Development programme
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1. Introduction

The cover image (European Council, 2015) was taken at the Valletta Summit on Migration in Malta, 2015. The Summit, called with the aim to strengthen European-African cooperation on migration issues, was called for in the wake of the ‘migration crisis’. Importantly, it was at this conference that the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (hereon, the EUTF) was agreed upon. In the image, beneath the vaulted ceilings, Heads of State and government representatives sit behind their national flags behind tables arranged to fit within the confines of a long, corridor-like room. Behind them, pressed into the wall, is a crowd of photographers, eager to capture the perfect image of this emblematic conference. This image was selected as it is befitting of the line of argument this thesis will present. The crowd of photographers represents the performative qualities of the EUTF and the long corridor-like room is an allegory to the ‘migration corridor' that drives the EUTF logic. This image ultimately displays a Border Spectacle; not simply in the tactile quality of the photo, but in a policy sense. It displays an image of ‘concrete action' EU on migration, a Spectacle of state power and a new generation of external migration policy instruments.

The European Union Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) is a fund managed by the European Union (EU) with the aim to fund projects which address the ‘root causes’ of irregular migration and displaced persons. Set up in 2015, it has formed part of the EU’s response to the ‘migration crisis’ (EUTF, 2019a). The EUTF is split into three regional ‘windows': The Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and the North of Africa (EUTF, 2019b) and are made up of 4.2 billion euros worth of funding. It funds a range of projects including
development projects, projects assisting return migrants and border security projects. The common link between these, somewhat, disparate projects is the concept of ‘root causes’.

This thesis assesses the extent to which the EUTF can be understood as a Border Spectacle. The concept of the ‘Border Spectacle’ describes the way borderwork can be performed as an expression of state power (De Genova, 2002). It is argued that the EUTF is a spectacle of European power; it is a symbol of the EU’s response to the migration crisis and an emblem of ‘security’ in a climate where migration is seen as a threat. In order for something to be classified as a ‘performance’, or even a ‘spectacle’, there must be an audience. It is argued that the primary audience is the member states which make up the EU, who demand border protection as a response to the ‘migration crisis’. The artefacts of this Spectacle include documents such as Action Fiches and Annual Reports, European Parliament (EP) debates, European Commission (EC) Press Releases, maps, websites and also, the physical sites of these projects. This thesis scales up the notion of the ‘border’ to encompass a much broader project, the EUTF. It does this in reaction to the political upscaling of the ‘border’ by the EU by which the governance of the European border has been extended both regionally and institutionally. This thesis aims to develop the theory of the Border Spectacle further in order to encompass new developments in European External policies. In these policies, there is no single spectacle, no one fortified border with the obvious spectacles of guards and ID checks but a much wider spectacle, namely, ‘a border in the midst of society’ (Rumford, 2008). Most significantly, this encompasses development projects not formerly seen to be migration projects. This, therefore, displays that the Spectacle must be adapted to a much wider meaning.
This thesis begins with a brief discussion of the context in which the EUTF came into being. After reviewing the relevant literature and theories, a methodology is provided. The analysis then consists of four chapters. The first of these chapters discusses the way the Border Spectacle is enacted in EU policy documents, press releases and meetings. It suggests that as the EUTF is repeatedly referenced as one of the EU’s responses to the ‘migration crisis’ the purpose of it is to answer to member states calls for action. As it was set up quickly, it appears to be a fast and impulsive response to the crisis. The phrase ‘root causes’ is then analysed. It is indicated that this phrase is used in many contexts, with the same phrases repeated over, yet it is rarely qualified. The following chapter analyses the geographical extension of the European border into the African continent. It argues that this has primarily been achieved through the construction of the ‘migration corridor’. It argues this has been rendered in both the overall architecture of the EUTF, in the formulation of three geographical ‘windows’ as well as in individual projects, as demonstrated by the example of the Response and Resource Mechanism for Migrants in Niger. The next chapter addresses the reworking and ‘re-framing’ of funding within the EUTF. The fund itself reworks EU money and the projects tackled are largely development projects, yet justified under the mantra of migration management, being cast as tackling ‘root causes’. The final chapter of the analysis attempts to explain why the EU engages in the construction of the Border Spectacle. It argues that the EUTF presents an opportunity for the EU to simultaneously engage in Spectacles of Compassion and Security, two paradoxical ideas that are both fundamentally part of the EU’s self-identity.

It is important to state that, although this thesis assesses the EUTF as a Spectacle, it does not aim to minimise the reality of this project; 4.2 billion euros are being used to fund projects with direct consequences. What it does aim to do, is highlight the motivations behind
developing such a fund are performative. As many of the projects under the EUTF are development projects that were funded previously, this extends border control into the realm of development which is highly significant as it politicises these projects. Moreover, as the EUTF is posed as an ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’ instrument, it seems inherently contradictory to fund continuing long-term development projects. It is ultimately these paradoxes which make this case of particular interest.

1.1 Research questions

- To what extent can the EUTF be understood as a Border Spectacle?
- What mechanisms does the EUTF use in order to develop the Border Spectacle?
- Why does the EU engage in this Border Spectacle?
2. Contextual background

2.1 Migration crisis

In 2015 and 2016 the EU experienced the highest influx of refugees since WW2 (Niewmann & Zaun, 2018). In both 2015 and 2016, over 1.2 million asylum claims were submitted to the EU, in contrast to 5000 in 2014 (Niewmann & Zaun, 2018). The highest number of applications were from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (Niewmann & Zaun, 2018). By the start of 2015, the Dublin Regulation, the EU law whereby asylum seekers must apply in the first country they set foot in, broke down. Southern Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Greece, were overwhelmed meaning many asylum seekers passed through their borders without applying (Niewmann & Zaun, 2018). The European response to this ‘crisis' was fragmented. Many countries absolved their responsibility. Germany notably took the greatest share of asylum seekers by far and in August 2015, the German government suspended the Dublin regulation for Syrians (Cosgrave et. al., 2016). Other countries, notably the Visegrad states, took a harsh response in not wanting any asylum seekers. In October 2015, Hungary built a new fence along its Croatian and Serbian borders, eventually leading to a total closure of the Balkan route. But as countries closed their borders, migrants sought different routes (Cosgrave et. al., 2016). The ODI reported that in 2015, only 35% of people applying for asylum had arrived by covert means but by 2016 this had increased to 60% (Cosgrave et. al., 2016). Therefore, instead of stopping migration, such border closures appear to deflect it; merely conferring the responsibility of care for migrants to others. The number of people applying for asylum in Europe has lessened since 2015/16 but it is still high. In 2018,
634,700 people applied for International Protection in EU+ countries, yet this is 10% lower than the year before and the third consecutive year with fewer applications (EEASO, 2019). The drivers of the crisis are complex, however, regional instabilities, such as the Syrian Conflict, are key drivers. In addition to this, systemic global inequalities and economic development factors as well as falling travel costs and widened networks are also causes (Cosgrave et. al., 2016). The fundamental point is that the causes of this ‘crisis' are multiple and incredibly hard, if not impossible, to pinpoint. Therefore, responding to the ‘root causes' of the migration crisis is an impossibly hard and subjective task.

2.2 Twofold response: Internal and External

Following the migration crisis, the EU had a twofold response with internal and external dimensions. Internal mechanisms included the Temporary Emergency Relocation Scheme in 2016, whereby a proportion of those in need of International Protection who arrived in Italy or Greece after 15th April 2015 would be relocated to other EU Member States, overriding the Dublin Regulation (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). The response to this scheme was contested with Volksgrad states opposing it. Additionally, the scheme fell massively behind in both its schedule and scale. In contrast to the discord over internal regulations, European countries were united in the desire to increase the regulation of external European borders. Such measures implemented included the hotspot system in Italy and Greece and the EU-Turkey agreement that went with this. A new Safe Countries of Origin list was created in order to redefine who had the right to asylum (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). It is in this context that the EUTFA represents part of a wider externalisation of EU migration policy, whereby the EU's ‘neighbours’, categorised as ‘transit’ and ‘source’ countries, are mobilised into managing Europe’s border regime. This ‘externalisation’ is increasingly occurring through conditional mechanisms. The 2016 common Migration and Mobility Agenda emphasised a ‘more for
more’ logic with more visas delivered to third country nationals, dependent on the country’s cooperation with migration governance requests. This conditional logic continues in the EUTF. This support for external action has led to the development of the EUTF and arguably, the EUTF represents the next development of this external-logic.

2.3 Increasing EU-African cooperation

This push towards externalisation has developed concurrently with increasing cooperation between the EU and African countries over the issue of migration. Since 2006, there has been a common EU-Africa migration strategy, the Rabat-Process (Rabat-process.org, 2018). Due to the institutional limits of the African Union (AU) it has been argued that this relationship is not always one of equals as it stems from a history of bilateralism (Robert Schuman Foundation, 2018). At the 2017 Abidjan Summit, the European Parliament described this relationship as an ‘equal, long-lasting, mutually beneficial relationship’ (Robert Schuman Foundation, 2018). Wanjiku Kihato (2018) argues that the European ‘migration crisis’ has overshadowed the fact that in 2015, 80% of Africans migrated within the continent. This ‘African complicity’ in European constriction of African mobility has been termed the ‘containment compact’ (Wanjiku Kihato, 2018; Wanjiku Kihato & Landau 2016). Wanjiku Kihato (2018) describes this being achieved through three methods: containing African migration through fortifying borders, promoting development to remove migration incentives and by selecting a few suitable candidates to enter Europe. The EUTF mostly fits into the first two categories, however, its involvement in the Erasmus+ programme (EUTF, 2017a), arguably fits into the latter. Before the development of the EUTF, European-African cooperation in migration was increasing in the form of migration compacts and bilateral agreements such as Italy-Libya. In December 2007, Italy and Libya signed a series of bilateral agreements, including on creating joint patrols of the Libyan coasts; this meant
Italian vessels were allowed to operate in Libyan waters (Bialasiewicz, 2012). In 2008, the two countries signed The Treaty of Friendship in which Italy agreed to compensate Libya for its 20\textsuperscript{th} Century occupation of the country. In addition to the €5 billion package, were provisions for bilateral efforts to combat illegal immigration (Bialasiewicz, 2012). Another example of this increased cooperation includes the renewal of the Lome Convention in 2000 as the Cotonou Agreement. This convention which specified terms of trade as well as aid between the EU and 77 countries in the Caribbean, Pacific and Africa were reformulated to include an agreement where these countries had to accept the return and readmission of any of their nationals illegally present in an EU territory (Bialasiewicz, 2012). Compacts with Ethiopia, Lebanon, Jordan, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal tied development aid to preventing migration to Europe. Wanjiku Kihato (2018) argues that these conditional arrangements are ‘couched' in win-win rhetoric. Overall the EUTF represents a new stage in the increasing EU-African cooperation on migration.

2.4 Founding of the EUTF

The Fund was set up following the 2015 Migration Summit between European and African leaders in Valletta, Malta (EUTF, 2019b). Before 2013, the EU could not set up its own trust funds, it could only pool funds with other donors in Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) with a third party functioning as a trustee (Hauck et. al. 2015). The EU channelled aid through many MDTFs in this way, as trust funds have been present internationally since the 1980s. In 2013 there were changes to the EU’s Financial Regulations, and the ability for the EU to set up its own trust funds was laid out in article 197. The motivations behind this new regulation included: increasing the visibility of the EU, improvements in leveraging member states funding and improving EU leadership in these fields (Hauck et. al. 2015). The EU has so far established four trust funds: The Bekou Fund (Central African Republic), The Madad Fund
(Syria), the Columbian Fund and the EUTFA. Hauck et. al. (2015) outline that there are three kinds of EU trust funds that can be formed: ‘thematic’, ‘regional’ and ‘emergency’. The EUTFA is the only one with ‘emergency’ status and this alters its architectural procedures. Funds are governed by direct management, whereby the European Commission performs the implementation, yet in an emergency fund, indirect management can take place (Hauck et. al. 2015).

