Securitizing Migration in Hungary
Analysing the third Orbán Government’s Discourse on Migration

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List of Abbreviations

CDS           Critical Discourse Studies
DHA           Discourse-historical Approach
EASO          European Asylum Support Office
EU            European Union
IAO           Immigration and Asylum Office
IOM           International Organization for Migration
KSH           Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical Office)
UNHCR         United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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1. Introduction
From the spring of 2014 on, the number of mostly African, Middle Eastern and Central Asian migrants who were seeking to irregularly enter the European Union (EU) was steadily growing (Frontex 2015a). With the growth of departures, on the one hand, the number of those who have died or gone missing while crossing the Mediterranean or the Aegean Sea increased as well (IOM n.d., UNHCR 2014). At the same time, however, the number of those who successfully made the journey, set foot on European territory and managed to apply for asylum was also on the rise, placing a disproportionally high burden on the asylum and migration authorities of frontline EU member states (Frontex 2015a).

Concurrently, Hungary was also experiencing a steep increase in the number of submitted asylum claims. Compared to just over 2,000 applications in 2012, the country faced a nine-fold (18,900) and a twenty-fold (42,777) growth of those in the following years respectively (IAO 2015). Nevertheless, in case of Hungary, it was citizens of European countries (mostly from Kosovo) who made up one-third of the claims in 2013 and more than half of that in 2014 (ibid.). Despite the greatly increased number of asylum-seekers, the Hungarian public perceived immigration as a challenge facing rather the EU, than the country itself (Eurobarometer 2014).

After incidents, such as the one at Lampedusa (BBC 2013), the EU stepped up its search and rescue efforts in the Mediterranean region and was joined by NGOs’ own operations, in order to prevent more deaths. Nevertheless, the increased presence of these missions sparked a debate whether this kind of humanitarian assistance further encouraged refugees to embark on the perilous journey to Europe (see e.g. Cuttitta 2018). Another concern was that most migrants arrived from or passed through instable countries (e.g. Syria, Afghanistan, Libya) with actively operating terrorist organisations within their territories. Some argued that members of these organisations could infiltrate into EU member states by disguising themselves as refugees. This worry gained prominence especially in the wake of the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris (see e.g. New York Times 2016).

Months before these attacks, at the very beginning of 2015, two other terrorist attacks happened in the French capital. Back then, however, most politicians were just as much concerned with the humanitarian aspect of the unfolding ‘refugee crisis’ than its potential security implications (see e.g. European Council 2015a; 2015b). One exception was the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán. After attending a march organised in
response to the terrorist attacks, he argued that ‘immigration is a bad thing … because it only brings trouble and danger [to Europe], therefore it must be stopped’ and stated that he (and his government) would like to ‘keep Hungary as the land of Hungarians’ (Orbán 2015a).

Later it turned out that these remarks were the starting point of a campaign against migrants, multiculturalism and the EU’s migration policies (see e.g. Budapest Beacon 2015; Euronews 2018). Migratory movements towards both the EU and Hungary further intensified during the first half of 2015, therefore the government decided to back up its anti-immigrant rhetoric with concrete actions (Frontex 2015b). It declared a ‘state of emergency caused by mass immigration’, ordered the construction of a fence along the southern border as well as initiated the amendment of several migration-related laws, in order to make it more difficult to apply for asylum (Government of Hungary 2015a; 2015b; 2015c). Furthermore, the government openly refused to implement the decision of the Council of the EU (2015a and 2015b) on a relocation mechanism and challenged the resolution before the Court of Justice of the EU (Act CLXXV of 2015).

Even though in September 2015 the border fence was completed, barring migrants to enter the territory of Hungary, the government kept the issue of migration on the agenda and even broadened the scope of the threat. Apart from openly going against an EU decision, in 2016 it called a referendum to reject the European Commission’s (2015) proposal on a compulsory resettlement mechanism and a year later it launched a national consultation survey on the same topic (Government of Hungary 2016; 2017). Thus, the cabinet started to present the migration policy of ‘Brussels’ just as much a threat as immigration itself.

The government’s tactics have paid off. In 2016 it was able to mobilise more than 3.3 million voters, who supported the standpoint of the government and rejected the idea of a mandatory resettlement mechanism. More importantly, however, the Fidesz-KDNP alliance, with ‘stop immigration’ as the main campaign message (Bíró-Nagy 2018, 282), won the 2018 election with 2.8 million votes and secured another two-thirds parliamentary majority (National Election Office 2016; 2018).

In this thesis, however, I will not focus on the ‘demand side’ but on the ‘supply side’. Instead of studying voters’ perception of migration and their motivations behind supporting an anti-immigration force (either at a referendum or at the general election), I study how the third Orbán government, in office between 2014 and 2018, presented
migration and related policies of the EU as matters of security. In order to grasp how this was done, I study the language use of the government, that is its discourse on the issue.

In line with the claim of Austin (1975), I argue that language can be performative, that is by saying something, one does more than just uttering words: (s)he performs an action. The speech act theory was adapted to the field of security by scholars of the Copenhagen School (e.g. Wæver 1989, Buzan et al. 1998). They argue that security can be understood as a performative linguistic action because simply by saying security an issue is presented as such, that is as being above normal politics. Therefore, the process of securitization is understood as a speech act, whereby an issue gets to be treated in the realm of security merely because an actor argues in favour of that and the majority accepts this claim.

This thesis states that the third Orbán government successfully securitized migration. Balzacq (2011, 32) argues that a security problem must be salient on the political agenda, that is on the one hand, ‘it should be a focus of public attention or debate’, and on the other hand, it ‘should be a target for activities related to public opinion or legal and/or political actions’. According to Buzan et al. (1998), securitization is successful only if the audience (Hungarian voters in this case) also deems the securitized issue a threat. Calling a referendum, launching national consultations and winning the election by focusing on anti-immigration messages in the campaign put the issue in the spotlight, while related legislative actions were taken as well as normal politics have been ‘suspended’ through the continuous renewal of the migration-related state of emergency since September 2015 (Government of Hungary 2019), therefore, the conditions of successful securitization were met.

In this thesis, however, instead of studying the extraordinary measures that the government was permitted to take as the result of successfully securitizing migration, I analyse the process of securitization. Therefore, the thesis puts emphasis on the discourse of the government, through which it presented and portrayed migration – that was of marginal importance in Hungary prior to 2014 in both public and political debates (Barna and Koltai 2018, 9; Bernáth and Messing 2015, 9) – and the EU’s migration policy as a matter of security. As Balzacq (2011, 32, emphasis in original) points out, ‘knowing what the [security] problem is, does not tell us what makes it a threat, for whom, why, and why now’. In other words, arguing that an issue was successfully securitized does not mean that the underlying perceptions, which made that particular actor, object or phenomena a credible threat, are known.
My main research question thus reads as ‘How did the third Orbán government securitize the issue of migration between January 2015 and April 2018?’. In order to be able to answer this broad question, I pose the following four sub-questions:

- What qualities and attributes did the government attach to migrants through the analysed period?
- For which domains or fields did the government present the arrival of migrants as an existential threat?
- Through which discursive means did the government portray the EU and its policies an existential threat, and for which domain(s)?
- Did referent objects, claimed to be under threat, change over time in the government’s discourse?

Analysing the securitization of migration gained academic interest in the late 1990s (see e.g. Huysmans 1995, 2000; Tsoukala 2000; Bigo 2002; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002), after the traditional understanding of security was broadened. Research in this domain of security studies was further intensified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (e.g. Karyotis 2007; Swarts and Karakatsanis 2012; Glušac 2014; Messina 2014). After the 2015 migration crisis, attention was drawn to analysing the European Union’s or individual member states’ reactions to the mass influx, among them the discursive construction of immigration as a security threat (e.g. Banai and Kreide 2017; Zvada 2018; Ferreira 2019; Grigoriadis and Dilek 2019) as well as the coverage of the crisis in the media (e.g. Tkaczyk 2017; Vezovnik 2017; Colombo 2018).

Some research has been done which specifically focus on how migrants and migration were conceived of in Hungary. Most works before the crisis year of 2015 focus on the rather negative attitude of Hungarian society towards external as well as internal others (Juhász 1995; Simonovits and Szalai 2013). Korkut (2014) analysed how this hostile societal context enabled the government to adopt rather restrictive immigration policies even before the crisis year of 2015. After the government launched its anti-immigration campaign, migration, the public attitude towards it and the government’s response (both its rhetoric and concrete decisions) came to the spotlight. Researches were conducted to analyse how the government and more broadly the Hungarian far-right framed the 2015 crisis and sought to take advantage of it and make electoral gains (Glied and Pap 2016; Thorleifsson 2017; Birá-Nagy 2018). Meanwhile, Sik et al. (2016) explored the presence of xenophobia within Hungarian society and that of immigration-
related fears. Juhász (2017) analysed whether the government’s migration and asylum policies were in line with respective migration strategies of the EU and Hungary. Similarly, a thorough study, edited by Tálas (2017), assessed government-initiated amendments to the asylum policy (Szép 2017) and the Penal Code (Hautzinger 2017), among other responses of the cabinet to the crisis. Apart from these, discourse analyses have been conducted on the government’s campaign on migration as well. Kiss (2016) analysed how the Hungarian news media covered and broadcasted the messages of the government on the issue of migration, while Bernáth and Messing (2015) studied how political parties constructed different – and often contradictory – frames of the crisis and which of these were ‘accepted’ by the media, thus represented more frequently in the news.

Despite the government’s hostile attitude towards migration and migrants generated Europe-wide debates, very few academic works studied the securitizing process underlying the fierce rhetoric and restrictive policies. Two exceptions are the researches conducted by Bocskor (2018) and Szalai and Gőbl (2015), both drawing on the securitization theory. The former article analysed the 2015 national consultation on immigration and terrorism using the discourse-historical approach, which enabled to embed the rhetoric applied in the survey into the broader socio-political context. Therefore, previously existing beliefs, fears and attitudes in relation to migration in Hungary were taken into account as well as the subsequent Orbán cabinet’s attempts at othering certain social groups, between 2010 and 2015. The latter work analysed both discursive and non-discursive elements of the government’s anti-immigrant campaign and assessed how these practices fit into previous examples of migration-securitizing strategies of Western European actors. Furthermore, it broadened the scope of analysis and studied how practices and (in)action contributed to the securitization, apart from language use.

These works provide good insight into aspects of the Hungarian government’s securitization efforts, however with some limitations. On the one hand, Bocskor (2018) restricts his analysis to study just one – however important – text of the securitization process. On the other hand, while the research of Szalai and Gőbl (2015) covers a longer period of time (the first nine months of 2015), it does not take into account how the government continued to securitize the issue after the autumn of 2015. Therefore, despite the cabinet was running a permanent campaign on migration in the following years as well (for example during the campaign prior to the 2016 ‘quota referendum’), no research
has covered these developments yet. Moreover, these studies focus only on the securitization of migrants, thus do not take account for how the scope of securitization was broadened by linking other actors (i.e. the EU) to immigration and presenting them and their actions as existential threats. Similarly, because of a limited timeframe, these works cannot give an overview regarding which domains/fields (e.g. public security, economy, national sovereignty etc.) did the government portray as being threatened by the influx of refugees.

Owing to these shortcomings, thus far no research has dealt with the securitization strategies of the Hungarian government as one broad unit of analysis. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill in this empirical gap and provide insights on how the cabinet started the securitization of migration and subsequently continued the process throughout the following years. Moreover, in my opinion, this case provides a unique example for studying securitization. The government’s campaign has been continuously running since the beginning of 2015, a timeframe which is not too long to study in one piece, however not too short either, thus allows to track how the discourse evolved over time.

In this thesis, I use securitization theory as the conceptual framework. The theory was developed by Buzan et al. (1998), who – as mentioned above – argue that security is a speech act. According to them, public issues ‘can be located on a spectrum ranging from non-politicized through politicized to securitized’ (ibid. 23). A particular issue becomes securitized (i.e. ‘presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures’, thus justifying exceptional actions) not necessarily because it poses a real threat to security, but simply because an actor states that it should be given priority over all other issues (ibid 23-24). I also incorporate elements of the sociological approach of securitization to the theoretical framework. Scholars of this approach argue that in order to have a better understanding of securitization, more factors need to be taken into consideration than discursive practices only (Balzacq 2011). They advocate that the social, historical and linguistic context also have an important role in the (successful) creation of threat images, therefore must be taken into account.

Securitization theory adopts a broad understanding of security. It argues that both military and non-military objects might be existentially threatened, thus be securitized. Therefore, it identifies five sectors of security where different referent objects could be portrayed as being threatened (Buzan et al. 1998). This widener approach to security is especially valuable for this thesis since depicting unarmed asylum-seekers as threatening the state (which is the central referent object in traditional security studies) would be
unlikely to result in successful securitization. However, if one assumes that subjects other than the state can be threatened as well, immigrants might be portrayed as posing too great of a financial burden, thus threatening the economy, or as coming from a different civilization, thus jeopardising the cultural homogeneity of the host country, and so on.

In order to analyse the third Orbán government’s securitization process, this thesis conducts a discourse analysis. As it conceives security as a speech act, the Copenhagen School argues that ‘to study securitization is to study discourse’ (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). Bearing in mind the valuable observations of the sociological approach, I argue that it is not enough if one studies only the language and language use of a securitization process, but needs to include the social and historical context in the analysis. Applying the discourse-historical approach (DHA) allows for conducting discourse analysis, while also for embedding the use of language in the broader context within which it is interpreted and constructed.

The DHA is a method within the broader framework of critical discourse studies. This approach – just like the speech act theory and the securitization theory – understands language as a practice that can change and reproduce social reality, apart from describing it. Moreover, it is thought to be constituted by that same social reality as well, that is the socio-political and historical context affect meanings (Reisigl 2018).

This approach focuses on larger linguistic units, such as discourses as well as texts that constitute the former. Within these, it aims to identify the applied discursive strategies which help the speaker to realize its goal through the use of language. Furthermore, the DHA seeks to uncover the conclusion rules (or topoi), that serve to justify claims made in discourses (Reisigl and Wodak 2009).

Apart from analysing these aspects of language use, the DHA also contextualizes texts and discourses. On the one hand, it studies the relationships of those to each other as well as their linguistic coherence. On the other hand, these language practices are embedded in the socio-political and historical context, while the specific conditions in which the utterances are produced are also taken into account (ibid.).

The DHA is applied to analyse speeches of and interviews with Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister. Taking into consideration the power which derives from his position and the authority that it guarantees to him over security-related issues, I argue that it is relevant and justifiable to deem the Prime Minister’s utterances as the official standpoint of the government. Following this argument, it is enough to analyse texts produced by Orbán in order to study his government’s discourse on migration.
The data consists of 50 interviews and 13 speeches, conducted between January 2015 and March 2018. The constant frequency of the interviews enables to analyse in detail how the process of securitization began and how it evolved throughout the 3 years of the studied period. Meanwhile, the more structured language of the speeches serves as a kind of synthesis of the main arguments of the discourse, while their more historical perspective allows for embedding the texts into context.

Applying the DHA to analyse the government’s discourse enables to answer the research questions of the thesis. Through the uncovering of its discursive strategies, the analysis reveals what qualities were attached to the arriving migrants by the cabinet, in order to portray them as threatening ‘others’, who are different from ‘us’ and pose an existential threat to ‘our’ common values. Furthermore, after identifying the applied argumentation rules, it becomes clear which sectors (national economy, public security, culture and identity, etc.) were perceived to be jeopardised by the increased immigration. Embedding the texts into context, on the one hand, allows for evaluating whether the government have been consistent in its discourse or not, and on the other hand for identifying how changes in the socio-political context within the analysed period facilitated or constrained the use of certain discursive strategies.

1.1. Structure of the thesis

In the second chapter, I introduce the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School more extensively. I present the idea of a wider understanding of security, than elaborate on the speech act theory. Subsequently, it is explained in detail how the core ideas of the former concepts are merged together in securitization theory. Finally, taking into account critiques of the sociological approach of securitization, I incorporate some elements of that approach into the theoretical framework of this thesis.

The third chapter introduces the methodology applied in the thesis. Firstly, the most important ideas of Critical Discourse Studies are presented. After that, the discourse-historical approach is situated within the broad, inclusive group of CDS and its main concepts are explained. Afterwards, the methodological tools of DHA are presented and it is briefly demonstrated how those are applied in the empirical section to analyse the data, which I also introduce in chapter 3.

Chapter 4 puts the discourse into context. Hungary’s historical experiences with migration, the public’s attitude towards ‘others’ as well as the immediate political context
are briefly summarized. Then, before analysing the texts, I justify the argument that the securitization was successful.

In Chapter 5, I turn to analyse the discourse. Four salient micro-topics are identified in the broad discourse on migration, thus these are analysed separately. The applied discursive strategies within texts, as well as the context shaping those are uncovered in order to be able to answer the research questions of the thesis. Finally, the main findings are summarized in Chapter 6.

2. Securitization theory

The theoretical base of my thesis is the securitization theory. I will incorporate elements of both the Copenhagen School’s post-structuralist, philosophic approach and the sociological approach, ‘two ideal-typical approaches’ to securitization (Balzacq 2011, 19).

The theory itself was born out of the combination of two separate developments in security studies. On the one hand, more and more authors (e.g. Jahn et al. 1987, Matthews 1989; Nye 1989; Haftendorn 1991; Wæver et al. 1993) argued that it was time to broaden the state-centric approach of security studies and shift the focus away from military and nuclear threats. Their claim became even stronger at the beginning of the 1990s, as the bipolar logic of the Cold War era came to an end. The prevailing traditionalist view at the time thought of security as an exclusively military issue related to the use of force (e.g. Walt 1991; Dorff 1994), overlooking wideners’ arguments. The latter challenged the idea of narrowing down security studies to military conflicts and advocated for understanding security in a broader sense, by the inclusion of non-military causes of conflict (e.g. environmental, economic and identity issues) in analyses.

On the other hand, drawing on Austin’s (1975) theory, a concept developed by Wæver (1989) thought of security as a speech act. He argued that simply ‘saying security … moves [a] particular case into a specific area’: the realm of security (ibid. 6). Thereby, the utterance of security in itself becomes a securitizing action.

These two new approaches in security studies were merged together in Security: A New Framework for Analysis, the seminal work of the Copenhagen School’s authors, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998). The scholars embraced calls for a wider security agenda as well as the idea that security is a speech act, thus argued that any issue (military or non-military) can be securitized, merely by uttering the word security.
This concept was further developed by Balzacq (2011), whose critique of the Copenhagen School’s excessive focus on speech acts added valuable thoughts to securitization theory. Moreover, he emphasized the importance of context in relation to the securitization process.

2.1. A wider understanding of security

In their work, Buzan et al. aimed to develop a new framework of security which keeps ‘the security agenda open to many different types of threats’, including non-military ones, but also incorporates some ideas of the traditionalist approach (1998, 4). The authors identified five sectors by adding three more sectors (economic, societal and environmental) to the traditional categories of military and political security. In all of these, interactions can be distinguished that are typical for each sector.

The traditionalist element of the new framework was its understanding of the nature of security issues in international relations. In this respect, ‘security is about survival: an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object’. Such threats ‘justify the use of extraordinary measures to handle them’, therefore portraying an issue as a matter of security legitimizes the use of force, special powers or extraordinary measures in order to avert the danger that jeopardizes the referent object. (ibid., 21).

The authors blended together ‘widener’ and traditionalist elements of security studies in their framework by identifying different perceptions of existential threats and accordingly, different measures to deal with them in each sector of security. They argued that in order to understand what counts as an existential threat in a particular sector but not in another, one should be familiar with the character of referent objects in different domains of security. In other words, what is seen as an existential threat ‘will vary greatly across different sectors and … so will the nature [of them]’ (ibid., 21-22).

In the two traditional sectors, military and political, the referent object is the state itself and its sovereignty (or sometimes ideology). The former can be existentially threatened by a hostile foreign countries’ military invasion against the state, while the latter by questioning the recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority of the state.

In the three ‘new’ sectors it is harder to clearly define referent objects. In the economic sector – according to rules of the market economy – it is usual that firms go bankrupt, therefore it is hard for them to justify why extraordinary measures should be taken to ‘keep them alive’. On the contrary, ‘national economies have a greater claim to
the right of survival’, however, according to the authors, a threat that jeopardizes the whole economy of a country rarely emerges on its own (ibid., 22). Such a development is usually a consequence of other security-related issues, for example, a war.

Buzan et al. identified collective identities (nations, religions) as referent objects in the societal sector. Nevertheless, since these identities are – especially in the age of globalization – constantly evolving ‘in response to internal and external developments’, it is hard to define what could be seen as an existential threat. Furthermore, the perception of existential threats is also dependent on the extent to which holders of a particular collective identity are open-minded or narrow-minded. (ibid., 23).

In the environmental sector, a range of possible referent objects could be drawn. One can argue that the security of the whole biosphere of the Earth is being threatened, while others may be worried about the security of specific species or a particular habitat.

2.2. Security as a speech act

As I mentioned above, the Copenhagen School conceived security as a state of affairs where the survival of a referent object is at stake and where all necessary means can be mobilised in order to protect the safety of the referent object. But how can one legitimise such a claim and the application of extraordinary measures?