The EUTF operates in three different geographical regions, termed ‘windows’; The Horn of Africa, The North of Africa and The Sahel and Lake Chad (Hauck et. al., 2015). Discussions on the formation of the fund originally envisioned it solely for the Sahel and Lake Chad region, but in response to discussions on the migration crisis, the scope of the fund widened. The EUTFA is funded by various EU funds and EU/ European Economic Area (EEA) member state contributions. The largest contribution to the EUTF comes from the European Development Fund. The EU also supports the fund through other instruments: The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), Humanitarian and Disaster Preparedness and Instrument for Stability and Peace budgets. EU money pooled from non-aid budgets does not have to comply with Development Assistance Committee (DAC) rules. The EUTF operates outside of the EU budget. It is instead governed by two bodies: The Strategic Board and three Operational Committees, one for each window. The Strategic Board is chaired by the European Commission and is composed of representatives from EU Member States and other contributing donors. The Operational Committee is comprised of the Commission and contributing Member States. In order to vote, Member States must have contributed at least three million euros. African partner countries participate in meetings of the Board and Operation Committee, yet only as observers. Because the EUTF is outside the
EU budget, the European Parliament has no official powers to influence the fund, but they have recently been invited to become observers of the Board (CONCORD, 2018). This is, therefore, a point of contestation. The projects are implemented by a mixture of private and state actors as well as by international organisations (Hauck et. al., 2015). The driving idea behind the mechanics of the fund is flexibility. It is aimed to provide a common and rapid response to an emergency situation. The funds can be dispersed much faster than other EU funds as, for example, they do not have to comply with EDF procedures. Decisions are made more rapidly, however, this can come at the price of accountability (Robert Schuman Foundation, 2018). There have been questions over the accountability of the EUTF as the fund is outside the jurisdiction of the European Parliament. In particular, there has been concern over the fact that member states have to contribute €3 billion to the fund in order to vote, despite the fact they contribute to the European Development Fund which has made up the majority of the EUTF's budget.
3. Literature review and theoretical framework

3.1 The Border Spectacle and Borderwork

The pivotal concept for this thesis is the ‘Border Spectacle’. The term ‘Border Spectacle’ was coined by De Genova (2002) in order to express the notion of the border as a performance space of power; a ‘mise-en-scène’ of migrant ‘illegality’ (De Genova, 2013). De Genova describes the ‘material practices of immigration and border policing' as being ‘enmeshed in a dense weave of discourse and representation' (De Genova, 2013: p1181). In other terms, the actions, policy practices and mundane realities of border work are simultaneously emphasised and reworked through representations of these practices, such as through governmental discourse or the media. It is the amalgamation of these actions and representations that comprise the Border Spectacle. De Genova derives his notion of spectacle from Guy Debord’s (1994) *The Society of the Spectacle* in which the Marxist philosopher and theorist displays the importance of representation to modern social life. Additionally, his focus on physical performativity stems from the genealogy of the Border Spectacle (De Genova, 2002) being rooted in Lefebvre’s ‘monumental’ and ceremonial space (2001). Casas-Cortes et. al. (2015) in their ‘New Keywords’ aim to mimic the social-science definitions offered in Raymond Williams *Keywords* (1976), yet for migration-related terms. They state: “In this regime of governmentality the border spectacle constitutes a performance”. Border Spectacle as Andersson (2014) contends that the Border Spectacle can be understood as ‘the visual economy of clandestine migration’ (p.98). Van Reekum (2016)
suggests that in response to the migration ‘crisis’, the Mediterranean has been rendered as a ‘Border Spectacle’. He indicates that these scenes of rescue at sea, which enact the ‘spectacle’, serve to naturalise migration politics. Another useful concept in understanding the spectacularisation of the border is that of ‘visualisation’ as a form of enactment. Van Reekum and Schinkel (2017) stress the notion that the border exists through its enactment. They conceptualise this process through the notion of ‘visualisation’ whereby borders are not simply ‘visualised’ in the physical sense of being seen, but ‘visualised’ in a process of predetermining what may happen, as a way of ‘doing statecraft’. “Visualizing border crossings is, then, part of doing statecraft by coding certain forms of movement, by certain people, as political events” (Van Reekum & Schinkel, 2017: p29).

This thesis aims to investigate the extent to which EUTF is itself a Border Spectacle, yet, it additionally aims to take the concept of the Border Spectacle further. De Genova (2013), however, recognises that the Border Spectacle does not need to be so literally connected to the obvious geographies of border enforcement, but it can include a variety of spaces, such as airports and seaports. Therefore, it is essential to understand the Border Spectacle’s many manifestations. The external border of the EU has been expanded far beyond its geographical borders, even beyond the obvious border checks at nodes of transport, such as airports, through external policies. The latest manifestation of this is within development projects. The nature of external migration policies is a fast developing field and theory must develop with it. Therefore, the notion of ‘spectacle’ developed in this literature helps to highlight the performativity of European statecraft in external migration politics, in particular, the EUTF.

The Border Spectacle is part of wider literature on Borders. This thesis builds on literature concerning ‘Borderwork’. Borderwork can be defined as “the discursive and practical labour
that goes into the production and maintenance of the borders” (Frowd, 2018: p1659). In other words, borderwork has two dimensions; the material control of borders and the discursive control of them. The term, coined by Rumford (2008), expresses the dispersed nature of borders, namely, ‘networked borders’. In other terms, borders are present throughout society as opposed to simply existing at the polity boundaries. Bialasiewicz (2012) similarly uses the term ‘borderwork’ to depict the widened periphery of border politics. Bialasiewicz examines the way ‘EUropean’ borderwork is stretched beyond the EU’s borders, focussing on the Mediterranean ‘long the premier laboratory for creative solutions to the policing of EU borders’ (2012: p.843). To quote the scholar Henk van Houtum “A border should first and foremost be understood as a process, as a verb’ (2010: p958). He remarks this is primarily done through three mechanisms: bordering, ordering and othering. He perceptively suggests: ‘the EU is not merely defending its borders; it is expanding its perimeter’ (p962). This statement magnifies the central argument of this thesis. This ‘expanded perimeter’ functions as a Spectacle, displaying EU control far beyond its borders. This rendering of borders can be conceptualised as an ‘imagined geography’ (Said, 1991) of migratory flows. Therefore, this literature on borderwork is highly connected to this study, in particular, the notion of a widened understanding of what ‘borderwork’ encompasses.

3.2 Governmentality

The Foucauldian notion of governmentality (Foucault, 2007) is useful in enabling us to understand the political logic inbuilt in the performance of the Border Spectacle. Governmentality and borderwork reify the existence of the state, whereas, it is important to be aware of the createdness of states; they are not simply a priori entities to social existence, but, created by it (Jeffrey, 2015). From this perspective, Borderwork and Border Spectacles form part of statecraft. In the case of the EUTF, it is the European-wide ‘state’ which it aims
to uphold. Walters (2015) discusses the interface of migration and governmentality, indicating that Foucault’s work can be used to inform migration studies by emphasising the ways in which statecraft and the technologies of government inform the management of population mobility (Foucault, 2007).

The notion of performance links the logics of governmentality to the Border Spectacle. It is, thus, useful to think in terms of the concept of ‘performative politics’, a term which encapsulates the ‘co-constitutive nature of performance and politics’ (Rai, 2015: 1179). Geiger and Pécoud (2010) indicate that migration management is comprised of a range of practices, performed by institutions, moreover, they rely on a set of discourses and narratives on what migration is and how it should be addressed. The notion of ‘performative power’ has been linked to counter-terrorism politics where it is proclaimed that low levels of performative power in this context have a faster neutralising effect on radicalisation than large-scale public efforts (De Graaf & De Graaf, 2010). Jones et. al. (2017) explore the ‘performative politics of immigration control’ exercised in the ‘Go Home' van campaign used in the UK whereby vans emblazoned with the message ‘Go Home or Face Arrest' were implemented to warn ‘illegal' migrants to leave the UK. Jones et. al. interestingly indicate that these vans were as much a display aimed at immigration-sceptics in the UK as to ‘illegal' migrants. This thesis will similarly argue that in the EUTF, this intended audience appears to be the EU member states. This literature on performance thus introduces the notion of an intended audience and enables one to break down the spectacular aspects of Borderwork.

This thesis argues that governmentality in the EUTF is exercised in multiple ways. This includes the ‘migration corridor’ (van Reekum, 2016). The ‘migration corridor' describes the way in which areas are geographically connected to the border through the notion of a
‘corridor’. Both the motivation for and architecture of the Trust Fund are built around the ‘migration corridor’ as the three regional ‘windows’ target different ‘key routes’ into Europe and mark differentiated spaces of ‘source’ and ‘transit’. Another relevant concept in this paper (van Reekum, 2016), the ‘ethical landscape’, is described to be a landscape generated by surveillance images that depict the Mediterranean as a space one is morally obliged to intervene in. This is inherently driven by humanitarian principles. This can be seen in the way in which humanitarian principles are used to justify security policies towards migration (Frowd, 2018), for example, projects which stop people from departing by boat across the Mediterranean as a humanitarian project for reducing deaths at sea. Such humanitarian sensibilities can be linked to the notion of a ‘Spectacle of Compassion’. Humanitarian theorist, Walter Laqueur argues that a new understanding of compassion in the eighteenth century, deriving from newfound ‘enlightenment’ principles, generated a moral imperative for ameliorative action in the form of humanitarianism (1989). This is highly linked to the concept of the ‘morality play’, depicted by Aaltola (2009) as a performance in which morality is enacted and groups of people are categorised according to moral codes. By this, the Border is seen as a space of profiling and rituals of acknowledgment; a space where morality is ultimately performed. This ‘morality play’ feeds into the Spectacle of the Border; politicians simultaneously must demonstrate the strength of the border yet maintain humanitarian ethics in doing so. Walters (2010) explores the way Foucault can be read to inform scholarship on the ‘humanitarian border’ suggesting that state borders have become spaces of humanitarian government. Pallister-Wilkins (2017) discusses ‘humanitarian borderwork’, suggesting that an increase in border-practices which aim to ‘save lives’ is a reaction to the reduction of safe routes which have led to greater danger and violence in border crossings and thus, greater need for humanitarian assistance. In addition, Aaltola (2009) conceptualises ‘Violent Vortexes of Compassion’, magnifying the contesting, yet
synergistic, nature of these phenomena. In sum, compassionate humanitarian principles have become embedded in the contemporary statecraft of borderwork. Compassionate ideals are paradoxically used to justify security practices in the field of border management. It is argued that these can be conceptualised as Spectacles of Security and Compassion. This draws on De Genova’s 2011 paper on ‘Spectacles of Security’ which refers to political responses to terrorism, emphasising the performative nature of these responses. Overall, these governmental techniques can be identified within the EUTF and they contribute to the way in which the Border Spectacle is enacted.

3.3 Development and migration

There has been a growing focus on the links between migration and development within both scholarship and practice. The EUTF is an example of this as it is underpinned by the notion that development can reduce migration. Merotta (2017) proposes that the EU embeds migration into various external policies, including development. It is highlighted that this change has fundamentally occurred since 2015, the time of the ‘migration crisis’. Merotta indicates that Africa has become the ‘privileged continent’ in this approach. This can clearly be seen in the EUTF. Glick Schiller (2009) suggests that issues in discussions of the migration-development nexus fail to look beyond the rubric of the nation state, a worldview known as ‘methodological nationalism’. As the EUTFA works to securitise borders, it thus privileges the security of the nation state. Massey et. al. (1993), in their seminal paper, indicate that migration is far more complex than the simple push-pull impacts often cited and that personal ties and networks play a key role in perpetuating migration. This, therefore, outlines that even if ‘push’ factors were reduced through development, people would still likely move due to personal networks with people in receiving countries. Written in 1993, this is not a recent finding and is widely understood in scholarship and practice, yet, despite
this, the simple linear development-reduces-migration understanding persists. This is possibly due to deep-routed ‘governmental’ desires to control migration.

Bakewell (2008) suggests that despite a burgeoning literature on the links between migration and development, there has been little questioning over the definition of ‘development’ used. He argues that the current definition is sedentary and rooted in its colonial history. Bakewell highlights the colonial history of the control of mobility, whereby European imperial powers imposed forced labour and forced movement across the continent. African space has been rendered and re-rendered by Europe throughout history and migration has formed a fundamental part of this imaginary. The ‘peopling’ of space has played a key part in this understanding. The legibility of populations was essential to colonial control and this was regulated under the paternalistic belief that ‘primitive subjects’ were static. It is implied that some of these ‘static’ understandings remain in current dialogues on migration and development, for example, in the way in which migration is largely cast as a failure of development. Bakewell thus contends that the definition of development must change in order to facilitate the concept of mobility. Bakewell’s paper, therefore, leads to important considerations for the EUTF as projects which aim to reduce migration from rural communities, such as the Migration Response and Resource Mechanism Niger discussed in chapter six, echo these understandings of ‘static’ populations.

More specifically, this research draws on the concept of ‘developmental borderwork’ coined by Frowd (2018). As part of the process of externalisation, development has been rendered part of borderwork and as a result, the European border has been weaved into development projects. Therefore, the border has become somewhat impalpable; it is so dispersed into the EU’s external policies, it is hard to pinpoint what exactly ‘borderwork’ is. Yet crucially, this
is performative. The EUTF doesn’t necessarily expand EU funded development in Africa, as it is composed of reworked European funds, but reformulates this work as an extension of the European border regime. It is performed in order to show an EU response to the ‘migration crisis’. The logic of this fund is, in some ways, to expand the border into something which is multi-layered with each layer acting as a preliminary border in order to preserve the sanctity of the European border. Frowd (2018), in his discussion on the IOM and ‘developmental borderwork’, exhibits the ways the IOM operates on these two rationales. Frowd argues that this is part of a wider phenomenon in which intergovernmental organisations are increasingly carrying out governance over borders and migration. As the EUTF is an intergovernmental pool of funding, Frowd’s argument is of high relevance to this. The EUTF additionally contracts out to multiple IGOs and IOs, including the IOM. Furthermore, Frowd’s argument situates this phenomenon within the context of the migration crisis, as does this study. Overall, this concept is integral to the Border Spectacle the EUTF engages is. Overall, this literature demonstrates that the links between development and migration are not as simple as the linear model often presented; this is essential to understand when reviewing the EUTF.

3.4 Externalisation

The EUTF is fundamentally part of European external migration policy, of which there has been a range of literature on. Following the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, external elements of EU migration policies have flourished. Niemann and Zaun (2018) draw attention to the crisis situation in the European handling of refugees following 2015. They, however, signal that it was not solely the increase in applications for asylum that triggered the crisis, but systematic flaws in the European system that were exposed by the increased flows. They suggest these flaws stem from the fundamental disparity between the supranational EU system and national asylum policies. Additionally, Niemann and Zaun point to the strategic use of non-EU
mechanisms in order to bypass humanitarian responsibilities. This concept is of interest to this thesis, in relation to the use of private actors. Kipp and Koch (2018) focus on the intensification of external EU policies following the 2015 ‘crisis'. They highlight three trends that have developed since 2015: a regional shift from ‘neighborhood' to more distant countries of origin, increased merging of development aid with migration policies, a gradual renationalization of development funding through new funding units that exist outside the community method. Kipp and Koch reference the EUTFA, which is particularly interesting as an example here as it fits within all three of these trends. There has been a strong geographical focus of European external migration policies on the African continent. The Robert Schuman Foundation (2018) refers to the Mediterranean as a ‘dividing line' in migration politics, also exhibiting the prominence of external, preventative policies. He, however, underlines the disparities between EU and AU agendas on migration. He also draws attention to the fact that the EU regularly participates in African Union (AU) activities, but this involvement is not reciprocated with the AU, and other African bodies, having limited involvement with the EUTFA. Bisong (2019) discusses trans-regional institutional cooperation between the EU and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), outlining that through policy and norm diffusion from the hegemon, ECOWAS has not only adopted a similar governmental architecture but has adopted some similar migration policies as well. Wanjiku Kihato (2018) suggests that a focus on ‘containment', influenced by a narrative of crisis and anxiety, has blinded both European and African politicians to implement measures to prevent migration which ignore the long term needs of both continents. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the wider literature on EU external migration policies. Additionally, this literature points to a history of European and African migration relations, yet displays that following 2015 this has increased. The EUTF is a direct example of this.
3.5 Criticisms of the EUTFA

This thesis contributes to existing literature which criticises the Trust Fund. Hauck, Knoll and Herrero Congas (2015) analyse three EUTFs: The EU Trust Fund for Africa, the Madad Trust Fund for Syria and the Bêkou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic (since this was written the EUTF for Columbia has been set up). They note the positive aspects of trust funds remarking that they allow increased flexibility and fast responses as well as increasing EU visibility. They do, however, criticise trust funds for exercising leverage on African countries and underline that trust funds are situated within a larger external action toolbox and that the expectations of what they can achieve are too high. They magnify the fact that the fund responds to a European urgency to stop irregular migration to Europe. Kipp (2018) argues that the EUTFA has moved ‘from exception to rule’. In other words, the fund which has been set up under the understanding it is an emergency body for an exceptional circumstance, is actually part of a wider move by the EU to control, or ‘rule’, African migration. They highlight the fact that despite the internal European response to the migration crisis remaining ambivalent, the external dimension has grown and that even for the skeptical Visegrad states, the external dimension is attractive. Roman (2018), through interviewing employees of civil society organisations on both sides of the Mediterranean, indicates that the critical views being expressed by southern organisations are taken up by northern ones. This ‘reversing the perspective' suggests that norms are being diffused in the opposite direction than the flows normally studied. This displays that civil society organisations are concerned with EU external policies, however, most people still expressed that they saw some merit to these operations. Pace (2016) in a ‘preliminary assessment' of the fund criticised the assumption that development aid to countries would directly impact the lives of would-be migrants. It is here demonstrated that finding is not what is needed, the African continent is saturated with
various funding. Pace also emphasizes the conditionality of the EUTFA, with a major focus being for countries of origin to accept deportations, ultimately suggesting that the overall Valletta objective was to secure compliance. Ultimately, these different criticisms are united in the notion that the EU has set up the EUTFA with the aim of furthering European objectives, namely, reducing the number of irregular African migrants reaching Europe.

There has, more widely, been literature on funding and EU migration policies. Den Hertog (2016) attempts to map the funding streams for such policies and in doing so, exhibits the incredibly complex, and sometimes overlapping, nature of these funds. He stresses the incoherent nature of this field, expressing concern that policy is at risk of being ran by ‘emergency' rather than long-term policy goals. Kervyn and Shilhav (2017) analyse all the projects under the EUTFA, focusing on the flows of funding and which areas receive the highest amounts of funding. They warn that the fund has insufficient checks to ensure that European interests don't take precedence over those the fund is intended to support. Following this concern, they show that the majority of the funding is channelled into discouraging irregular migration and that many of the projects identify their beneficiaries based on their migration status. Kervyn and Shilhav also outline their concerns with the transparency of the fund. They also highlight the flawed ‘root causes' narrative which fails to note that migration is a human experience, different from forced displacement. Funding from the EUTFA goes to some private companies that implement a variety of services. There has been literature, more generally, on funding to private companies, in particular to private security firms. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2015) terms the involvement of such firms in migration as the ‘migration control industry’. Gammeltoft-Hansen suggests that by outsourcing to private companies, states can absolve their responsibility. In addition, as private companies are seen to operate in the apolitical market, private companies can be used as a depoliticizing
tool. This thesis, therefore, aims to contribute to this literature, investigating why different actors are chosen in each stage: state, private or intergovernmental and what impacts these have.

This thesis largely agrees with the account given by Knoll and Sherriff (2017): ‘to a large extent the framing of the EU Trust Fund as being about migration has served political purposes rather than influencing the focus very strongly thematically' (p237). They suggest that thematic activities, such as resilience, basic services, economic development and governance are now labelled and communicated under the umbrella of addressing root causes of irregular migration and displacement. This means that in practice, these activities do not necessarily become more migration-led and act as development projects but simply by being part of the EUTF they enact the Border Spectacle. On the other hand, the EUTF has allowed an increase in more concrete security project and return-schemes as well as agreements which prevent people from crossing the Mediterranean in safer ways, thus, have to result to more dangerous means so it shouldn't be viewed as something simply performative but also real.

3.6 Research aims

This research draws its understandings from pre-existing literature, yet, it adds something new. It develops the concept of the Border Spectacle to encompass development projects which have been co-opted into European Borderwork. While there is literature on Border Spectacles at crossing-points (De Genova, 2009) and in physical symbols, such as the ‘Get Out’ vans (Jones et. al., 2017), the notion of Spectacle has not been applied to migration and development, or migration funding. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that trust funds could become a new key player in migration politics and therefore, analysis of the EUTF is of great importance.
4. Methodology

4.1 Case selection.

The thesis draws on the case of the EUTF in order to develop the concept of the Border Spectacle. This case if of particular relevance because trust funds are a new mechanism used by the EUTF and the wide-scope of this fund makes it of key importance. Within the thesis, there are several more in-depth case studies on The Migrant Response and Resource Mechanism (MRRM) Niger, EUTF funding in South Sudan and the West African Police Information System (WAPIS). These cases were developed as close analysis and investigation of individual funding streams and projects allowed this research to illuminate the mechanisms by which the EUTF has been put together.

4.2 Data collection

This research is based on a desk-based policy analysis of the EUTF. This relies on an analysis of the organisation’s policy documents, press releases and information available through the website, in addition to careful reading of investigative reports and secondary literature. Furthermore, technical phone conversations with three EU officials aided the authors technical understanding of the fund. A desk-based policy analysis was feasible due to
the large number of documents pertaining to the EUTF which are publically available. These include: the EUTF website (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en) in addition to the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu) and European Parliament (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en) websites. In addition to this, it is possible to find documents on the websites of implementing partners, such as the IOM, on their projects which are funded by the EUTF. Therefore, a great deal of information is stored in these documents. Due to the wide availability of open information, these sources available were, therefore, able to provide broad coverage on the EUTF; they provide information on a broad range of projects as well as covering a range of opinions. Additionally, using documents allows one to track changes in projects and ideas (Bowen, 2009). Furthermore, as Bowen (2009) notes, document analysis is of particular relevance to case studies. As the case in question, the EUTF, is bureaucratic, a document analysis is of particular relevance as it allows one to gain insight into the internal mechanisms and logics of the Fund.

This analysis involved an iterative process combining both content and thematic analysis. Initially, themes were identified in the documents. This was achieved by a broad ‘skimming’ of many documents, as well as the EUTF website, and watching a European Parliament debate on the topic (European Parliament, 2019) in order to identify recurring and pertinent themes (Bowen, 2009). Therefore, a wide range of documents was initially consulted with the aim of completeness. Following this, a close content analysis of relevant and meaningful passages of text was undertaken by returning to particular appropriate sources. An example of this is the analysis of the ‘root causes' discourse in the first chapter. Documents from different organisation pertaining to the same policies, such as the Health Pooled Fund addressed in chapter seven, allowed differing representations to be cross-examined. A table of primary sources used can be found in Appendix A. Many of the documents which were
analysed were selective in that they largely only provided positive information relating to the trust fund; especially in official reports and their purpose is to exhibit the positive results of the fund. In order to assess differing opinions, secondary sources were consulted including reports from auditors and civil society organisations (Appendix B). These generally had more critical insights. A limitation of this analysis has been that not all voices are represented by these documents, such as the African Union, individual European and African states and migrants themselves. These other voices were beyond the scope of this research, however, they remain important avenues for future research. Ultimately, this study aimed to focus on the EU’s role in constructing the EUTF as a Border Spectacle, therefore, an analysis of EU documents was the most appropriate source as it was the EU voice this research sought to analyse. Therefore, a desk-based policy analysis was the most suitable method to address the research questions.

4.3 Analysis summary

The analysis is made up of four chapters. The first assesses the EUTF as a Border Spectacle from a broad perspective. The second chapter investigates the geographical extension of the European border the EUTF creates by rendering the African continent as a ‘migration corridor’ to Europe. The third chapter focusses on the ‘reworking’ of European funds under the EUTF, delineating projects as migration-led, when they were not originally viewed as such. The final chapter assesses two somewhat contradictory logics of the fund, those of care and control, through the concepts: Spectacles of Compassion and Security. The Border Spectacle acts as the central conceptual pivot of the analysis.
5. The Border Spectacle

The spectacle is not a collection of images, rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images


5.1 Introduction

The ‘Border Spectacle’, coined by De Genova (2002), captures the performativity enacted by Borderwork. This chapter will assess the way the EUTF acts as a ‘spectacle’ in the EU policymaking arena, in response to the first research question. By analysing the language used in the European Commission (EC) press reports and meetings, it is possible to see how the EUTF is reported in EU policy circles. This, ultimately, enables one to unravel the motivations behind setting up the fund. It argues that the EUTF acts as a mechanism for the EU to display its coherent and timely response to the ‘Mediterranean crisis’; this can be identified in these examples. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘root causes’ is interrogated, in particular, its use in the EUTF 2018 Annual Report (EUTF, 2019b). Through this, one is able to illuminate the manner in which statecraft is enacted (van Reekum & Schinkel, 2017). In the prefixing quote of this chapter, Guy Debord describes the spectacle as a relationship ‘mediated’ by images (1994). In the case of the EUTF, the image presented is also not simply
a ‘collection of images’ but a relationship between migrants and states that is mediated by power.