In response to the latter question, Buzan et al. (ibid., 23) argue that since it is about the survival of a referent object,

‘security takes politics beyond the established rules of the game
and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.’

Therefore, securitization is understood as the process of dramatizing and presenting an issue as one of supreme priority, by labelling it security.

If there are issues that can be placed above politics, consequently there must be others which remain in the realm of normal or everyday politics, moreover, some are not even represented on the political agenda. In other words, public issues can be located on a spectrum depending on the extent to which they are politicized. At the beginning of the spectrum are the non-politicized issues which remain outside state authorities’ limit of power and are not present in any public debate. At the next stage, in the middle of the spectrum, are the politicized issues. These are issues which concern the public, and thus are part of policy discussions and authorities have to make decisions relating to them. On
the other end of the spectrum are the securitized issues. Here, issues are presented as existential threats which require emergency measures, meaning that in order to avert the danger, actions can be taken ‘outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ (ibid., 24). A particular issue can be placed anywhere on this spectrum, depending on to what level of politicization the state or other societal actors raise (or degrade) it.

Following this logic, one is able to securitize an issue by simply arguing that it should be taken outside the field of everyday politics, where special powers can be used to deal with it. This implies that ‘the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and … not in what people consciously think the concept means’. To put it another way, how people implicitly use a concept in some ways rather than others, determines its meaning. Therefore, if a state or another actor can argue that a particular issue presents such a grave threat that it should be given absolute priority (i.e. lifted above normal politics) and should be dealt with outside everyday politics, it ‘has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game’ (ibid., 24).

Scholars of the Copenhagen School see security as a self-referential practice and a speech act. In their understanding, an issue becomes securitized and gets to be treated outside the realm of normal politics ‘not necessarily because a real threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat’ (ibid., 24). By claiming that an issue should be considered as a matter of security, an actor has already started securitizing it, or as Waever (1995, 55) puts it, ‘something is done … by uttering security’. This approach draws on the speech act theory of Austin (1975). He argues that apart from statements that only ‘describe some state of affairs, or state some fact’ there are also performative sentences (ibid., 1). Uttering these performatives is more than just saying something: it is doing something, performing an action (e.g. betting or making a promise).

To sum up the essence of securitization, let me refer back to the question I posed at the beginning of this section. According to the Copenhagen School, one does not (necessarily) have to legitimise the claim that a referent object is existentially threatened, thus neither that extraordinary measures are required in order to protect it. Since language is understood as a performative act, saying security in itself indicates that a particular issue exceeds the limits of normal politics, thus elevates it to the realm of security, where actors are not bound by rules and can use special powers.
2.3. The process of securitization

After introducing the idea of securitization, it is important to elaborate on how the process is exercised in theory, who the main actors are and what the main concepts are. The process begins with a securitization move by which the securitizing actor seeks to convince the audience that a referent object is being jeopardised, in order to get its approval for using special powers to fend off the threat. If the audience accepts the actor’s claim and follows the securitization lead then the securitization is successful, and the issue comes to be treated as a matter of security. If, however, the audience does not agree with the actor, the referent object remains in the (non-)politicized domain.

The first step in the securitization process is thus the securitization move. It is performed by the securitizing actor, who ‘presents something as an existential threat to a referent object’, thereby claims the right to take emergency measures (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). This move serves as a securitization lead which the audience – those targeted by the securitizing move – can either follow or reject, depending on attributes of the referent object as well as the social power of the securitizing actor.

Referent objects are ‘things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival’ (ibid. 36). Since the location of issues on the spectrum of politicization is subjective, that is it is determined by the level of importance and urgency actors assign to them, anything can be portrayed as a referent object (i.e. as being in the realm of security). In reality, however, the securitizing actor is able to achieve successful securitization, only if the targeted people acknowledge the legitimacy of the securitizing move. These people constitute the audience, whom the ‘securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures’ (ibid. 41). To put it simply, they have to follow the securitization lead put forward by the actor and agree with the claim that a particular object is under threat because only then will they accept the invocation of extraordinary measures.

Nevertheless, it is not enough for a successful securitization if both the actor and the audience perceive threat. The latter must also be willing to accept or tolerate violation of the rules of normal politics for the sake of the referent object in question. According to the Copenhagen School, size or scale is a ‘crucial variable in determining what constitutes a successful referent object’ (ibid. 36). Individuals and small groups are weak to generate security legitimacy for themselves, while issues at the global level are too indirect to garner mass identity. Limited collectivities (e.g. states, nations, civilisations),
however, are able to trigger a ‘we’ feeling as they are in constant rivalry with other groups of their kind. Thereby, middle-level referent objects are the most likely to successfully establish a claim to survival, that is to be seen as a value whose safety must be preserved by any means (ibid.).

A further aspect which can determine the success of a securitization move is the social capital of the securitizing actor. On the one hand, anyone can attempt to securitize any issue, while on the other hand, some actors are expected to be more successful in doing so, although no one is guaranteed to succeed (see Bigo 1994 and Wæver 1995). In other words, no one is excluded from trying to portray a referent object as being threatened, but people view certain actors as ‘accepted voices of security’, therefore their securitization lead is more likely to be followed by the audience. However, as ‘no one holds the power of securitization’ it is not guaranteed even for the most powerful actors in the field of security to convince the audience (Buzan et al. 1998, 31).

Lastly, actors seeking to securitize an issue should satisfy certain conditions in order to make the speech act work properly (Austin 1975). The first set of – ‘internal, linguistic-grammatical’ – rules states that a conventional procedure should exist and should be executed appropriately. In securitization theory this means that the securitizing actor must follow the ‘grammar of security’ in general and the ‘particular dialects of different sectors’ as well, but also the logic of securitization, i.e. presenting an existential threat, a point of no return for the referent object and a possible way out. The ‘external, contextual and social’ rules prescribe that an appropriate actor should deliver the speech act, in appropriate circumstances. Thus, securitizing actors should be ‘in a position of authority’ and refer to objects that are associated with threat within the audience (Buzan et al. 1998, 33).

2.4. Incorporating elements of the sociological approach

In order to have a better understanding of the process of securitization, it is useful to embrace some ideas of the sociological approach which are absent from that of the Copenhagen School. Having these ideas in the theoretical framework makes the applied methodology more relevant. At the same time, the framework itself will remain coherent even after blending together the two approaches because ‘studies of securitization … combine philosophical and sociological insights’ (Balzacq 2011, 3).

The main critique of the Copenhagen School’s approach concerns the role of the audience. In the philosophical approach, whether the audience gives its assent for the
invocation of extraordinary measures – that is indispensable for successful securitization – depends only on external factors (importance of the referent object, authority of the speaker). The sociological approach, however, argues that the feelings, needs, interests and experiences of the audience should be taken into consideration by the securitizing actor (see Edelman 1988), who ‘has to tune his/her language’ accordingly (Balzacq 2011, 9).

A related aspect, the importance of context is also highlighted by this approach. Drawing on Bubandt’s (2005) claim that different audiences have different historical experiences, it argues that these experiences constrain or facilitate the securitization of particular issues. Therefore, the grammar of security is ‘a combination of textual meaning and cultural meaning [that] form a frame of reference through which security utterances can be understood’ (Balzacq 2011, 14).

A third valuable addition of the sociological approach concerns the discursive strategies applied by securitizing actors. Similarly to Austin’s facilitating conditions, this approach also identifies acts that contribute to the success of securitization. These include appropriate language use (e.g. grammar of security, logic of securitization) as well as the application of discursive strategies, that is to mobilise heuristic artefacts (metaphors, stereotypes, emotions etc.), in order to ‘facilitate the mobilization of the audience’ (ibid., 36).

3. Methodology

Since the Copenhagen School understands the process of securitization as a speech act, scholars of the approach argue that ‘to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations’ (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). Applying discourse analysis enables to ‘map the emergence and evolution of patterns of representations which are constitutive of a threat image’ (Balzacq 2011, 39). In other words, conducting such an analysis helps to uncover which arguments could lead to the successful securitization of an issue, and under what circumstances.

This thesis will apply the discourse-historical approach (DHA), a method that belongs to the broader school of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS; previously known as Critical Discourse Analysis). In the following sections, I introduce the main concepts of both CDS and the DHA and elaborate on how applying this method helps to answer the research questions of the thesis.
3.1. Critical Discourse Studies

CDS sees language as a social practice, that is discourses are both socially constitutive and socially constituted (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). On the one hand, discourses ‘influence social and political reality’, thus ‘(re)create social worlds and relations’, while on the other hand, they are shaped and affected by ‘the situational, institutional and social contexts’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 8; Flowerdew and Richardson 2018, 2). Therefore—drawing on the speech act theory of Austin (1975)—the approach assumes that discourses can be performative and may change social reality. However, in other contexts, they may stabilize and reproduce the status quo. In other words, discourses have ideological effects as ‘they can produce and reproduce unequal power relations’ between different social groups (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 258). Discourses, thus, are understood as ‘relatively stable uses of language serving the organization and structuring of social life’, that is to ‘give expression to particular institutions or social groups’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 6; Flowerdew and Richardson 2018, 2).

The ‘critical’ aspect of CDS is based on the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School (see e.g. Horkheimer 2002 [1937]). This approach advocates for ‘critiquing and changing society as a whole’ rather than just understanding or explaining it (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 6). Therefore, in relation to CDS, critique means that rather than merely studying language (or language use) in itself, critical discourse analysis should be aimed at investigating social phenomena. Accordingly, CDS focuses on larger linguistic units (e.g. texts, discourses, speech acts) and studies not just grammar but the performative aspect of language as well (Wodak 2001a; Wodak and Meyer 2009).

CDS argues that ‘every discourse is historically produced and interpreted’ (Wodak 2001a, 3). As such, in order to understand them, the context – culture, ideology, power relations of the actors as well as other related discourses – in which discourses are constructed and acquire meaning must be taken into account (Wodak 1996; Wodak and Meyer 2009).

3.2. The discourse-historical approach: concepts and method

This thesis applies the discourse-historical approach (DHA) of the methods under the umbrella of critical discourse studies. Its emphasis on argumentation schemes fits well into how securitization theory conceptualizes the process of securitization. Moreover, this method of CDS pays the most attention to history and context, which are also featured in
securitization theory as factors that should be considered in order to successfully securitize a particular issue.

As a critical discourse analytical method, DHA aims to embed the analysed data in the social context. In order to do so it applies three different forms of critique (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 88):

1. Text or discourse immanent critique aims at discovering inconsistencies, self-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures.
2. Socio-diagnostic critique is concerned with demystifying the persuasive character of discursive practices by making use of contextual knowledge.
3. Prospective critique seeks to contribute to the improvement of communication.