5.2 The EU's response to the crisis: the EUTF in EU reporting

It seems logical to begin the analysis by addressing EU reporting of the EUTF. Here, four examples of EUTF reporting are analysed. The first is a Press Release from the European Commission on the 9th of September 2015. It lists seven EU responses to the migration crisis, which interestingly includes the EUTF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Concrete measures’ by the EU to respond to the ‘current refugee crisis’ and ‘to prepare for future challenges’</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. An emergency relocation proposal for 120,000 refugees from Greece, Hungary and Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A Permanent Relocation Mechanism for all Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A common European list of Safe Countries of Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Making return policy more effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Communication on Public Procurement rules for Refugee Support Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Addressing the external dimension of the refugee crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. A Trust Fund for Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Source: Authors own. Adapted from: (European Commission, 2015) - Press Release: Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action

This emphasises that the fund was set up as an instrument to address the refugee crisis. These seven ‘concrete methods’ collectively form the European border mechanism and thus, the European Border Spectacle. The EU has to project an image to member states that it is taking action on the migration crisis; this press release is an example of that. It is interesting that this press release (9 September 2015) preceded the Valletta Summit (11-12 November 2015) which is regarded as the event which led to the formation of the EUTF (Kipp, 2018). This displays that the Trust Fund had been ‘thought up’ before the meeting between European and African governments, therefore, it was clearly a European idea. Saliently, as this press release preceded Valletta, it can give us insight into the motivations behind the genesis of the EUTF. As one of the first mentions of the EUTF, it appears to not have received its full title yet,
simply being called ‘A Trust Fund for Africa’. This adds to the argument that the EUTF was set up to form part of the EU’s Border Spectacle, as it here represented simply as another migration crisis ‘measure’ to add to the list. Moreover, it is possible to split these seven measures into the twofold internal/external response by Europe to the migration ‘crisis’ (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). The first, second and fifth measures can be classified as internal, the other five as external.

Secondly in a EC press release, when referring to the first pillar of the European Agenda on Migration: ‘Tackling the drivers of irregular migration’ it states that “over the past 4 years, migration has become firmly embedded in all areas of the EU’s external relations” (European Commission, 2019). This statement is interesting as it illustrates that migration is seen as a forefront-EU issue as the EU is proud to express the widely embedded nature of migration policy. This, additionally, reflects an ‘expanding definition of migration issues’ (Frowd, 2018: p1657) as migration policy, or arguably Borderwork, is absorbed by other policy arenas. This is evident in the EUTF where development and migration have been thrust together. The EUTF is mentioned: “Through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, over 5.3 million vulnerable people currently benefit from basic support and over 60,000 people have received reintegration support after returning to their countries of origin” (European Commission, 2019). This ‘weave of discourse and representation’ (De Genova, 2013: p1181) arguably displays that the EU wants to project a comprehensive image of the Border Spectacle.

Thirdly, at the 3622nd EU Council meeting on the 4th and 5th of June 2018 (Fig. 1) ministers discussed four external initiatives: 1) the EU-Turkey statement, 2) increased support to EU agencies Frontex, Europol and EASO, 3) supporting partners in the Western Balkans to ‘stem
flows’ in the region and 4) ‘ensuring sufficient and timely funding to the EU Trust Fund for Africa, to keep up EU efforts on the Central and Western Mediterranean routes’ (European Council, 2018). This statement on the EUTF illustrates that the fund is viewed as a mechanism to reduce migration along the Central and Western Mediterranean routes, namely, through Italy and Spain. This notion of the corridor will be explored in the following chapter but here it is evident that this notion of ‘routes’ and ‘corridor’ underpin the logic of the fund.

As the ‘lunch meeting’ is said to have discussed migration issues on ‘all three Mediterranean routes’ action in the Western Balkans and in Turkey is, from this perspective, tackling the Eastern route. In addition to this, progress is purely cited in terms of the reduction of irregular migrant crossings, ‘44% in comparison to 2017’. This evidently does not include the wider goals of the development projects which are funded by the EUTF, reducing the fund to a measure designed to ‘protect the external borders’. The fact that the EUTF is listed among the other three projects emphasises that the EUTF is viewed as part of the EU’s external migration efforts. This can, therefore, be seen to echo van Reekum’s (2016) argument that through the rhetoric of crisis, the Mediterranean has been rendered a Border Spectacle. This press release can thus be viewed as part of the performance of migration control, and thus forms part of the EU Border Spectacle.

Figure 1. Source: Taken from the Outcome of 3622nd EU Council meeting. (European Council, 2018)
The idea that the EUTF has been set up to tackle specific ‘migration routes’ is reiterated in the final example. In a European Commission Press Release entitled: ‘Western Mediterranean Route: EU reinforces support to Morocco’ the EUTF is mentioned for its support to the Moroccan border:

“A programme to support border management in the Maghreb region under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was adopted in July 2018. Morocco will benefit from €30 million out of this total budget, which helps Moroccan border agencies and related bodies to protect vulnerable migrants, address irregular migration, and dismantle cross-border criminal networks. The programme is already being rolled out in close cooperation with the Moroccan authorities”.

(European Commission, 2018).

This press release, therefore, reports the EUTF as a mechanism to increase the security of third country borders. As the EUTF is reported in the context of a press release solely on the ‘Western Mediterranean Route’, this indicates that the funding of such projects is seen in the wider context of stemming migration along this route. This securitised discourse is imbued with humanitarian sentiments of care and compassion to ‘protect vulnerable migrants’. Most importantly, this displays that in the EU policy arena, the EUTF is presented as a mechanism that specifically tackles the migration crisis.

5.3 Root causes narrative

Analysing the ‘root causes’ narrative is central to understanding the EUTF as a Border Spectacle. It is this idea which allows the seemingly vast projects of the EUTF to be grouped under one umbrella. ‘Root causes’ has become a phrase so readily used in migration that it must be broken down and denaturalised. It is, thus, important to contextualize this phrase. In a discussion on discusses the use of ‘root causes’ within human rights work, Marks (2011) discusses this genealogy. The earliest usage of this phrase is cited by the Oxford English
Dictionary as a passage in The Healing of Nations and the Hidden Sources of their Strife in which it is suggested there is a need to ‘get at the root causes of this war’ (Marks, 2011). Additionally, ‘root-cause analysis’ has become a method in business administration. Marks outlines that the ‘root causes’ narrative arose with the ‘explanational’ turn in human rights, which moved beyond simply documenting abuses. This notion is concordant with the idea that migration services have become increasingly professionalised, with technical logics depoliticising them (Frowd, 2018). The idea of cause and effect in migration should be treated with caution. It is important to understand the underlying reasons for migration, however, they are incredibly complex so one must avoid being deterministic. Ultimately, it is the broadness of the term ‘root causes’ that allows the EU to insert borderwork into a vast array of European interventions, most importantly, within development.

The EUTF operates around four ‘strategic axes' which act as the focal point around which projects are chosen. These axes, therefore, operate as the focus points for tackling ‘root causes'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic axes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater economic and employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening resilience of communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved migration management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved governance and conflict prevention</td>
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</table>

Table 2. Source: Authors own. Adapted from: 2018 Annual Report (EUTF, 2019b).

Out of these four ‘strategic axes’, ‘improved migration management’ is the only one with a direct link to migration. The other three cover an incredibly broad spectrum. It could be possible to argue that a vast array of projects could fit within these categories, therefore, would be permissible under the EUTF.

In addition to these axes, in 2018, six ‘priority areas’ were chosen.
### 2018 Priority areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return and reintegration</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugees management (Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-trafficking measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential stabilisation efforts in the Horn of Africa (in particular in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia) and in the Sahel/Lake Chad region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions supporting migration dialogues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Source: Authors own. Adapted from: 2018 Annual Report (EUTF, 2019b).

It is interesting here that the six ‘priority areas’ have more direct links to migration; ‘essential stabilisation efforts’ is the only one which doesn’t. This focus has less emphasis on ‘root causes’, instead focusing on the mechanic of managing migration. These areas have more linkage with traditional understandings of ‘border regimes’. It is possible, therefore, to suggest that despite the EUTF funding a broad range of projects, the ‘priority’ is projects which directly impact migration, as opposed to the broad range of development projects.

Throughout the report, the term ‘root causes' is only mentioned five times. In each of these mentions, the term is not explained but appears as a recurring soundbite.

### Mentions of ‘root causes’ in the 2018 Annual Report

It continued to tackle the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, including the fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants and the return and reintegration of migrants to their countries of origin by promoting development and security. (p4)

In line with the EU’s comprehensive approach towards migration and forced displacement, the EUTF for Africa contributes to better migration management and helps to tackle the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal opportunities, security and development. (p7)

It has continued pursuing a balanced approach supporting the multiple aspects of migration, with a focus on areas of mutual interest such as addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, the fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants and the return and reintegration of migrants to their countries of origin. (p11)

It continued to address the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration, by promoting development and security. (p11)

On December 4, 2018, the European Commission adopted a Communication “Managing Migration in all its aspects: progress under the European Agenda for Migration” reiterating that long-term partnerships with third countries are essential to facilitate return and reintegration, to assist refugees and stranded migrants, to fight against human trafficking networks, and to address the root causes of irregular migration. (p12)

Table 4. Source: Authors own, emphasis added. Adapted from: 2018 Annual Report (EUTF, 2019b).
The term is repeated over again in a slight reworking of the same words and phrases; three times the full ‘root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration’ is used, with the other two mentions being shortened versions of this phrasing. In no part of the document is there an interrogation of what these root causes could be, or a scientific investigation into these. Therefore, here it seems that ‘root causes’, the very phrase which allows the fund to exist and is the fundamental guiding idea, is not appreciated or understood fully, it simply acts as a discursive link. Development projects, which formerly were not seen as migration projects have become migration projects, united under the ‘root causes’ logics of the EUTF. This is examined fully in chapter seven. Ultimately the term ‘root causes’ is a fundamental facet of the enlarged Border Spectacle. By repeating the phrase, the EU is able to project a response to the ‘migration crisis’ by citing that a vast array of projects, some which existed before, are tackling the ‘root causes’ of the problem.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the way in which the EUTF is reported in EC press releases and meetings. It has displayed that the Trust Fund is firmly placed as one of several measures formed in response to the Mediterranean Crisis and is rendered a mechanism for ‘tackling’ the main migration routes from Africa to Europe. The EUTF thus acts as a way of the EU displaying its might against the crisis. The term ‘root causes' is interrogated and it is found that the term seems to be simply repeated over without qualification or interrogation into what this really means. The notion of root causes is therefore understood as a vector of the Border Spectacle; it is the discourse and representation spoken of by De Genova (2013). It can, therefore, be argued that these examples display that the EUTF is part of a performance of migration control (Casas-Cortes et. a., 2015) and thus forms the Border Spectacle.
6. Geographical extension of the border through the ‘migration corridor’

The single word “border” conceals a multiplicity and implies a constancy where
genealogical investigation uncovers mutation and descent.

(Walters, 2010: 138).

6.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the physical extension of the European border into the African continent as a key facet of the Border Spectacle. It argues that this has been achieved by rendering African space as part of a ‘migration corridor’ (van Reekum, 2016) to Europe. The migration corridor is an image which has caused fear across Europe; displayed by the popular idiom of a ‘tide’ of migrants (De Haas, 2007). The EUTF is fundamentally an answer to this fear. In addition, this chapter explores the notion that the architecture of the fund reflects this ‘corridor’ understanding. It investigates the extent to which the organisation of the three
regional windows categorise states into spaces of ‘source’ and ‘transit’ and the degree to which these windows mimic the migration routes to Europe; the ‘Western’, ‘Central’ and ‘Eastern’ routes. The EUTF is part of a trend within European ‘externalised’ policy which increases Europe’s control over migration in areas outside of Europe (Kipp & Koch, 2018). Wanjiku Kihato (2018) has described these external migration policies in Africa as part of a ‘containment compact’ which restricts African mobility. This chapter will investigate how this is achieved through the migration corridor.

6.2 The migration corridor and sedentary understandings

In the prefixing quote of this chapter (Walters, 2010) depicts the way in which border politics has a façade of ‘constancy’ which somewhat naturalises and technicalises the border. It is possible to trace the political genealogy of border politics to a complex history which reveals that borders are not a priori, but politically constructed (Jeffrey, 2015). This notion of genealogical construction can be applied to the way in which African space has been rendered and re-rendered by Europe throughout history: ‘Africa exists only as an absent object, an absence that those who try to decipher it only accentuate’ (Mbembe, 2001: p241). Mbembe here suggests that ‘Africa’ is conceptualised through absence. Therefore, in the context of the migration corridor, ‘Africa’ is erased as it is denoted as a transversal space in relation to Europe. This renders African issues as European ones. Migration has formed a fundamental part of this imaginary as has the ‘peopling’ and ‘unpeopling’ of space. This will be explored in the examples throughout this chapter.