The DHA defines discourse as ‘a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action’ (ibid. 89). Since discourses are related to macro-topics they are ‘composed of groups of … semiotic units’ (texts, conversations etc.) that are ‘produced by somebody, distributed by somebody and received by somebody’. These semiotic units ‘serve specific purposes’, therefore, together as a discourse, more than just representing social reality they can create, reproduce and change it as well (Reisigl 2018, 51).

Discourses are differentiated from each other according to which field of action and macro-topic they belong to. Fields of action are ‘segments of the societal reality’ functionally connecting texts, thus serving as frames for discourses (Wodak 2001b, 66). Examples in the political field include the field of law-making procedure and the field of formation of public opinion, among others. However, boundaries of discourses are not fixed but fluid. They are ‘open to reinterpretation’, therefore they can ‘spread to different fields and relate to or overlap with other discourses’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 89-90). This can be done through linking to each other sub- or micro-topics of respective discourses by interdiscursivity, thereby intertwining elements of separate discourses.

Discourses are made up of ‘thematically interrelated semiotic tokens’ (Titscher et al. 2000, 156). To put it simply, these are (written or spoken) texts, through which discourses are realized and made durable over time (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 89). Texts are categorized into genres according to their linguistic style because, as Fairclough (2010, 93) argues, a genre is the ‘use of language associated with particular socially ratified activity types’. Then, depending on which genre they are assigned to, texts can also be classified as which field of action they belong to.
Texts within one discourse are related to other texts in other discourses. This link is described as *intertextuality*, that can be manifested through explicitly referencing or more vaguely evoking and alluding to the same topics, events or actors as well as through transferring arguments (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 90). The latter aspect of intertextuality is called *recontextualization*. First, this process takes out the claims of a text from their original context through *de-contextualization*. Then these arguments are placed in a new context, where new meanings are assigned to them (ibid. 90).

All of these different relationships between discourses, texts, topics and genres are illustrated in Figure 1. The two big overlapping ellipses represent interdiscursivity between ‘Discourse A’ and ‘Discourse B’. The intersection of the discourses indicates that within the texts that constitute the discourses, at least one has a common micro-topic that is related to the respective macro-topic of the two discourses. Thereby, this topic can be found in both discourses. Intertextuality is represented by dotted double arrows, where texts are referring to other texts. The simple arrows link each text to (a) certain genre(s). Topics are assigned to texts with simple dotted arrows. The overlapping small ellipses represent that topics within different texts have commonalities regarding their content. Explicit intertextual references are indicated by simple broken arrows.

![Figure 1. Interdiscursive and intertextual relationships between discourses, discourse topics, genres and texts (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 39)](image)

To sum it up, fields of action, topics, relationships between texts and of course language use itself determine how a particular discourse is being interpreted. Nevertheless, owing to its historical alignment, DHA argues that for a complete understanding of discourses history should be integrated into the analysis. Therefore, it identifies four levels or dimensions of context (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 93; Reisigl 2018, 53):
1. Immediate, language internal co-text and co-discourse: for example, coherence, collocations, connotations and presuppositions within texts.
2. Intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses.
3. Social factors and institutional frames: a specific context situation’s degree of formality, occasion (time and place), addressees, features of the actors (e.g. roles, orientation and identities).
4. Broader socio-political and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in and related to.

After introducing the most important concepts in CDS and DHA, I turn to explain how the analysis is carried out in practice. The approach is three-dimensional: the first step is to identify topics within a specific discourse; in the second stage the discursive strategies are investigated; and lastly, the exact linguistic means are examined through which the discursive strategies are employed as well as the context-dependent linguistic realizations of those (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 93).

Discursive strategies are intentionally applied ‘practices … to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal’. There are five types of these strategies that can be uncovered by looking for the answers to the following five core questions (ibid. 93-94):

1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or mitigated?

These strategies are summarized in Table 1, which highlights the aims of each strategy as well as the applied linguistic tools in order to achieve the former.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Devices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Referential/nomination</td>
<td>construction of in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>membership categorization</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tropes (metaphors, metonymies, deictics, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>denoting verbs and nouns</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Predication</td>
<td>labelling social actors positively or negatively</td>
<td>stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>implicit and explicit predicates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>collocations, allusions, presuppositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Argumentation</td>
<td>justification of attributions</td>
<td>topoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Perspectivization,</td>
<td>expressing involvement</td>
<td>reporting, description, narration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>framing, discourse</td>
<td>positioning the speaker’s point of view</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Intensification,</td>
<td>modifying the epistemic status of a proposition</td>
<td>augmentatives or diminutives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigation</td>
<td></td>
<td>hyperboles or litotes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1. Discursive strategies (Wodak 2001b, 73; Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 95)*

Topoi are ‘conclusion rules which connect the argument(s) to the conclusion [thereby] justifying the transition’ from the former to the latter (Kienpointner; cited in Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 102). In order to uncover these argumentation schemes in the analysed texts, this thesis applies formal argumentation analysis in the empirical section. This approach focuses on three elements that are present in argumentation, either explicitly or implicitly (as illustrated in Figure 2): argument, conclusion rule and claim. The former argues in favour or against a disputable statement, while the topos links it to the actual contested claim (Kienpointner; cited in Reisigl 2014, 75).

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argument __________ conclusion rule/topos __________ claim
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*Figure 2. A simplified model of argumentation (Reisigl 2014, 75)*

This method of argumentation analysis identifies a number of content-abstract topoi (ibid. 76.) Nevertheless, different discourses may apply specific content-related topoi. For example, in discourses about national identity, the most common argumentation rules include the topos of similarity/difference, the topos of external threat or the topos of name interpretation, while in debates about migration those include the topos of usefulness/uselessness, the topos of threat or the topos of humanitarianism (see Wodak et al. 2009; Wodak 2001b). The following sections present the data and then explain how it is analysed through the application of DHA’s methodological tools in order to answer the research questions of the thesis.
3.3. The data

The data consists of interviews conducted with and speeches delivered by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, between 11 January 2015 and 30 March 2018. This thesis focuses only on the utterances of the Prime Minister, as Orbán can be deemed to be speaking in the name of the whole government. On the one hand, he arguably holds the most political power in Hungary, thus he is in a position of authority (see e.g. Pesti et al. 2015, 130). On the other hand, by virtue of this position, he has access to undisclosed (security-related) reports and other material that is not available for the general public. In other words, the power position and the inherent knowledge are linked (Balzacq 2011, 24-25). Owing to the asymmetric access to information, the Prime Minister is seen as credible, thus he is an ‘accepted voice of security’ and has authority over the field (Buzan et al. 1998, 31; Gusfield 1981). Moreover, Buzan et al. (1998, 41) argue that if an actor is ‘locked into [a] strong role’, instead of focusing on the individual who is the ‘designated authoritative representative’ of a group of people, the collectivity itself should be regarded as the speaker. In other words, when Orbán speaks in an official capacity, as the Prime Minister of Hungary, it is more relevant to interpret the utterances as not his own personal opinion, but as the official standpoint of the government of Hungary. Consequently, this thesis studies the discourse of the government on migration through the analysis of spoken texts produced by the Prime Minister.

The first element of the data – thus the starting point of the analysis – coincides with the securitizing move of the Hungarian government, i.e. when it began to portray migration as a security issue (see Orbán 2015a). The endpoint of the analysis is the last interview that Orbán gave (to Kossuth Rádió) before the 2018 Hungarian general election. This timeframe is utilized in order to avoid the discretionary selection of a random date, resulting in analysing either just a segment of the third Orbán government’s discourse or broadening the scope of analysis, and including texts from that of the subsequent fourth Orbán government. Therefore, the temporal limitation gives the strength of this thesis; it studies the securitization efforts of the third Orbán government, that is its discourse on migration, as one unit – from the securitizing move to the 2018 election – thereby it is able to provide an overview of the whole securitization process that was exercised by the cabinet.

In total, the analysed data consists of 50 interviews and 13 speeches. The interviews (except for one) were all conducted in the ‘180 minutes’ programme of state-
owned radio Kossuth Rádió. During these conversations, which last approximately 30 minutes each, the Prime Minister is asked about the most important and most recent political issues and developments. The issue of migration gained the Hungarian public’s attention at the beginning of 2015 and remained (one of) the most salient topic(s) throughout the analysed period (Bíró-Nagy 2018). Therefore, migration was a recurrent theme in these conversations. Nevertheless, the issue was not concerned in all ‘180 Minutes’ interviews with the Prime Minister in the analysed period, thus these were excluded from the dataset. Orbán usually attends this programme once or twice a month, apart from a one-month period in the summer. Taking into consideration these factors, altogether the data includes 49 Kossuth Rádió interviews and one that was aired on state television M1.

In all, the thesis analyses 14 interviews from 2015, 17 from 2016, 15 from 2017 and 4 from the first three months of 2018.

The other part of the data comprises 13 speeches of Orbán. Six of them were performed on Hungarian national holidays (15 March and 23 October); three presentations were given on a major conservative Hungarian workshop and summer open university, called Tusványos; and four ‘State of the Nation’ addresses were delivered. These occasions usually draw the attention of the media, therefore they are covered and broadcasted to the public in more detail than the (by-)weekly interviews. Moreover, these texts are more thoroughly structured than on-air interviews, thus could be seen as summarizing as well as emphasizing the main arguments of the government’s discourse.

 Altogether, there are 1.6 texts per each month in the period between January 2015 and March 2018. This – especially if taking into account the constant frequency of the interviews – enables to study how the securitization process, that is the discourse on migration and related sub-topics, unfolded and then evolved over time. In addition, the speeches in the dataset (particularly those on national holidays) often place present-day issues in historical context, making the DHA an even more appropriate method for analysis.

3.4. Applying the DHA to analyse the government’s securitizing discourse

The analysis – as mentioned above – starts with identifying the main discourse. In this case, it is evident that the overarching macro-topic is migration. Before analysing the texts that constitute the discourse, the issue of migration is put into context through briefly

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1 The inclusion of the latter in the data is explained by its importance: the process of securitization was in fact launched during that exact interview.
introducing Hungary’s historical experiences with migration, actors identified as others in the past and the general public attitude towards strangers, as well as by presenting the immediate pre-2015 political context of the country.

After that, I present the most important micro-topics (portrayed to be) relating to the broad discourse on migration, that is themes which more often reoccur in the texts. After studying the texts through applying the securitization theory, as outlined in the previous chapter, the following four topics were identified as the most salient referent objects: 1) economy; 2) public security; 3) culture; and 4) national sovereignty. Afterwards, further analysis is conducted separately focusing on the four topics. In each of these sub-topics, the utilized discursive strategies and the linguistic, social as well as historical context are studied concurrently, which then enables to critically evaluate these.

The discursive strategies are revealed through a three-step process. Firstly, since nomination and predication strategies are closely linked to each other, membership categorization devices and stereotypical or evaluative labels attached to different groups are searched for at once. Secondly, through applying argumentation analysis, the topoi, that are mobilised in order to support the claims made in predications, are identified. Thirdly – if relevant – the self-positioning of the speaker (Orbán speaking on behalf of the government) is revealed as well as whether it applies intensification or mitigation strategies.

Simultaneously, the analysis takes into account the textual context as well as extralinguistic variables. The former is done through studying the coherence and interrelatedness of the texts, while the latter is concerned with developments and occurrences (such as increase/decrease in the number of arriving immigrants, actions of other political actors, terrorist attacks, etc.) that contributed to the alteration of the socio-political context of the migration discourse throughout the analysed period.

Conducting a thorough analysis of how language is used and with the aim of reaching which goals, while at the same time contextualizing this linguistic practice enables to critically analyse the texts. Uncovering the discursive strategies reveal whether the texts are fully coherent or whether there are (self-)contradictions and inconsistencies within them. Moreover, putting them in context allows for socio-diagnostic critique, through which ‘discrepancies between discursive and other practices’ can be exposed. Nevertheless, this form of critique is subjective to the extent that it relies on the background knowledge of the analyst (Fairclough 2018, 51).
4. Contextualizing the third Orbán government’s discourse

As argued before, the discourse-historical approach highlights the role of context, thus prior to the analysis of the texts, it is necessary to familiarize with the context in which the discourse is embedded. Thus, the following chapters contextualize the discourse of the cabinet, through briefly introducing the last one hundred years’ notable immigratory movements into Hungary as well as the public attitude towards ‘strangers’ and the political context in which securitization began. Then section 4.4. summarizes how the government successfully securitized migration, by presenting the dynamics of the public opinion and its legislative acts.

4.1. Hungary’s historical experiences with immigration

Between the late 17th century and the end of the first World War, Hungary was part of the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, called Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1867. Native Hungarians accounted for slightly more than half of the population living within the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary (not accounting for Croatia-Slavonia that enjoyed considerable autonomy) (Romsics 2010, 25).

However, after losing the Great War the constituting nations of the empire declared their independence and Austria-Hungary was dissolved. In 1920, the Treaty of Trianon regulated the borders between Hungary and the surrounding newly-independent states. More than one-third of its territory, with more than 3 million ethnic Hungarians living in those areas, was annexed to Hungary’s neighbours. Thus, a great wave of immigrants reached the country soon after the end of the war: around 200,000 Hungarians, who remained outside the new ‘Trianon’ borders of Hungary, resettled to their ‘homeland’ (Juhász 1995, 203). As a result of these developments, from a multi-national country, it became an ethically homogenous nation-state with nearly 90 percent of the population being Hungarian (Romsics 2010, 94).

After World War II, the ethnic composition of the country was further homogenised. Through ‘population exchange’ programmes as well as forced evictions tens of thousands of Slovaks and Germans left the country, while nearly 70,000 Hungarians resettled from Czechoslovakian territory and further 200,000 from other neighbouring countries (Juhász 1995, 204). Consequently, native Hungarians came to constitute 99 percent of the population by 1949 (KSH 1950, 315).
After the communist regime took power, borders of the country were sealed. The thorough monitoring of its frontiers cut off Hungary from migration routes, thus ‘between 1949 and 1989 virtually no immigrants had arrived’ (Hajduk 2008, 22) Two exceptions were the admittance of Greek and Chilean refugees in the late 1940s and in 1973, however, these instances were not publicized widely (Juhász 1995).

Migratory movements intensified in the region in the late 1980s and turned Hungary into a transit as well as an ‘immigrant country’. In 1989 rumours spread across the countries of the Eastern bloc that Hungary plans to ease controls on its border with Austria, that was part of the Iron Curtain. During the summer tens of thousands of Germans from the German Democratic Republic sought to escape to West Germany passing through Hungary, taking advantage of the situation that eventually resulted in the opening of the border (Weichel 2008).

Apart from Germans, 27,000 to 37,000 other refugees arrived in Hungary annually between 1988 and 1991 (Hajduk 2008). This surge in numbers was caused mainly by two waves of asylum-seekers from the east and south. From 1988 onwards, mostly ethnic Hungarians fled Romania because of ‘economic hardships and political persecution’, while later tens of thousands sought refuge from Yugoslavia after wars broke out in the country (Horváth et al. 2011, 21; Juhász 1995).

Later, between 1995 and 2012 the number of refugees stabilized well under 5,000 annually, except for a five-year period during and after the Kosovo War. Concurrently, by the 2000s, people from African and Asian countries began to account for the majority of applications (Gödri 2015). In 2013, after a great increase in numbers, they submitted two-thirds of the nearly 20,000 asylum claims, while Kosovars made up the remaining one-third of those. A year later the total number of refugees more than doubled, but this time people fleeing the poor economic situation in Kosovo and migrants from other third countries both accounted for half of the claims (IAO 2015).

In summary, Hungary did not have recent experience of large population movements before 2015. The most recent larger influx was around the millennium, nevertheless, the arriving refugees were either ethnic Hungarians from Vojvodina or came from neighbouring states with similar cultural background. Even after 2013, when the number of other third country asylum-seekers greatly increased, the issue remained absent from public debates (Bernáth and Messing 2015, 9; Gallai et al. 2017, 123; Bíró-Nagy 2018, 279).
4.2. Public attitude towards ‘others’

In the wake of losing most of its territory, thus its ethnic minorities as well, the target of (internal) othering came to be Jews in Hungary. Anti-Semitic topoi already existed before World War I, but were mostly marginal voices. However, after the defeat in the war these arguments were intensified and supplemented by the claim that Jews were not willing to fight for the country. The experience of the Hungarian Soviet Republic led to a further rise in anti-Semitism, as Jewish people were over-represented in the political leadership of the short-lived revolutionary republic (Romsics 2018). This resulted in the passing of the first anti-Jewish law in 1920, followed by several more in the 1930s. The anti-Semitic sentiments culminated in 1944 when hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews were deported to concentration camps (ibid.).

After the Second World War and throughout the communist regime, it was the Roma population who constituted the internal other. They were views as a social group with different culture and were to be integrated into the majority of society by suppressing these cultural differences Nevertheless, this policy did not succeed, but ‘cemented the marginal position of the Roma’ (Horváth et al. 2011, 18). They were the least tolerated minority group in Hungary in recent years, with widely accepted stereotypes about them (ibid.).

In the 1990s, the immigration of ethnic Hungarians was mostly met with solidarity. Nevertheless, economic rivalry shortly reduced the initial sympathy (Juhász 1995), and an ambivalent feeling established towards them: ethnic Hungarians who did not emigrate from the neighbouring countries were seen more preferably than those who did so (Tóth and Turai 2003). About a decade later the issue still generated strong feelings. In 2001, the so-called Status Law (2001) which granted mostly cultural and educational benefits, with limited work permits was passed in parliament. The opposition socialist party accused the government of opening Hungary’s labour market to ‘millions of Romanians’ (Kovács 2001). Furthermore, in a 2004 referendum on whether to grant the possibility to ethnic Hungarians to obtain Hungarian citizenship or not, the then-governing socialist-liberal coalition campaigned against this possibility (Melegh 2016). Despite these debates, ethnic Hungarians are still the most widely accepted group of migrants because of the same cultural background and the cross-border understanding of Hungarian nationhood (Simonovits and Szalai 2013; Horvát et al. 2011).
However, the general level of xenophobia remains high in Hungary. The proportion of those who would refuse to let in any migrants rose sharply in the first half of the 1990s, from 15 percent to 40 percent. In the following years, their rate fluctuated between 19 and 43 percent, before stabilizing at around one-quarter to one-third of the population. However, the proportion of xenophobes rose in the years before the refugee crisis to levels above 35 percent (Sik 2016). Despite the relatively high level of xenophobia, immigration was not considered to be a major issue in political or public debates before 2015 (Bernáth and Messing 2015, 9; Gallai et al. 2017, 123; Bíró-Nagy 2018, 279).

In all, it can be said that there are historical examples of (internal) othering based on both religious and cultural difference. Furthermore, since the end of the 1990s, Hungarians have been among the most strongly migrant-rejecting nations in Europe, even though a significant number of refugees did not enter the country before 2015 (Horváth et al. 2011).

4.3. Political context

The right-wing, conservative Fidesz-KDNP alliance won a two-thirds majority in the 2010 parliamentary elections. The gained supermajority was seen as an authorization for more than a change of government, thus it was interpreted as a ‘revolutionary mandate … for establishing a new political regime’ (Körösényi 2015a, 408). The new government declared the formation of the ‘System of National Cooperation’, a new mode of governance, where the ‘common will of the nation may not be overridden’ (Office of the National Assembly 2010, 10). Other populist elements, emphasizing the close connection between the government and its decisions and ‘the people’, include the issuing of national consultations (surveys sent to each and every voter in the country) in order to ‘demonstrate the participative and responsive nature’ of the cabinet’s policies (Körösényi 2015a, 417). Furthermore, the politics of Orbán are characterised by strong anti-establishment tones and the constant presence of enemy images (ibid., 415-416).

The government stated that the ‘System of National Cooperation is open to all Hungarians’, thus to ‘make Hungarians living abroad a part of [it]’ (Office of the National Assembly 2010, 6; 16). This claim was supported by legislative action as the parliament passed a bill that made it considerably easier to obtain citizenship for those with Hungarian descent (Melegh 2016). Moreover, after gaining dual nationality they are automatically entitled to vote in Hungarian general elections, without the need to reside
in the country. Meanwhile, policies towards other third-country nationals were far less supportive or even discriminatory in some instances (ibid.).

The government’s demographic policy could have contributed to the latter fact. In October 2014, Orbán (2014) stated that Hungary’s (as well as the EU’s) problem of ageing and declining population should not be solved by immigration but by family policy. In other words, instead of facilitating the reception of immigrants, the government sought to reduce population decline by assisting Hungarian families to be able to bear more children.

The immediate political context was shaped by the increasing popularity of far-right Jobbik, at the expense of that of the governing parties. The government’s, thus Fidesz-KDNP’s popularity was hit by the ‘entry ban scandal’ as well as deeply unpopular public policy proposals in the autumn of 2014 (Glied and Pap 2016). The loss of around 1 million voters became evident as Fidesz-KDNP lost three by-elections in a row – between November 2014 and April 2015 – and as a result, its two-thirds majority in the parliament as well (Bíró-Nagy 2018).

In all, the government prioritized ethnic Hungarians and the birth of Hungarian children over immigrants and immigration, when it came to granting citizenship and managing demographic problems. Moreover, the surge in support of another right-wing party raised the possibility of a shrinking electoral base. The generally high level of xenophobia among Hungarians provided an opportunity for the governing parties to recover the lost voters by placing migration on the forefront of the political agenda.