6.3 Funding the ‘migration corridor’
The EUTF is split into three regional windows: The North of Africa, Horn of Africa and The Sahel and Lake Chad. Each of these regions is arguably rendered in terms of the role it plays in the ‘migration corridor’ (van Reekum, 2016) to Europe. The North of Africa is primarily seen as a space of transit, with all funding for this region directed to improving migration management (fig. 2). The Sahel and Lake Chad appears to be seen as an area with complex immigration channels. Here, funding is directed to improving governance and conflict prevention, strengthening resilience, increasing economic and employment opportunities and improving migration management, all to significant levels (fig. 3). The Horn of Africa is principally seen as a ‘pool’ of economic migrants, with 57% of funding directed to improving economic and employment opportunities, followed by improving governance and conflict prevention at 19% and strengthening resilience at 12.4% (fig. 4). This arguably contributes to the Border Spectacle due to the way it renders each region as a function of the border. By delineating spaces as ‘transit’ and ‘source’ this depicts them as part of the border process, and therefore, as having different roles within the ‘migration corridor’. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that this constructs African space as part of the extended European border.

The North of Africa

![Figure 2. Source: EUTF, 2019c](image)

The Sahel and Lake Chad
Interestingly, the EUTF originally was planned to be a trust fund solely for the Sahel and Lake Chad region but after demand arose, in connection with the European Agenda on Migration, the fund was expanded (Kipp, 2018). It is, therefore, telling that this region receives the most funding (fig. 3). It is possible that the objectives of the fund have been diluted by its widening. The EUTF is now an ‘emergency’ trust fund, built around the notion of ‘root causes’, whereas if the fund had remained simply a regional one, the projects funded in the region may have been very different. The could have been less migration-focussed and instead more focussed on the Lake Chad Basin crisis.

The rubric which binds a trust fund together, in this case, root causes, matters because it becomes inbuilt into which projects are funded and which indicators are to be used. Due to this, the EUTF, uses migration-related criteria (Table 5) in allocating the funds (Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017). This can be seen in Action Fiche documents published by the fund, which detail the plans for new projects to be funded. This achieves two things: it continues the notion of the ‘migration corridor’ and secondly, it explicitly renders projects in terms of their
migration significance, thus, rather than seeing an economic development project as simply economic, we are made to see it as part of the wider mechanism of migration control. These projects then become a part of the Border Spectacle.

The ‘migration corridor’ additionally fits within the understanding of three migration routes: the Western, Central and Eastern routes. The EUTF design mirrors European rhetoric on the migration routes. The three routes can be seen on the IOM map below detailing arrivals and deaths from people travelling by sea across the Mediterranean, documented in: Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus. It could be possible that the three ‘windows’ of the fund correspond to these routes. Migrants from the Horn of Africa are more likely to take routes through the Eastern and Central routes, whereas migrants from The Sahel and Lake Chad are more likely to go through the Western and Central routes. Below is an example of a project which illustrates this.

6.4 The Response and Resource Mechanism for Migrants: Niger

The “Response and Resource Mechanism for Migrants” (MRRM) operating in Niger aims to “support Niger’s response to the complex migratory flows that cross its territory, notably by promoting economic and social development through circular migration” (EUTF, 2015). The project is a ‘joint initiative’ between the IOM and the EU, funded by the EUTF. In the Action Fiche,

![Figure 5: ‘Migration flows Europe: arrivals and fatalities’](image)


![Figure 6. West and Central Africa Areas of High Emigration and Migratory Corridors. Source: (EUTF, 2015b).](image)
it is explained that the ‘route’ is at the ‘heart\(^1\)’ of the MRRM strategy (p.9). Moreover, in this document (EUTF, 2015) Niger is described as “one of the pivotal countries on migratory routes of sub-Saharan Africa to the European Union and in particular to Italy\(^2\)”\footnote{“Ce résultat est au coeur de la stratégie MRRM” (EUTF, 2015b: p.9). Translation by: DocTranslator. Available at: https://www.onlinedoctranslator.com/en/}. This quote iterates the centrality of migratory routes to the project, and of Niger as a space of transit. This is further illustrated by the map used in the Action Fiche (Fig 6). Significantly, the arrows are labelled ‘Migratory Corridors’, visually depicting this trend in European thought.

More specifically: “The objectives of the programme are to provide direct assistance to migrants in transit centres and along migratory routes, and to support the sustainable and effective socioeconomic reintegration of migrants in their countries of origin” (IOM, 2017). To simplify, the objectives appear to be fourfold: 1) assisting home and supporting voluntary returns, 2) improving economic opportunities in Niger, specifically Agadez, to reduce the reliance on the Smuggling economy, 3) improve conditions in ‘source’ regions to discourage initial migration 4) encouraging circular migration from and to West Africa and Niger, as opposed to permanent settlement or journeys onward to North Africa and Europe. It is clear that assisting voluntary returns is a key element of this project. As Niger is part of ECOWAS, the majority of the migrants have free movement to enter Niger, therefore, ‘voluntary return’ is the only option for return.

During the current phase (two) the IOM aims to improve the structure of the Niger National Agency against Trafficking in Persons and Illicit Trafficking of Migrants and assist the establishment of a referral system for cases of trafficking and smuggling. In addition, the
project is involved in mapping key points of departure and transit of migrants in an ‘inventory’ from other West African Countries. These initiatives aim to map the migrant population in Niger, a complex task as it is a route for irregular migration. This could be viewed as the EU aiming to create a legible population. This can be seen as a facet of statecraft as the management of populations is a key element of state control over territory (Foucault, 2007). From this Foucauldian perspective, the EU is managing population in another territory, thus, is exercising statecraft in another state. By mapping key points of departure, ‘villages of origin’ in Nigeria are identified and assessed for their: available services, accessibility and present infrastructures. These “Village Assessment Surveys (VAS)” have been used by the IOM in South Sudan (EUTF, 2015b). It could be argued that these projects echo colonial understandings of sedentary rural populations (Bakewell, 2008) as the agency of individuals desiring to migrate is overlooked and instead a paternal attempt to stymie migration is enacted.

Another project funded by the MRRM is the ‘Awareness Raising Caravan’. Its name is ‘In da na sa’ni' in Hausa which translates to ‘If only I had known' (IOM, 2019). The naming of the caravan is embedded with preexisting assumptions and imparts a feeling of regret. The caravan travelled for one month in April 2019 on a 2 300km journey, stopping in areas with high migrant populations in order to raise awareness on the risks associated with irregular migration and its alternatives (IOM, 2019). The logic of the project operates around the idea that people will not take these journeys once they know the risks involved. The risks are incredibly high, but they continue to get worse as well-travelled routes become policed, people are forced into more dangerous ones. Europe allows this to flourish. It is true that people are not fully aware of the risks involved in these journeys, however, funding one ‘awareness' caravan seems tokenistic, rather than addressing the larger problem. The
‘Awareness Raising Caravan’ thus typifies the errant understandings of ‘corridor’ and ‘route’, yet paradoxically, it embodies movement whilst aiming to quash it.

Overall, it can be argued that the MRRM embodies the logic of the ‘migration corridor’. Firstly, the geographical coverage of the project is not solely within Niger, but operates along the ‘migration corridor’ that links Niger to West Africa and Europe. In addition, the project aims to map out and make legible a ‘messy’ and complex phenomenon, rendering intangible populations legible. It also aims to prevent initial migration by improving public services at the village level. Furthermore, the project aims to encourage ‘circular migration’.

6.5 Conclusion

In sum, it seems that these three geographical ‘windows’ were selected in response to the three Mediterranean routes as well as being categorised in terms of being ‘source’ or ‘transit’. This is displayed by the differing projects funded in the different regional ‘windows’. The MRRM Niger displays how the ‘migration corridor’ is embedded into a single project. It exemplifies how understandings of the ‘migration corridor’ are derived from sedentary assumptions of populations. In addition, the ‘Awareness Raising Caravan’ exemplifies these paradoxical logics of movement and sedentarism. Therefore, these findings contribute to the second research question as the formulation of the ‘migration corridor’ facilitates the Border Spectacle.
7. Re-framed funding

The frame offers a way of understanding world politics as a form of specific politico-cultural performance.

(Aaltola, 2009: p69)

7.1 Introduction

This chapter suggests that the EUTF is made up of funding that has been ‘reworked’ from other EU funds in order to create the EUTF. It argues that by doing this, the EUTF has expanded the European border project as it delineates development projects, which before were not seen as ‘migration’ projects, as part of the border regime. This extends the control of the border beyond security measures, into development projects. In response to the second
Due to this ‘reworking’ of funding, a ‘spectacle’ is constructed as the EUTF is not necessarily developing new projects, but moving them under the ‘root causes’ umbrella. It is thus important to ask: why has the EU reworked this funding? From an EU policy perspective, as the EUTF is classified as an ‘emergency’ trust fund, money channelled through it can be disbursed faster than the normally slow and bureaucratic EU pace (European Parliament, 2019). This chapter, however, argues that the effects of this are far greater. By transferring development projects into the EUTF, the same projects take on whole new meanings. They become tied to EUTF indicators, furthermore, they become fundamentally categorised as tackling the ‘root causes’ or irregular migration. Consequently, when the EU reports on migration-crisis measures, it is possible to reference a larger number of EU actions taken and larger amounts of money being spent. Therefore, the funding is not simply ‘reworked’ but re-framed. This re-framing is first discussed in relation to the EUTF more broadly before looking specifically at the funding of projects in South Sudan.

7.2 The ‘framing’ of funds

In total, the EU made EUR 6.2 billion available to address the ‘refugee crisis’ externally in 2015 and 2016 (Knoll & Sherriff, 2017). From the fund’s inception in 2015 until December 2018, the EUTF was made up of €4.2 billion (yet only €3.6 billion approved actions) which included €489.5 million from EU member states and other donors (Norway and Switzerland) and €3.7 billion from the EDF and EU financial instruments (EUTF, 2019b). A large amount of EUTF funds are from EU funding earmarked for Official Development Assistance (ODA). Knoll and Sherriff (2017) discuss the wider trend within Europe to use Official Development Assistance funds to address the ‘root causes’ of migration. They use the EUTF as one of their case studies. Therefore, although this thesis specifically focusses on the EUTF, it is important
to remember that it is set within an environment of an increasingly developmental focus in European migration funding. Additionally, because the EUTF has drawn on a large amount of money from the 11th reserves of the European Development Fund, this indicates that there is an underlying assumption that in the current financial framework, there will be no other crisis. On the other hand, as the largest amount of the EUTF is drawn from reserves, it is difficult to say what the reserves would have been used for otherwise (Knoll & Sherriff, 2017). Moreover, it is important to consider how re-framed funding can alter the use of funds from their original intentions. CONCORD (2018) display that the main aim of the EUTF, to ‘tackle the root causes of irregular migration and displacement’, is very different from the main goal of EU development cooperation (formed in the Lisbon Treaty); to reduce and in the long term, eradicate poverty. All EU ODA should, in theory, uphold this goal. CONCORD, however, recognise that some EUTF goals are in line with traditional EU development such as employment and education, yet, the key difference is that under the EUTF, it is assumed that these actions will reduce irregular migration, an assumption CONCORD sees as flawed. CONCORD (2018) also questions whether such actions uphold principles of aid effectiveness due to the ways the funding is used for European political aims; reducing migration. Therefore, by recasting development projects and migration related projects, this can alter the use of funds from their original intent.

It has been remarked that a lot of EUTF funding is made up of ‘reworked’ funding from other parts of the EU budget (Knoll & Sherriff, 2017). This was discussed in the European Parliament Committee on Development and Committee on Budgets Joint Meeting (European Parliament, 2019). Emma Collet, then the Director of Migration Policy Institute Europe, described a period of ‘innovation’ and ‘experimentation’ in EU funding, catalysed by the migration crisis whereby funding has been drawn and diverted, including from emergency
and contingency funds. She likens this to a ‘washing machine’ whereby the same pieces of money are used again, and questions how many people in EU institution know how the funds fit together (European Parliament, 2019). In relation to the EUTF, she also expresses frustration with the term ‘root causes’ stating that “All development funding could be held under the rubric of root causes” (16:18:48). Furthermore, Collet highlights tensions within the funds owing to rules that restrict spending on EU external assistance funding, as 90% must qualify as Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). As recent funds have been based on a broad range of goals including the security sector, and in the case of the EUTF, migration, this diverts from primary EU objectives, and this the funds have to be rectified with ODA. This commentary from the EP meeting illustrates the fundamental facet of this argument; that EUTF funding is made up of a so-called ‘washing machine’ of funding and that by strategising the fund around ‘root causes’, this alters channels of EU funding from their original intentions.

In the 2018 Annual Report (EUTF, 2018) it is possible to see the total amounts of funding pledged and received from the EDF and EU budgets (since 2015):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUTF for Africa contributions from the EDF and EU budget (Excluding member states and other donor contributions):</th>
<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve of the 11th EDF:</td>
<td>2 043 500 000</td>
<td>147 013 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th EDF:</td>
<td>440 000 000</td>
<td>290 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific regional funds in EDF:</td>
<td>294 533 858</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG NEAR:</td>
<td>253 233 626</td>
<td>25 500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO:</td>
<td>50 000 000</td>
<td>20 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG HOME:</td>
<td>100 000 000</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Special Measure:</td>
<td>100 000 000</td>
<td>100 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI Migration:</td>
<td>259 500 000</td>
<td>50 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI DEVCO B- Migration:</td>
<td>25 000 000</td>
<td>25 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI PANAF:</td>
<td>25 000 000</td>
<td>25 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI Food:</td>
<td>43 000 000</td>
<td>43 000 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table (7) displays the different EU funds which make up the EUTF. Funding is drawn from many areas of the EU budget. This is displayed by the streams of funding from different Directorate General’s (DG): The DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), The DG for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), The DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO). These three DGs represent the different policy areas united under the ‘root causes’ umbrella: external neighbourhood relations, migration and humanitarian aid. This elucidates how the EUTF is envisioned politically. The EUTF also receives funding from a range of Development Cooperation Instruments (DCI): Migration, Pan-Africa, Food and International Cooperation and Development (Migration). These, additionally, give insight into how the EUTF is understood. As we have seen, the EUTF is seen as a migration and development project, but also specifically a Pan-African project. Interestingly, ‘Food and International Cooperation’ has not been a key feature of the EUTF imaginary, but food projects are funded and can be seen as part of the widening of traditional development into migration matters. The next section will investigate EUTF engagement in South Sudan and will interrogate the use of funds from the Special Support Programme for the South Sudan Development Plan.

### 7.3 EUTF engagement in South Sudan

Through close analysis of EUTF engagement in South Sudan, it is possible to see how pre-existing projects have been continued under the EUTF and how pre-existing funds have been subsumed. However, first we must understand EUTF funding in South Sudan as part of wider EU engagement in the country since it’s independence in 2011. In 2011-2013 the EU

| Special Support Programme for the South Sudan Development Plan: | 86 400 000 | 86 400 000 |

Table 7. Source: Authors own. Adapted from: (EUTF, 2019b).
implemented a “Single Country Strategy (Response Strategy) for South Sudan: Aligned with and in support of South Sudan’s 2011-2013 Development Plan” (DG DEVCO, 2011a; DG DEVCO, 2011b). This was the main mechanism for EU developmental assistance in the country. Now, according to the European Commission webpage on South Sudan, the EUTF is now the ‘main vehicle’ of EU development assistance in South Sudan (European Commission, 2019).

The EU developmental assistance in South Sudan focuses on agriculture and food security (to enhance the productivity of small farmers, strengthen markets and value chains, and construct rural roads), basic services delivery (primarily health and education), justice and reconciliation, and on public financial management to improve local governance, transparency and accountability. The main vehicle of such assistance is the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).

(European Commission, 2019)

This passage indicates that the EUTF has taken on the role of the EU’s main funding body for the country. This is particularly interesting as the EUTF was set up as an ‘emergency’ fund in response to the migration crisis, yet in reality, its use in South Sudan appears to be the latest of a series of funding instruments for the region. This means it has become absorbed by long-term EU development architecture in South Sudan, rather than the ‘emergency’ mechanism it was set out to be. It will now be argued that EUTF intervention in South Sudan is predominantly composed of ‘re-framed’ projects which have been subsumed under the ‘root-causes’ narrative by virtue of receiving funding from the EUTF, because as the ‘main’ mechanism for EU development in South Sudan, funding is being channelled through it. However, it will be argued that, in practice, this does not necessarily make the projects more migration-led. For example, in this passage on the EC webpage on South Sudan, ‘migration’ is not mentioned (European Commission, 2019).
Table 8. Projects in South Sudan currently funded by the EUTF.

Source: Authors own, adapted from (EUTF, 2019f).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUTF projects in South Sudan</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building Sustainable Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to stabilisation through improved resource, economic and financial management in South Sudan</td>
<td>3 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPACT South Sudan: improve primary education</td>
<td>31 961 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in Emergency Programme in Four Former States in South Sudan</td>
<td>22 439 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan Rural Development: Strengthening Smallholders’ Resilience - SORUDEV SSR</td>
<td>15 000 000 (originally 7 000 000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Cooperation Facility for South Sudan 2018-2020: contribute to an efficient and effective use of the development funds the EU implements in South Sudan</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Livelihoods Resilience of Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Communities in South Sudan’s cross-border areas with Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda</td>
<td>28 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Pooled Fund 2 - South Sudan</td>
<td>20 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>101 700 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4 Health Pooled Fund (HPF)

The ‘Health Pooled Fund 2’ is the second in a series of pooled funds between the EU, Department for International Development (DFID) UK (lead donor), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (EUTF, 2015a). The first ran from 2012-2016 and the second 2016-2018. This project is, therefore, not new but a continuation of a series of projects (Integrity 2018; EUTF, 2015a). The project aims to “establish an effective public health system that will deliver improved access to quality health services in South Sudan and respond to emergency needs where required, with a specific
focus on reducing maternal and child mortality” (Integrity, 2018). In the *Evaluation of the South Sudan Health Pooled Fund* (Integrity, 2018) the terms ‘migration’ and ‘root causes’ were absent and ‘refugees’ were only referred to once in the appendices. Therefore, one can conclude that this project is not primarily seen as a migration project by the lead auditor. In contrast, in the EUTF *Action Fiche*, it is said to contribute to the first domain of the Valetta Action Plan: “Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement” (EUTF, 2015a: p1). Ultimately, this analysis displays that the Health Pooled Fund was not tied to migration objectives, until it was funded under the auspices of the EUTF. Furthermore, since being funded by the EUTF, the Health Pooled is only framed as a ‘migration’ project by the EU as it is loosely categorised as reducing the ‘root causes’ of migration.

7.5 Support to stabilisation through improved resource, economic and financial management in South Sudan

This project is, in part, a continuation of a former project, ‘Technical Assistance for sub-national capacity building in payroll and PFM [Public Financial Management] in South Sudan’ (EUTAPP) (EUTF, 2015c; ECORYS, 2016). EUTAPP was planned to run from August 2014 until February 2016, however, the EUTF funded an extension until August 2016 (European Commission, 2016). Following this, EUTAPP was subsumed into the EUTF project. The documents for EUTAPP do not detail any links with migration and ‘route causes’, however, in the EUTF *Action Fiche*, the project’s rationale is “based on objective two within the trust Fund, namely strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as the refugees and displaced people” (EUTF, 2015c: p1). This, again, displays an EU funded project which has been subsumed within the EUTF architecture, yet existed prior to the EUTF. By being absorbed into the EUTF it has taken on
a new role as a migration project, tackling so-called ‘root causes’, and thus has become part of the European Border Spectacle.

7.6 SORUDEV

South Sudan Rural Development (SORUDEV) is another example of a project that has been continued under the EUTF but existed before (EUTF, 2018b). SORUDEV is a smallholder food security and livelihoods project (Gurtong.net). The implementation of SORUDEV began in 2012 and it was financed by the 10th EDF Budget but it has now been absorbed into the EUTF. In the EUTF Action Fiche it is stated the project is aligned with Valetta Action Plan priority domain 1: “development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement” (EUTF, 2018b: p1). As a project assisting rural smallholders, SORUDEV had not been previously been seen as a migration project. This is another example of a project which existed previously but has since become part of the EUTF, justified by its link to ‘addressing root causes’, and thus has been absorbed into the European border regime. This is a ‘Spectacle’ as it is simply a re-directing of funding that has achieved this.

Special Support Programme for the South Sudan Development Programme

The EUTF receives 86 million, 400 thousand euros from the Special Support Programme for the South Sudan Development Programme (SSP) (Table 7). The SSP was formed in 2011, the same year as independence for South Sudan in order to address the “numerous humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges in a context of reduced governance capacity and political fragility” the nation faced post-independence (DG DEVCO, 2011b). It appears that the SSP for South Sudan has now ended and its funding and projects have been subsumed by the EUTF (Table 7). In the report: *Special Support Programme for the South Sudan Development*
Plan 2011-2013 (DG DEVCO, 2011b) the programme’s plans are detailed. Interestingly, in this document, there are no mentions of ‘migration’, or ‘root causes’, highlighting that the original programme was not connected to these issues. This contrasts strongly from the EUTF, which came into existence to address the ‘root causes’ of irregular migration. This is significant as SSP funding is now channelled through the EUTF, therefore, projects funded by this mechanism must comply with EUTF criteria. Despite this, it appears that several of the projects funded by the EUTF were already funded by the SSP, meaning they are not specifically migration projects. Therefore, they haven’t necessarily become more migration-led, except in their respective EUTF Action Fiche’s which link the projects to EUTF criteria.

The Special Support Programme for the South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 (DG DEVCO, 2011b) details where the funds for the SSP 2011-2013 were planned to be spent. The total funds were made up of two smaller groups of funding: Special Funds for South Sudan, amounting to €85mil and an additional €200mil. When comparing these projects (table 10; 11) to those funded by the EUTF in South Sudan (table 9), it is possible to see very similar projects being funded. Two projects have the same names; the Health Pooled Fund and the ‘Technical Cooperation Facility’. The latter will be explored in greater detail below. Additionally, there have been education projects funded by both, the SSP project on food systems could be likened to the EUTF project on smallholders and the Democratic Governance Programme could be compared to the EUTF project on Sustainable Peace. The EUTF does not aim to hide that it funds ongoing projects and it is positive that projects have been preserved for continuity. The issue highlighted is not this, but the way these projects are retroactively framed as migration projects. Consequently, this demonstrates a ‘reworking’ of EU money, meaning existing projects are reformulated into the migration discourse and thus, become part of the Border Spectacle.
Allocation of Special Funds (€85mil)

- South Sudan Rural Development Programme: Improving the efficiency of food systems in four states of South Sudan.
- Strengthening Democratic Governance: Strengthening selected governance sector institutions to better achieve their mandates, with particular focus on anti-corruption and human rights.
- Improved Management of Education Delivery: Strengthening the country’s education delivery, making it more effective, and increasing access to education.
- Better Health for South Sudan: Improving the health status of the population, particularly the poor.

Table 9. Authors own, adapted from: (DG DEVCO, 2011b)

Allocations from the €200 million

- Technical Cooperation Facility: The TCF will provide technical assistance and will enable funding for training activities and organisations of conferences and meetings. Technical assistance will be needed to ensure monitoring an evaluation, but also identification and programming.
- Management contribution - €6 million: This contribution will provide for additional support measures to operational activities in relation to the implementation process of this SSP.

Table 10. Authors own, adapted from: (DG DEVCO, 2011b)

As the EUTF is comprised of pooled funding, it is not possible to see the direct origin. However, €86 400 000 of funding from the SSP are part of the EUTF. The accumulation of the various projects in the EUTF operating in South Sudan, is above this amount (€101 700 000), but it would seem logical that this €86 400 000 has been used to fund these projects in addition to another part of EUTF funding. Interestingly, out of the projects funded, none of them specifically address migration, yet form part of the ‘tackling’ of ‘root causes’. This adds significance to the fact that the majority of EU funding for South Sudan is channelled through the EUTF, as the projects do not appear migration-led. This adds weight to the argument that this is done to display EU might in migration action, the Border Spectacle, as opposed to a migration-focused effort.
7.7 Technical Cooperation Facility for South Sudan 2018-2020

The Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) for South Sudan is an example of a project currently funded by the EUTF (EUTF, 2017b), that was previously funded by the Special Support Programme for South Sudan (SSP) (DG DEVCO, 2011b). The TCF aims to ‘contribute to an efficient and effective use of development funds the EU implements in South Sudan’ (EUTF, 2017b: p1) in particular focusing on the handover of humanitarian interventions into medium to long term development projects. As the SSP contributes €85 400 000 to the EUTF, it is likely that it is the same money funding this project, however, now it is channelled through the EUTF by the EU ‘washing machine’ (European Parliament, 2019). The ‘rationale’ for EUTF funding for the Technical Cooperation Facility for South Sudan 2018-2020 provides a good illustration of how a project which has existed since 2011 is now justified by its migration aims:

The Action is aligned with the Valletta Action Plan priority domain (1), development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, in particular through "investing in development and poverty eradication" and domain (3) protection, asylum through the emphasis in strengthening the link between humanitarian assistance and longer term development measures to improve livelihoods, self-reliance opportunities and to facilitate durable solutions.