Being a member state of the European Union also affected the political context. Hungary, as part of the EU, Hungary has shared its sovereignty over the issues of immigration and asylum. The most important rules that have to be observed by member states in these domains are the Dublin III Regulation, the Reception Conditions Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive.

The Dublin III Regulation (2013) determines which country is responsible for examining an asylum claim. The member state tasked with examining applications of asylum-seekers is the one in which they first apply for asylum within the EU. Technically, this means that most of the time member states on the EU’s external borders are conducting these processes since migrants enter the EU for the first time there.

The Reception Conditions Directive (2013) sets standard conditions that have to be provided for applicants. These include shelter, supplying food and clothing and medical care among others. The directive prohibits automatic detention of asylum-seekers
because of their status as such. Instead, it advocates for individual, case-by-case decisions on their confinement, however only as a last resort.

Lastly, the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013) stipulates a unified process of examining claims in order to harmonize decisions throughout the EU. For example, every application must be examined on an individual basis, claimants must have the right to appeal as well as for legal assistance through this process and they must be provided with an interpreter if necessary.

4.4. Success of the securitization: the audience and extraordinary measures

This section argues that the discourse with which the government securitized migration was successful, thus enabled the cabinet to handle the issue as if it was above the rules of normal politics. The securitization began on 11 January 2015, when Orbán (2015a) declared that ‘immigration is a bad thing [that] brings trouble and danger [to Europe, and] must be stopped’. In the years that followed the discourse of the government focused on the issue in order to legitimise measures to restrain migrants’ movements. Before I turn to analyse the discourse itself, this section first validates the claim that the securitizing attempt was successful, then shortly introduces the measures taken by the government. Thus, I present the public opinion on migration, that indicates whether the audience (in this case Hungarian society) accepted the securitizing actor’s (the government’s) claim to handle the threatening issue (migration) through extraordinary means (measures of the government).

Soon after launching the securitization process with the above-mentioned statement, the government decided to hold a national consultation on ‘immigration and terrorism’ (Government of Hungary 2015d). Dozens from academia protested against the survey, arguing that it was manipulative, allusive and inept, thus was rather a tool for disseminating and promoting the government’s standpoint than researching public opinion (Hungarian Spectrum 2015). Regardless of whether the consultation – and more broadly the whole discourse on migration – contributed to it or not, by the spring of 2015, the issue came to be perceived among Hungarians as the most important one facing the European Union, while the proportion of those who saw it as a challenge for Hungary more than quadrupled (Eurobarometer 2015a). Figure 3 demonstrates that each Eurobarometer survey, conducted since then but before the 2018 elections, indicates that the absolute majority of Hungarians constantly saw migration as a challenge facing the EU. During the same period, around one-third of the public perceived it as such for the
country, placing it among the top three issues Hungary had to confront, despite the fact that after the completion of the southern border fence the number of migrants entering the country significantly dropped.

As displayed clearly in Figure 3, the steep decline in the number of submitted asylum claims did not ease notably Hungarians’ worry about migration, as it remained a major concern for them at the national level, nevertheless, the urgency of the issue dropped more significantly considering the EU-level. Thus, I argue that the government’s securitizing efforts succeeded and managed to keep immigration on the security agenda, even when the ‘threat’ (i.e. asylum-seekers or migrants) was quasi non-present.

The cabinet amended several laws (for more details see Gallai et al. 2017), among others the Criminal Code, the State Border Act and the Act on Asylum, in order to be able to manage the ‘the greatest migratory pressure of [Hungary’s] history’ (Government of Hungary 2015e, 23). More importantly, however, it also introduced the term ‘state of emergency caused by mass immigration’, thereby legalised taking exceptional measures, a crucial element of securitization theory, until this kind of emergency is upheld.

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2 Available from:
http://bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=177&Itemid=1232&lang=hu
5. Analysing the third Orbán government’s securitizing discourse

In the previous chapter, I put the securitization process in context, both historically and socially, and argued that the public accepted migration as being elevated into the realm of security, thus the government successfully securitized the issue. Moreover, I briefly summarized the exceptional measures taken by the cabinet, which were legitimized by the consent of the audience. This chapter analyses the discursive process through which the securitizing actor (the government) was able to convince its audience (the Hungarian public) to accept such measures. Therefore, in the following sections, I study the government’s discourse on migration, that is the securitization process itself, between 2015 and March 2018, by applying the discourse-historical approach.

As I have pointed it out already, migration was barely politicized prior to the refugee crisis. This, however, changed at the beginning of 2015, as the issue was elevated to the securitized end of the spectrum of politicization straightaway. The fact that Orbán brought up the topic after the *Charlie Hebdo* terrorist attacks already associated migration with security matters. Moreover, the Prime Minister argued that the EU’s migration policy ‘is not working’, most of those arriving are not genuine refugees but economic immigrants, who pose a threat to Europeans. He concluded that ‘immigration must be stopped’ and that Hungary will not host ‘minorities with different cultural characteristics’ but will be kept as the ‘land of Hungarians’ (Orbán 2015a).

These utterances already outlined the four micro-topics which the government’s discourse mostly focused on subsequently.

1. Economy: claims were made to differentiate between ‘real’ or ‘genuine refugees’, fleeing wars and persecution, and ‘economic’ or ‘welfare-seeking immigrants’, whose life is not in danger but come only because of the economic benefits that Europe can provide.
2. Public security: immigration was implicitly linked to terrorism and immigrants were portrayed as troublesome and dangerous people.
3. Culture and identity: questions were raised about multiculturalism and the co-existence of groups with different identities, religions and civilizational backgrounds, as immigration was depicted as the expansion of Islam.
4. National sovereignty: the European Union was accused of trying to manage immigration in a way that infringes on member states’ sovereignty and that would facilitate the spread of migration-related problems.
The four sub-topics can be understood as different sectors of security, where different referent objects are portrayed to be existentially threatened by different understandings and utilizations of the migration discourse. The following sections study the discourse of the government through analysing these four micro-topics in detail. The analysis aims to reveal the applied discursive strategies, while concurrently taking into account the context of the texts and more broadly that of the whole discourse. These steps allow for a critical interpretation of the utterances and eventually of the discourse itself.

5.1. The economy

In 2013 and 2014, a significant number of asylum-claims were made by Kosovar people, who accounted for a relatively high proportion of applications even in the first four months of 2015 (IAO 2015; 2016). Since they were coming from a peaceful European country, the government could argue that they were not real refugees. Moreover, the economic hardships facing Kosovo and the fact that around 95 percent of the asylum-seekers arriving from there did not wait until authorities examined their claims but left for wealthier Western European countries, indicated that they left their home country because of economic considerations (EASO 2015, 25). The latter was also true for claimants of other nationalities, who, by the middle of the year, accounted for ever higher proportions of the total applications submitted.

Thus, in the early stages of the securitization process, the government highlighted the possible negative economic consequences of increased immigration as the main reason why it is a ‘bad thing [that] must be stopped’ (Orbán 2015a). The base of this arguments was the standpoint that

‘those who are fleeing to save their lives because of political reasons should be granted [asylum], but we cannot grant this for those who are leaving their country because of economic reasons’

(ibid., 11 January 2015)

By the claim made in the first excerpt, the government categorized the arriving people into two separate groups: one as deserving, genuine refugees from crisis zones and another as economically-motivated immigrants. The latter group was depicted as coming into Europe in the hope of a better livelihood. To this end, they were presented as seeking to take the jobs of Hungarians (as well as other European nationals) and to take advantage of the social welfare system of EU member states. Thus, in all, they were assumed to be
jeopardising the economic security and well-being of both Hungarians and other Europeans.

‘Those who are arriving at [Hungary] are coming from countries where they no longer qualify as refugees. They do not have to flee from there, therefore … every people, who – for whatever reason – left his/her homeland, is a welfare-seeking immigrant by the time (s)he gets to Hungary. They are not political refugees … yet they illegally cross the border … in hope of a better life.’

(Orbán 2015h, 5 June 2015)

As shown in both of the excerpts above, the *topos of abuse* and the *topos of definition* or *name-interpretation* was applied in order to justify the distinction of the two groups from each other. Both conclusion rules sought to ground the claim that the arriving people were not refugees but sought economic benefits.

‘Illegal border crossers … deceive us because they claim to be political refugees but in fact, they are economic immigrants. The moment they leave the danger zone these people are no longer political refugees since they are not fleeing for their lives. They are already safe [in Greece, Macedonia or Serbia] still they do not want to stay there. I would not even say they want to stay in Hungary, but they want to go on to Western Europe.’

(Orbán 2015i, 12 June 2015)

On the one hand – as the third excerpt shows – the topos of abuse was utilized to conclude that asylum-seekers deliberately deceived Hungarian authorities. In the government’s understanding, they submitted their claims not because they wanted to get refugee status in Hungary, but rather to pass through the country towards Western Europe. Because once having submitted their claims for refugee status, all asylum-seekers were able to move freely in the country – as EU rules did not allow for their detention – which they used to continue their journey towards their ‘target country’. In other words, according to the cabinet’s interpretation, migrants submitted asylum claims in Hungary only because they deemed it as a way to technically obtain the freedom of movement within the EU.

On the other hand, the topos of definition gave ground for the argument that immigrants pose a threat to the economic sector. The government consciously named the arriving people not as asylum-seekers or refugees but rather as welfare-seeking or economic immigrants. By doing so, it implied that they carry ‘the qualities, traits and attributes contained in the meaning’ of these definitions (Wodak 2001b, 75). This is
important because while the term ‘refugee’ evokes solidarity and compassion, the attribution of ‘welfare-seeking’ has negative connotations and implies that the actor is not worthy of help and sympathy (Bernáth and Messing 2015, 9). Thereby, despite the poor economic conditions of humans could bring forth solidarity as well, the government instead constructed an image where immigrants were portrayed as either parasitizing social allowances or as economic rivals for Hungarians.

Furthermore, the second and third excerpts went a step further from the initial distinction of the two groups. In these texts, the government virtually ruled out the possibility that any real refugees could reach the borders of Hungary because during their journey they pass through a number of countries which could provide shelter for them (Greece, Serbia etc.). Thereby, based on the fact that they continue their route towards the EU, instead of staying in the first ‘safe country’ which they enter, all migrants arriving in Hungary were assumed to be looking for solely better economic prospects and not a safe haven.

‘People illegally entering the territory of the European Union … take the jobs … and exploit the social welfare system’

(Orbán 2015f, 24 April 2015)

This excerpt demonstrates that the group of economically-motivated immigrants was further divided within the government’s discourse. On the one hand, welfare-seeking immigrants were portrayed as people seeking to exploit Hungary’s social welfare system, thus posing a threat to the well-deserved social benefits of Hungarians, who have worked hard for those. The topos of welfare chauvinism was applied in order to justify this argument. This warrant substantiates the conclusion that migrants threaten ‘our’ welfare system through drawing on welfare chauvinist arguments. These claim that the access of ‘others’ to social allowances should be restricted because those are the exclusive privilege of deserving natives, who have worked for decades to earn those benefits (see Van Oorschot 2006; Van der Waal et al. 2010; Emmenegger and Klemmensen 2013).