(EUTF, 2017b: p1)

By aligning the project with the Valletta Action Plan, the Technical Cooperation Facility is co-opted into European migration efforts. The first ‘priority domain’ appears to be a broad and slightly disjointed selection of phrases that attempt to link migration and development. The ‘development benefits of migration’ in the case of South Sudan would likely stem from the outmigration of South Sudanese people who would send remittances home. It is hard to
see how the Technical Cooperation Facility has links to this. Furthermore, ‘investing in development and poverty eradication’ (EUTF, 2017b: p1) is suggested as a way to address the ‘root causes’ of irregular migration in forced displacement when development and poverty eradication are the fundamental goals of development work in general, which does not have a specific link to migration. By this logic, any development project could be classified as a migration project. By having such a broad definition of migration, through the notion of ‘root causes’, the EUTF is able to encompass many projects with no real migration focus. Moreover, it has long been accepted in migration theory that development does not have linear impacts on migration (Massey et. al., 1994).

7.8 Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has illustrated that by tracing the origin of funds in the EUTF, it can be argued that the funds are not only ‘re-worked’, but ‘re-framed’. It is thus important to question: why is this process occurring? Why are funds that appear to be financing the same projects now going through the EUTF as the intermediary? The EU justification for this appears to be for allowing greater flexibility in programming. Thus, by channelling money through the EUTF, quicker responses can be achieved. However, this is not the only effect of re-channelling money through the EUTF. As projects must meet criteria relating to ‘root causes’, they qualify as being part of the EU’s response to the migration crisis. This has been displayed in a case study on EUTF funding in South Sudan. This example is particularly relevant as the EUTF forms the ‘main’ mechanism of EU development funding in South Sudan. It almost appears as if all EU development projects in the country have been rechanneled through the EUTF. By having such a flexible funding mechanism, the EU is able to report on rapid actions to the migration crisis, in order to pacify European constituency demands. By engulfing EU development projects and re-branding them as part of migration
efforts, these development projects form part of the European Border Spectacle. Furthermore, the EUTF does not only allow increased flexibility but it changes the fundamental aims and goals of these projects so they rotate around the notion of ‘root causes’. In sum, it is argued that Funding is being channelled through the EUTF to provide the image of a large, coordinated response to the Mediterranean crisis; a Border Spectacle.

8. Spectacles of Compassion and Security

“the Mediterranean is projected as a EUropean space of care and control”

(Perkowski, 2016: p333)
8.1 Introduction

This chapter will address the symbiotic, yet discordant logics of compassion and security used by the EUTF. The central argument of this thesis is that the Border Spectacle is ultimately a performatory exercise. It seems sensible to then question: why is the EU engaging in this performativity? These competing rationales within the EUTF are symptomatic of a trend in European external migration policy which ‘brings together seemingly distinct rationales and practices of care and control’ (Frowd, 2018: p16656). This paradoxical notion is iterated by van Houtum (2010) who discusses the EU ‘bordering itself’ through the mechanism of an ‘explicitly moral landscape’ (p958). Aaltola (2009) theorises ‘Violent Vortexes of Compassion’. She similarly recognises the embedded nature of these two phenomena. This chapter links these notions to that of the ‘spectacle’ (De Genova, 2002; Debord, 1994) in order to express the central importance of performance and reception in shaping these ideas. Namely, the EU simultaneously demands a humanitarian ‘compassionate’ response to the ‘Mediterranean crisis’, as well as a security-led focus which reduces migration flows. This chapter thus addresses this phenomenon as ‘Spectacles of Compassion and Security’.

8.2 The EUTF as a Spectacle of Compassion

The Spectacle of Compassion revolves around humanitarian principles. This can be linked to enlightenment understandings of humanitarianism which stemmed from 18th century changes in popular sensibilities termed the “revolution of compassion” (Barnett, 2011). Compassionate principles have become crucial to the contemporary statecraft of borderwork (Aaltola, 2009). ‘Humanitarian borderwork’ has been conceptualised as a co-option of humanitarian ideals of saving life into the protection of state borders (Walkers, 2010; Pallister-Wilkins, 2017). These humanitarian sensibilities can be seen in EU logics on
handling the ‘migration crisis’. Donald Tusk called for the Valletta Summit to take place a day after the largest migrant boat tragedy ever; 800 lives were lost when a fishing boat collapsed 96km off the Libyan coast on the 19th April 2015 (Pace, 2016). The EU’s political response to this tragedy saw cooperation with third countries as paramount:

As you know this meeting was suggested after the tragedy on 19 April, when hundreds of people lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea. This called on us to increase our efforts to try to stop such things from happening. The European Union took on the heavy responsibility of trying to save as many lives as possible. But this is dealing only with the symptoms. The only way we can manage migration is by working together. Our purpose today is to agree a joint approach and concrete steps so that migration becomes fruitful exchange between our peoples, and not a tragic loss to all. We have a joint responsibility, and we must deliver on it in partnership and solidarity. That is why we are here.

(Tusk, 2015)

As The Valletta Summit was where the EUTF was conceived, it is important for us to understand why the summit was called, as this sets the precedence for the motives of the trust fund. The EUTF is, therefore, a direct response to loss of life in the Mediterranean. It is a compassionate project charged with the responsibility of preventing human tragedy. Tusk suggests that the EU was at the time only “dealing only with the symptoms” of the crisis. This sets up a precedence for tackling the so-called ‘root causes’. He then suggests that the only way for the EU and Africa to “manage migration” is through “working together”.

Such justification of EU border security measures by humanitarian principles is further illuminated by a comment made by the High Representative and Vice President, Federica Mogherini:
Our work with the African Union and the United Nations is bringing results. We are assisting thousands of stranded people, helping many to go safely back home to start an activity, saving lives, fighting traffickers. The flows have decreased, but still too many put their lives at risk and every single life not saved is one too many. That’s why we will continue to cooperate with our international partners and with the countries concerned to provide protection for people most in need, address the root causes of migration, dismantle the traffickers’ networks and set up pathways for safe, orderly and legal migration.

(European Commission, 2019.)

This quote is not specifically about the EUTF but the overall EU-AU response to the Mediterranean crisis. This quote evinces the key characteristics of a Spectacle of Compassion: “The flows have decreased, but still too many put their lives at risk and every single life not saved is one too many”. By emphasising the care for ‘every single life’, the European response is posited around understandings of the sanctity of life and ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998). This alludes to the established iconography of tragedy associated with irregular migration across the Mediterranean (Pastore et. al., 2006: p95). Furthermore, Mogherini lists positive outcomes that have been realised from such interventions. She suggests the EU’s main aim is to assist ‘stranded people’ and to help them to ‘go home’. The notion of ‘stranded people’ is subjective; it denies agency to migrants and suggests they haven’t taken these journeys though choice. In many cases, this is not true; the journey to Europe is a carefully-planned and thought out decision (Pastore et. al., 20016). ‘Stranded’ is additionally imbued with notion of being ‘lost’ and suggests naivety. The EU is not simply assisting home ‘stranded people’ but aiming to reduce migration flows of Middle Eastern, North and Sub-Saharan African migrants into Europe. The phrase helping people to go ‘home to start and activity’ particularly stands out. This presumably hints at the work done by the IOM in assisting and supporting return migrants yet it seems an overly simplistic way of describing what can be a traumatic process of returning after ‘failing’ to reach Europe.
(Schuster & Majidi, 2015). What ultimately drives people to take dangerous routes and what encourages smuggling to operate, is not simply the naivety of ‘stranded people’, but the lack of safe migration routes available. It can be argued that states, therefore, cause smuggling to increase by reducing legal migration options (Doomernik, 2013). The EU could instead set up pathways for safe, orderly and legal migration, however, there is not the political appetite for this, whereas channelling money into return-programmes is seen as politically neutral, precisely because of understanding of compassion and security. By stating “the flows have decreased” this highlights the EU emphasis on ‘flows’ as a measure of results. On the other hand, while analysing this, we must not lose sight of Frowd’s assessment that humanitarian logics do not act as ‘smokescreens’ for control, but that humanitarian and security logics are intimately linked and ‘cohabit’. These Spectacles of Compassion include genuine concern over human life, however, this does not negate the fact that their logic is guided by security needs.

Projects supporting return migrants are underpinned by logics of compassion; they are not projects which simply organize the travel and logistical side of returns, they also operate as development projects, aiming to offer return migrants economic opportunities at ‘home’. Many projects supporting return migrants are carried out by the IOM. Fundamentally, many of these projects are conditional to the country receiving money from the EUTF; countries may only receive aid as long as they accept back return migrants (Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017). Therefore, in order to exert statehood, the EU has conditions based around ‘compassionate’ principles; aid and return programmes. There are 17 of these projects operating in different countries and regions (Appendix C). These projects assist people to find economic means on returning home in order to prevent them migrating. There is a logic behind this. The journey to Europe can be incredibly dangerous, and the lives people imagine leading in Europe are
often vastly different from the underpaid, and at times illegal, labour many are forced to accept. But the issue is that the aim of reducing migration to Europe is nonetheless the underlying political justification and that these dangerous journeys are driven by the reduction in safe migration routes. It is, therefore, impossible to untie these ideas.

8.3 The EUTF as a Spectacle of Security

In addition to the Border Spectacle, De Genova has written on two other forms of spectacle: ‘Spectacle of Terror’ and ‘Spectacle of Security’ (2011). These reference the spectacularisation of everyday life in regards to the September 11 attacks and the Bush administration’s response. The nature of spectacularisation De Genova refers to here cannot be completely translated to the EUTF, but the concept can. As development projects are co-opted into the securitised border regime, security seeps into the everyday. Economic development projects have an inbuilt logic that encourages people to stay ‘stagnant’. The EUTF funds projects which work to enforce border controls in two ways: by funding hard security programs and by facilitating the return of migrants. More traditional security projects, such as policing projects, can be linked to traditional understandings of the Border Spectacle (Appendix D). Duffield (2001) theorises a new form of ‘borderlands’ following involvement of a vast nexus of state and private actors in the management of borders. This resembles the EUTF. Duffield suggests that these complex nexuses of actors, act as new technologies through which metropolitan states manage these public-private networks to govern borderlands in new, often increasingly securitised, ways. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2015) writes of the migration control industry in regards to Private Security. Although some of the actors are private in the EUTF, the majority are not. Nonetheless, this notion of ‘industry’ could be extended to the way in which the Spectacle operates. Here, what is interesting, is that humanitarian driven border responses are underpinned by logics of security, meaning the
two are hard to distinguish. An example of this can be seen in the EUTF 2018 Annual Report:

\[
\text{Although the number of detected irregular border crossings on the Central Mediterranean Route fell significantly in 2018, the humanitarian situation along this route remains of great concern.} \\
\text{The EU continued sustaining its efforts in supporting Sub-Saharan partner countries to address the mixed migration flows in countries of origin and transit.} \\
\]

(EUTF, 2019b: p11) Emphasis authors own.

It could be possible to substitute \textit{detected irregular border crossings} for a more securitarian logic:

\[
\text{Although the number of detected irregular border crossings on the Central Mediterranean Route fell significantly in 2018, the security situation along this route remains of great concern.} \\
\]

This illustrates that compassionate and security driven logics are somewhat indistinguishable in the logic of the EUTF. The EU is concerned over the dire humanitarian situation in the Mediterranean, yet, the EU is equally driven by member states security concerns about these migrants. Within the EUTF, these logics conveniently cohabitate which is ultimately what leads to its success. The EU is able to engage in the Border Spectacle, engaging with both the normative beliefs of compassion and security. A project which neatly fits into traditional understandings of border security will now be dealt with.

8.4 Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region (WAPIS)
WAPIS is a project funded by the EUTF with the aim to: “increase the ability of G5 countries to combat organised crime, trafficking and terrorism, by building or strengthening the ability of national administrations to collect, centralise, manage and share data provided by the police” (EUTF, 2016b). The implementing agency for WAPIS is the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL). WAPIS existed before the EUTF, but has since become funded by it (Fig. 8). The WAPIS programme was initiated in 2010 during Belgium’s presidency of the EU Council (Interpol, 2012; 2017) after a symposium in which the West African Chiefs of Police declared that they needed an automated police information system in order to meet challenges in the region (UNODC & ECOWAS, 2017). WAPIS has had a permanent office in the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja since January 2014 (Interpol, 2014). The project has always been implemented by INTERPOL, yet it was originally funded by the EU Instrument of Stability (Interpol, 2012), however, when this was planned to be wrapped up in 2016, the EU continued to fund it under the EUTF (EUTF, 2016b). WAPIS was originally part of the EU’s Cocaine Route Programme (Interpol, 2012), therefore its original focus was on drug trafficking. WAPIS is additionally mentioned as one of the strategies in a document entitled: *Strengthening Regional Cooperation Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa* (UNODC & ECOWAS, 2017). In this document the only reference relating to migration is the mention of ‘human smuggling’ once. This illuminates that WAPIS was primarily seen as project which tackled drug-related crime. In order to receive funding from the EUTF, a project has to meet requirements of the Trust Fund and Valletta Action Plan. This is demonstrated in Figure 7 whereby ‘improvements in the overall governance’ are cast as ‘root causes’ for migration. Therefore, in order to be eligible for the funding, WAPIS has to meet EUTF requirements contribution to reducing ‘root causes’ of irregular migration and forced displacement’. In sum, this displays ‘re-framed funding’ as discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, it is argued that WAPIS was
originally not seen as a *migration* project as such, although recording criminals involved in the trafficking of persons was still a major aim, but a policing project which focused on drug trafficking. As WAPIS now forms part of European migration efforts, it has been subsumed into the EU Border Spectacle.

Ultimately, WAPIS primarily aims to make crime legible across the region through a coordinated, shared information system. It is therefore interesting that the EU has chosen to fund this project in light of Europe’s increased power in the region; will the EU have access to this data? Pierre Reuland, the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the EU stated in 2012: “WAPIS will become a regional system, compatible with European countries and the rest of the world through the INTERPOL I-24/7 secure global police communications system” (Interpol, 2012). This signals that WAPIS has been designed in order to be compatible with EU modes of data collection, as well as the ‘rest of the world’ magnifying that the increased legibility of crime is not solely for West African purposes, but global ones.

From a Foucauldian perspective (Foucault, 2007), this can be seen as an extension of European statecraft into the African continent, aiming to render legible population of

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<th>Title/Number</th>
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<td>Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region (WAPIS)</td>
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Figure 7. WAPIS Action Fiche. Source: EUTF (2015b).
criminals, in particular smugglers. WAPIS, therefore appears to be a project which has become more migration-led in order to receive EUTF funding. It is likely that is has been subsumed into the EUTF in order to have a ‘strong’ security project as part of the fund, in order to provide a Spectacle of Security to EU member states; this ultimately contributes to the Border Spectacle.

Figure 8. Source: WAPIS ‘Project Milestones’ (Interpol, 2017: p15)

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has displayed the ways in which the somewhat indistinguishable logics of compassion and care (Frowd, 2018) can be seen in Spectacles of Compassion and Security in the EUTF. With logics that describe increasingly externalized border control as a humanitarian function, such as that of Tusk (2015) ‘save as many lives as possible’ and Mogherini (2019) ‘stranded people’, these two conflicting rationales can be hard to trace. This is iterated in EUTF documents (EUTF, 2019b) which display how ‘the humanitarian
situation’ can be replaced by ‘the security situation’, emphasising how notions of compassion and care are interchangeable and to an extent, mutually reinforcing. The example of WAPIS magnifies that security projects that are not necessarily connected to migration, have become part of the European Border project and therefore, part of the European Border Spectacle. Ultimately, it is important to understand that logics of compassion are central to the self identity of the European Union and the EUTF, which is why they are perpetuated.
9. Conclusion

This thesis has analysed the extent to which the EUTF can be understood as a Border Spectacle. The term, coined by De Genova (2002) expresses the performative function of borderwork in contemporary migration politics. Why then, is performativity so essential to understanding the EUTF? By understanding the EUTF through the lens of ‘spectacle’ it enables us to make sense of the complex and at times, paradoxical, logics of the fund. The EUTF is presented as an ‘emergency’ fund, created in ‘response’ to a crisis. Upon closer investigation, it is evident that many of the projects under the fund have existed for many years, but their funding avenues have been redirected through the EUTF, giving the illusion that the EUTF has initiated a plethora of projects across the African continent to tackle migration. However, this is not the full reality. We must therefore question, why have funds been re-channelled through the EUTF? It is argued here that this is done to increase the appearance of the EU’s response to the migration crisis. Moreover, the EUTF is understood as a continuation of European external migration policies which have intensified following the ‘migration crisis’. Following a new mechanism in the EU’s Financial Regulations (Article 197) in 2013, the EU has been able to create trust funds. It is, therefore, important to analyse the EUTF as it is a new phenomenon and it is possible more migration-funding will be channelled through such mechanisms in the future.

The analysis first explored the construction of the Border Spectacle in the EU policy arena. It addresses the first research question and suggests that yes, the EUTF is aptly understood as a Border Spectacle. When conceptualising a spectacle, it is essential to identify an audience in order to understand why the performance is produced. It is argued that the Border Spectacle is performed in the policy-making arena to EU member states who demand ‘crisis’ action. By
analysing European Commission Press releases, a performative discourse was identified. The EU situates and frames the EUTF firmly in the domain of external migration response to the crisis where it is depicted as one of several ‘concrete measures’ to the ‘Mediterranean crisis’. The language of ‘root causes’ is analysed and it is found that this term is used repeatedly as a ‘sound bite’ to justify and link EU external actions. By using such a broad term, the EUTF can fund a multitude of projects, many of them continued development projects, and can link them under the rubric of ‘root causes’. This projects the Spectacle of a coordinated EU response to ‘crisis’ that politically, it needs.

Secondly, it analysed how the EUTF has altered the geography of European border intervention in the African continent. This is well expressed through the concept of the ‘migration corridor’ (van Reekum, 2016). In response to the second research question, it suggests that this is a mechanism by which the Border Spectacle is enacted. By separating the fund into three geographical ‘windows’, the EUTF has coded different African regions as having distinct roles in the migration corridor, as either ‘transit’ or ‘source’ spaces. Moreover, there appears to be parallels in how the fund is separated into three regions and the way migration into Europe is conceptualised around ‘three’ main routes, the: Central, Eastern and Western routes. By analysing the Response and Resource Mechanism for Migrants (Niger) it is possible to see how this ‘corridor’ logic is employed in a single project. The project is not only based in Niger, but the ‘corridors’ that link to it. This includes mapping out the populations which pass through Niger and includes surveying ‘source’ villages and towns in Nigeria for the levels of services. Taking a Foucauldian lens (Foucault, 2007), this thesis argues that this represents an expression of statecraft through the rendering legible the population of the ‘unruly’ corridor.
Next, it investigated the funding of the EUTF. It discovers that the EUTF is comprised of a compilation of EU funding sources and that it funds projects that existed before the EUTF, but were not classified as ‘migration’ or ‘root causes’ projects. It argued that by re-working, and ultimately, re-framing this funding, the EUTF brings projects that would not have been understood as migration projects under the umbrella of the trust fund. It primarily does this through the ‘root causes’ narrative through which development projects are de facto linked to preventing migration. It is argued, in answer to the second research question, that this is the primary mechanism by which the Border Spectacle is rendered. A key example of this reframed funding is EUTF engagement in South Sudan where the majority of EU development funding for the country is now channelled through the EUTF. This is of great significance. This categorisation of development projects as migration projects has led to the Border Spectacle permeating the everyday. This can be linked to the concept of developmental borderwork (Frowd, 2018) and displays that the notion of ‘spectacle’ (De Genova, 2002) is useful here. Considering that a significant amount of the funding is ‘reworked’ and many of the same projects are funded as before from other sources, this becomes an issue of Spectacle.

Finally, it attempted to explain why, in the case of the EUTF, the Border Spectacle is engaged with. This addresses the third and final research question. It argues the Border Spectacle is used by the EU in order to rectify the competing ideals of security and compassion that coexist in the European imaginary. Both are fundamental to the self-identity of the EU; it is imperative that the EU reacts on a humanitarian level to save life, however, the European constituency demands security measures to lessen migration. The EUTF, therefore, represents a diplomatic way of achieving both these things; it funds compassionate development projects, yet also funds security projects and requires receiving countries to
accept back return migrants. Tusk’s call for the 2015 Valletta Summit and Mogherini’s 2019 Speech on returning ‘stranded people’ frame securitised migration measures as protecting the sanctity of life. The example of WAPIS builds upon the argument in chapter seven as it is the continuation of a project that has existed since 2012, yet only since being funded by the EUTF has it become a ‘migration’ project. It indicates that this project’s funding has been shifted to the EUTF in order to represent a strong security measure against migration, which politically, the EU wants.

This desire to bind together care and control links together the arguments of this thesis. The representations of the EUTF in press releases attempt to exude both of these logics, as do the measures taken to secure the ‘migration corridor’, yet save life by preventing crossings of the Mediterranean. The examples of re-framed funding discussed in chapter seven can particularly be understood by this argument as they specifically recast development projects as migration projects in order to expand the Border Spectacle. Therefore, conceptualising the EUTF as a Border Spectacle has facilitated analysis of the performative nature of this policy. In addition, this thesis has not only employed the concept of the Border Spectacle to inform this analysis but has also extended it. External migration policy is quickly evolving, particularly in Europe and funding development projects in order to ‘prevent’ irregular migration is the latest development of this. Therefore, the new mode of the Border Spectacle is unique; it is covert and hard to spot. It is hoped that this contribution to the Border Spectacle can provide a useful ‘springboard’ for future avenues of research.
Limitations and future recommendations

This project was limited in the time available, therefore, further research would enable one to elucidate the subject further. Methodologically, a policy analysis using publicly available documents, press releases and speeches was the most appropriate method, however, it is important to recognise that these only express the views of EU institutions, and do not reflect those of the African Union, individual African and European countries or migrants themselves. It is recommended that future, in-depth analysis of EUTF actions and funding can provide useful insight into the future directions of external European migration policies. Due to research constraints, in-depth analysis of only a select few projects was possible but it would useful to engage with more. Comparing this to similar studies on other EU Trust funds, such as the Madad Fund, could provide fruitful insight into Border Spectacle developments.
## Appendices

### Appendix A: Documents consulted and analysed (primary sources)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document consulted</th>
<th>Data analysed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission. (2019b). <em>Press release The European Agenda on Migration: EU needs to sustain progress made over the past 4 years</em>. 6 March.</td>
<td>Discourse and content analysis, factual information.</td>
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### Appendix B: Documents consulted and analysed (secondary sources)

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<tr>
<th>Document consulted</th>
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Appendix C: EUTF projects supporting return migrants

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Projects supporting return migrants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Nigeria (Nigeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainable Reintegration support to Ethiopian returnees from Europe (Ethiopia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of return migrants in the Gambia (The Gambia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the return and sustainable reintegration in Senegal and support for investments by the Senegalese diaspora (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Resilience and Empowerment Capacity of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons Related to the Northern Mali Conflict (Mali)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facility on Sustainable and Dignified Return and Reintegration in support of the Khartoum Process (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection and sustainable solutions for migrants and refugees along the Central Mediterranean route (Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Cameroun, Tchad, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinée, Mali)</td>
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<td>Strengthening the management and governance of migration and sustainable return and reintegration in Burkina Faso (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<td>Strengthening the management and governance of migration and sustainable return and reintegration in Cameroon (Cameroon)</td>
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<td>Contribute to strengthening governance and management of migration and borders, and facilitate the protection, return and sustainable reintegration of migrants in Mauritania (Mauritania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening Migration Management and Governance and Sustainable Return to Niger (Sustainable Return from Niger - SURENI) (Niger)</td>
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<td>Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in the Gambia (Gambia)</td>
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<td>Kenya-EU Partnership for the implementation of the Kenya Counter Violent Extremism strategy (Kenya)</td>
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<td>RE-INTEG: Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows (Somalia)</td>
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<td>Facility for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt)</td>
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<td>Supporting protection and humanitarian repatriation and reintegration of vulnerable migrants in Libya (Libya)</td>
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Appendix D: EUTF security-led projects

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<td>West Africa region: Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region.</td>
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<td>Sahel region: GAR-SI SAHEL (Rapid Action Groups - Monitoring and Intervention in the Sahel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>North of Africa region (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia): Dismantling the criminal networks operating in North Africa and involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking</td>
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<td>Morocco, Tunisia: Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region (BMP-Maghreb)</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso: Integrated Border Management Program in Burkina Faso (ProGEF)</td>
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<td>Support to the fight against trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea countries</td>
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<td>Mali: Security Support Program in the Mopti and Gao Regions and the Management of Border Areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao)</td>
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<td>Support program for the operation of civil status in Mali: support for the establishment of a secure information system</td>
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<td>EU for nexus security-resilience-development in Mauritania</td>
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<td>Creation of a Joint Investigation Team (CIS) to fight against criminal networks linked to irregular immigration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling (Niger)</td>
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<td>SECurity and Border Management (SECGEF) (Chad)</td>
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<td>Enhancing security and the rule of law in Somalia</td>
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<td>Horn of Africa region (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda): Disrupting criminal trafficking and smuggling networks through increased anti-money laundering and financial investigation capacity in the Greater Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya - Second phase (Libya)</td>
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