On the other hand, economic immigrants were also portrayed to be looking for a better life, but contrary to the previous group, through seeking to enter target countries’ labour market. Thus, their presence was associated with a threat to the jobs of Hungarians, that is their economic safety. This argument was substantiated by the topos of reality. The discourse of the cabinet based its anti-immigrant stance on arguments such as ‘immigrants contribute to rising unemployment’ (Orbán 2015k). The applied conclusion rule aimed to justify these claims by referring to the assumed social reality in Western Europe, which
was argued to ‘show that across entire generations, the unemployment rate is much higher … among those born outside Europe’ (Orbán 2016d). Nevertheless, the source of these facts was left unspecified and no exact figures were presented to confirm the claim.

During the first five months of 2015, the government’s discourse was using just the label welfare-seeking immigrant to generate economy-related concerns among the public in relation to migration. However, after May 2015, the discourse started to use the phrase economic immigrant instead, even though the routes of migrants did not change and Hungary remained a transit country, and not a destination or target country. Therefore, taking into consideration that virtually all asylum applicants left the country before a decision was made on their claims, it was groundless to depict them as a threat to either the welfare system of Hungary or jobs of Hungarians. Moreover, despite the fact that the discourse did not use them concurrently, the two terms contradicted each other. One cannot seek to exploit the welfare system (i.e. get benefits undeservedly) but at the same time aim for entering the labour market (i.e. be a rival for jobs).

In other texts, the government itself diminished the previously created threat image of economic immigrants. The discourse’s depiction of migrants contradicted the claim that their aim is to take the jobs of natives. Asylum-seekers were presented as ‘completely uneducated [who] only speak Arabic [and] hardly have any job experience’ (Orbán 2015n). As a result, the discourse was left in self-contradiction: while it portrayed all the arriving people as a threat to the livelihoods of Europeans, at the same time it suggested that they lack even the most basic skills to be able to enter the labour market.

In the early weeks of the migration crisis, the government’s discourse assumed that wealthy Western European target countries would not tolerate the uncontrolled, unlimited influx of migrants, thus predicted that they were about to tighten their immigration rules (Orbán 2015b; 2015c; 2015f). Drawing on this prognosis, the texts described a possible dangerous consequence for Hungary, as well as a way out to prevent its occurrence.

‘These refugees – who are by the way welfare immigrants – will get stuck here and … Hungary will become … a giant refugee camp. It [must be made] clear that it is not worth coming to Hungary because they will get arrested, will be detained, deported, and while they are here, they will be forced to work to make money for the supplies provided.’

(Orbán 2015c, 13 February 2015)
This extract imagined a not-too-distant future where migrants would no longer be able to enter Western European states (i.e. their initial target country) but would be jammed in Hungary. Once again without providing evidence to its claim, the text stated that as a result of imminent changes to the immigration policies of unspecified destination countries, a bottleneck would form and Hungary would be overwhelmed by immigrants.

Therefore, on the one hand, this utterance constructed economic threats as very near possibilities. Until then, dangers to the economy of Hungary or prosperity of Hungarians were diminished by the fact that migrants merely passed through the country. However, by assuming that migrants will get stuck in the country, the extract above forecasted that Hungary would become a de facto target country. Thereby, from a latent menace, economic threats were portrayed as more likely to directly affect the country and its residents.

On the other hand, the extract put forward a possible way through which the threatening possibility of becoming a ‘giant refugee camp’ could be evaded. To this end, the discourse utilized both the *topos of disadvantage* and the *topos of burden*. The former was applied in order to justify that ‘unrealistic, bad’ EU rules, which are ‘forced on’ Hungary, have to be changed since they allow for economic immigration, as asylum-seekers cannot be detained (Orbán 2015i). The latter was used to legitimize that detained migrants would have to reimburse the cost of their catering. Thus, the extract implies that providing for asylum-seekers places a burden on the budget. However, this argument ignored the fact that practically no one resorted to using Hungarian facilities since they did not wait for their application to be examined but left the country.

Throughout the summer of 2015, the number of asylum-seekers steeply increased (KSH 2019). Because of this development and the publication of the European Commission’s (2015) proposal for a permanent relocation mechanism, threats to the economic sector were overshadowed by putting emphasis on other micro-topics. Accordingly, the public opinion perceived that the economic sector is less threatened than for example the cultural sector (Simonovits 2016). Thus, economic issues as referent objects were largely absent from the discourse in the remaining part of the analysed period.

One exception was the issue of the border fence, built in the southern borders of Hungary. The fence was completed in mid-September 2015, barring migrants from entering Hungary freely through unobserved sections of the border. As a result, the number of asylum-seekers dropped significantly, since migrants were forced to use new
routes leading towards Western Europe, which mainly evaded the territory of Hungary. The cabinet first proudly voiced that, by building the fence, it was able to defend the borders of the country on its own without help and thereby Hungary was the only country observing the Schengen Agreement (Orbán 2015j). However, later the discourse’s tone was changed and the EU was called to account for not helping in financing neither its construction nor its maintenance.

‘Hungary has already spent [hundreds of millions of] euros on its own defence efforts and … no more than 4-5 million euros has been refunded by the EU in compensation. Hungary itself is footing the entire bill of our defence against the migrants, and the European Union is not helping at all.’ (Orbán 2016e, 4 March 2016)

The topos of burden was once again utilized in this excerpt. An image was constructed in which the fence was protecting the whole of Europe from the dangerous, undocumented immigrants. The cabinet objected to the unwillingness of other states and the EU to compensate for the Hungarian efforts, that is for leaving Hungary on its own with the burden of defending an entire continent at its own expense. However, the fact that the fence did not stop, thus did not defend Europe was overlooked. Migrants continued to arrive in Europe through other routes, while the Western Balkan route remained active as well but led through Croatia and Slovenia instead of Hungary (Frontex 2016). Moreover, the government was not consequent in how much money did the EU ‘owe’ the country. From the initial argument that ‘Brussels’ was not billed for the fence, later it was argued that it should compensate 250 billion forints for the defence efforts, while some time later the cabinet would have settled with 140 billion forints (Orbán 2016i; 2017m; 2017o).

The EU was referred to in the discourse in relation to the economic sector in another context as well. As presented above, the government strongly rejected the proposal of the European Commission on the permanent relocation mechanism but mostly because of security and sovereignty-related concerns (see sections 5.2 and 5.4). However, as the Commission (2016) recognized the opposition of Hungary and others to the mechanism, it came up with an idea, whereby those who refused to resettle migrants would instead have to pay a ‘solidarity contribution’.

‘They want to make countries which do not want to take in migrants pay 250,000 euros for every migrant not admitted. Over the course of seven years, a Hungarian citizen receives approximately four thousand...’
euros in funding from Brussels. In other words, according to Brussels, a Hungarian citizen is worth four thousand euros … meanwhile a migrant is worth 250,000 euros. And … for the average Hungarian citizen to make 250,000 euros it would take thirty-nine or more years of hard work.’

(Orbán 2016i, 6 May 2016)

In this case, a welfare chauvinist argument was applied again. The *topos of finances* and the topos of burden was applied to indicate how great a loss of revenue would be the obligation to pay the contribution, especially for Hungarian citizens. Accordingly, they were labelled as hard-working but not acknowledged and rewarded duly by the EU. In contrast, it was implicitly stated once more that migrants pose a burden to the social welfare system since they would get significantly larger support from the EU than European natives. Nevertheless, the government did not mention the fact that the compensation would not be allocated directly to refugees thus they could not spend it discretionally. Instead, it would be up to the hosting member states on what they spent the money (e.g. provide supplies for refugees, help their integration, etc.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Examples of the utilized devices</th>
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| Referential/nomination    | welfare-seeking/economic immigrants  
                               not refugees                                                                                     |
| Predication               | leaving for economic reasons, coming in the hope of better livelihood  
                               exploiting the social welfare system  
                               taking the jobs, contributing to rising unemployment  
                               uneducated, without job experience                                                                         |
| Argumentation             | topos of abuse; definition/name-interpretation; welfare chauvinism; reality; disadvantage; burden; finances |
| Perspectivization         | do not want Hungary to become a target country  
                               defending Hungary (and Europe) at all costs                                                               |
| Intensification/mitigation| there are not any ‘genuine refugees’ entering Hungary  
                               ‘Hungary will become a giant refugee camp’                                                                              |

*Table 2.* The applied discursive strategies in texts relating to the micro-topic of economy

This section studied how the third Orbán government securitized migration with economy-related referent objects. Table 2 summarizes the applied discursive strategies within the economic micro-topic. As a result of the broader context, that is asylum-seekers did not want to get refugee status in Hungary but sought to go forward to Western Europe, the discourse immediately labelled all arriving migrants as welfare-seeking. Later,
technically from one day to another, the discourse abandoned the previous term and started to use the attributive ‘economic’ instead. Importantly, the repeated usage of these attributives was enough in itself to generate a negative attitude towards migrants. The threat image of migrants was further strengthened through negative – often stereotypical – predicates, that gave rise to economic insecurities in the Hungarian society, similar to that caused by the influx of ethnic Hungarians in the 1990s. These predications were justified by using several types of topoi, nevertheless, the discourse often contradicted developments taking place ‘on the ground’ as well as failed to provide solid evidence for some of the figures it referred to. Finally, as migrants started to evade Hungary because of the fence and strict rules. Nonetheless, the EU and its plans of a relocation system came to the fore as a threat to the economy, thereby the threat image was kept alive throughout the analysed period, however with less intensity than at the beginning of the crisis.

5.2. Public security

The text that started the securitizing move was produced in the wake of a terrorist attack, thereby already implicitly linked terrorism to migrants. The utterance, however, did not specify the exact threats that migration might pose to the European public (Orbán 2015a). Later, as the discourse developed, several public security-related hazards were assumed to have raised or those already existing were thought to have intensified owing to the increased influx of immigrants. In other words, apart from the economy, the security of Hungarians was also understood as a referent object under threat.

This section studies how these (perceived) dangers were attributed to migrants, thus how their appearance in the country and Europe was presented as a threat to public security in the discourse, that is how they were securitized. Firstly, I present what attributes were attached to immigrants to depict them as threatening. Afterwards, the most common arguments of the discourse are demonstrated which were mobilised in order to justify the mentioned characteristics.

‘Terrorist organizations recruit fighters … from among immigrants living in the continent’s western part, while the southern borders of the EU … are besieged by waves of modern-day migration. It is our duty … to ensure that [Hungary] may remain a safe and secure place. Hungarian people … do not want to see their country thronging with people … who would pose a threat to public order.’

(Orbán 2015d, 27 February 2015)
This excerpt securitized not just the then-arriving asylum-seekers but also those migrants who have already been living in Europe before the crisis and even those born in the continent with immigrant background. On the one hand, the former group was likened to an army that is besieging the EU. On the other hand, the latter two groups, that is already settled or second and third generation immigrants mostly in Western Europe, were linked to terrorism through implicitly referring to the generalised assumption that they are more susceptible to be radicalisation, thus are more likely to become terrorists. Thus, through applying the *topos of origin* this utterance tacitly argued that if migrants were allowed in, then that would mean more potential terrorists within European territory. However, the discourse did not provide any evidence of the claim that those with migrant background are more likely to become terrorists nor that this would be true for the then-arriving asylum-seekers.

Through the ‘siege’ analogy, migrants were compared to a hostile army evading ‘our’ territory. Later it was reinterpreted in images where immigrants were portrayed as breaking into ‘our’ home (Orbán 2016a). In this metaphor, the home translated into the familiar, comfortable and peaceful Hungary (or Europe), which was being threatened by an aggressive flood of criminals, that is unknown, wild migrants. The criminalization of immigrants, however, was even more straightforward in other instances, as exemplified below.

‘Everyone who crosses the border illegally [should be regarded] as a lawbreaker … [and] must be immediately taken into custody.’

(Orbán 2015g, 8 May 2015)

‘Illegal border crossers begin with violating Hungarian laws. They could come through legal border crossing points, but they do not come there; they start by the violation of law.’

(Orbán 2015i, 12 June 2015)

Just like in the economic sector, the cabinet’s discourse utilized the *topos of definition* in order to invoke a threatening image merely through referring to migrants by using certain metaphors. In the field of public security, these included the label ‘lawbreakers’ and synonyms of the word migrant with the ‘illegal’ attribution attached to those (e.g. illegal refugees, illegal immigrants, illegal border crossers etc.). These attributions linked the conclusion that migration has to be stopped to the argument that migrants pose a threat to the security of Hungarians, by calling them the aforesaid names. Thereby, attributes of lawbreakers and those engaged in illicit activities were attached to immigrants. In other
words, lawlessness, troublemaking, criminality, disorder and several other related negative attributes were associated with them. Thus, the cabinet argued that the presence of migrants entails more criminal activity, that is worse public security.

‘According to police statistics in western countries, those states with large numbers of illegal immigrants experience dramatic increases in crime, with a proportionate decrease in public safety. Illegal immigration … is a threat to the security of European people.’

(Orbán 2015k, 25 July 2015)

This extract applied the topos of numbers to support the claim that the wherever migrants turn up, public order deteriorates. Similarly to the economic sector, the text did not specify the sources of the data it referenced: neither which countries’ statistics it cited, nor what proportions did ‘large numbers’ or ‘dramatic increase’ exactly stood for. Most of the time, instead of quoting concrete figures the discourse resorted to using vague quantifiers to argue that the more migrants reside in a specific territory, the worse the public security would be there. However, as Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, 25-26) noted, relying solely on police statistics to prove that migrants are overrepresented among criminals is very likely to be misleading.

A few days after construction of the border fence was completed – which was argued to have ‘resolved the problem’ (Orbán 2015o) – violent clashes erupted between riot police, overseeing a border crossing point near Röszke, and hundreds of migrants who were stranded in the Serbian side of the border (BBC 2015). In the following weeks, the government labelled the events as a terrorist attack, which took the centre stage in the discourse.

‘An armed, organised attack … was launched on Hungary and on the Hungarian police protecting the Hungarian state border. In Hungary, … we have arrested a terrorist; we know who organised the attack. This amply demonstrates that this is not just a simple immigration problem, but we must also seriously talk about the threat of terrorism.’

(Orbán 2015m, 18 September 2015)

In wake of the confrontation, the emphasis was shifted from the trope of criminal migrant to that of attacking or terrorist migrant. The discourse mostly focused on constructing an even more dangerous image of immigrants, where they were not just criminals but armed aggressors. The arrival of migrants was labelled as an invasion, while individuals as ‘young, warrior-looking men … who resemble more an army than asylum-seekers’
These tropes referred back to thesiege metaphor. Moreover, the size of the threat was dramatized as the discourse argued that ‘tens of millions of people are preparing to set out’ (ibid.). Thereby the discursively created ‘army of migrants’ was portrayed as having an unlimited supply of manpower.

Meanwhile, the discourse sought to portray Hungary as being ‘immune’ to these threats. The country was presented as ‘an island of stability’ being protected by the border fence, in contrast to other European countries where it was said that the threat of terrorism has increased and the ‘public safety was being disrupted by high number of immigrants’ (Orbán 2015o). In other parts of the discourse, the safe ‘migrant-free zone’ of Europe was broadened to include Central and Eastern European countries as well, while Western Europe was labelled as unsafe ‘immigrant countries’ (e.g. Orbán 2017r). These arguments gained even more prominence in the texts following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.

‘Security and elimination of the terrorism threat must be given priority.
A considerable percentage of migrants are coming from countries, where we [member states of the EU] are conducting military operations: we are at war with them. If we are at war, we cannot allow masses of people into our countries in an uncontrolled and unregulated manner without knowing their identities, their origins or their intentions.’

(Orbán 2015p, 20 November 2015)

This extract proves my previous argument, as it stated that Hungary and the EU were facing not a refugee crisis, not even an immigration crisis but a security emergency. The text alluded that there might be soldiers or terrorists among the arriving migrants, deployed by terrorist organisations to infiltrate Europe and as ‘subversive groups … carry out attacks’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, it was pointed out in this utterance as well that Hungary was not among terrorists’ targets, unlike other (Western) countries where these threats increased according to Hungarian security agencies. In this case, the topos of authority was utilized. This conclusion rule is based on the assumption that people are more likely to believe and trust information which comes from reliable sources. Those with authority (e.g. national security agencies) are seen as such, thus if they state something then it is accepted as credible and true.

The extract above used several other topoi. Firstly, it applied the topos of name-interpretation to label (some) immigrants as armed troublemakers who would cause chaos if allowed into Europe. Secondly, the topos of reality was utilized to claim that for
example conducting air strikes in Syria against the Islamic State or stationing troops in Afghanistan to counter the Taliban insurgency equals to being at war. Thus, terrorist organisations were argued to try to take advantage of the mass influx by sending their troops disguised as asylum-seekers to the enemies’ territory (i.e. into Europe). Lastly, the topos of history was mobilized in order to ground the argument that terrorists’ tactics, that is the concept of trying to send soldiers behind the enemy’s lines, was ‘as old as war itself’ (ibid.).

In the wake of the incidents that took place on the New Year’s Eve of 2016 in several German cities (BBC 2016), the focus of the discourse was moved back towards general criminal activities attributed to migrants. However, the threat of terrorism remained salient as well, thus the two issues remained in the forefront concurrently.

‘Immigration brings crime and terrorism to our countries … We shall not import to Hungary crime [and] terrorism … there shall be no urban districts beyond the reach of the law, there shall be no mass disorder or immigrant riots here, and there shall be no gangs hunting down or women and daughters.’

(Orbán 2016f, 15 March 2016)

This extract further emphasized the narrative that public security has deteriorated where migrants were allowed in. Thereby, the discourse portrayed parts of other (mainly Western) European countries who let in ‘enormous masses of people without controls’ as being turned into chaotic, anarchic places, referred to as ‘no-go zones’ (Orbán 2016b).

The government argued that it did not want Hungary to be like Western Europe in this sense. This conclusion recontextualized a common argument of the ‘catching up discourse’. Texts within that discourse compare Hungary and Western countries to each other and lament when and under what circumstances would the former be on level terms with ‘the West’, for example economically (Haynes and Husan 1999; Mihályi 2011). However, according to the cabinet, in the context of immigration-management Hungary was the leading example as the ‘best-protected country in the European Union’ who did not ‘let anyone in without controls, [thus] remained a safe place to live’ (Orbán 2016e).

The extract below illustrates this opposition clearly.

‘Hungary has defended its southern borders, and so no one is entering there … We are a country with good defence capabilities. [Whereas] in Europe there has been a rise in terrorism … because hundreds of thousands of people came in without controls from areas where Europe
This text juxtaposed the safe Hungary and the unsafe other European countries. Again, the construction of the fence was deemed the key in not having any migrants in Hungarian territory, that is being intact from their alleged negative impact on public security. In contrast, other parts of Europe are depicted as flooded by migrants, thus as suffering from the dangerous attributes assigned to them. Nonetheless, the discourse consequently obscured the fact that either if it was not for the fence, most probably no migrants would have stayed in Hungary because of the economic reasons presented in the previous section.

One could ask why public security-related issues were kept on the agenda throughout the analysed period. Since, on the one hand, Hungary was presented as being protected by the fence, and on the other hand, the number of arrivals into Europe fell steeply as a result of the EU-Turkey deal and later as a result of agreements with Northern African countries (Frontex 2017; 2019). The government had its answer to this question: several texts argued that the fence itself was not enough against the influx of migrants since the EU was planning to resettle them across all member states. This argument is demonstrated well in the following extract.

‘The debate … is over what should happen to those who are already inside the EU. If someone has made a unilateral decision to let migrants in without controls [and] unilaterally assumed the underlying responsibility … [then] we cannot now be asked to suffer the consequences of someone else’s decision. We cannot be asked to voluntarily import into Hungary the problems arising from their decision: terrorism, violence. The question of the quotas remains [because] Brussels … is in favour of distribution.’

(Orbán 2016h, 22 April 2016)

As exemplified by this extract, the cabinet kept migration on the agenda as a threat to public safety, by referring to the proposal of the European Commission (2015). Western European countries were – by using the topos of definition– labelled as ‘immigrant countries’ that were unable to defend their borders, thus let in migrants. According to the government, they subsequently realized the negative consequences of this ‘open-doors policy’, therefore wanted Central and Eastern Europeans to be solidary and take in immigrants from them.
In the discourse’s interpretation, the Commission’s quota proposal was a means to fulfil this alleged will of Western Europeans. Therefore, despite the government implicitly acknowledged – to an extent – that the crisis is over the number of newly arriving refugees was significantly reduced, the quota was identified as a tool that could still bring migrants to Hungary and with them the associated problems as well. The following extract demonstrates how the cabinet interpreted the permanent relocation mechanism not long after the Commission’s plan was revealed.

‘We must attack the quotas … and we must block them. Quotas mean that we would spread terrorism across Europe. I think there are fair numbers of [terrorists among the immigrants, therefore] spreading them across Europe … is the craziest thing we could do, and would jeopardise our own citizens’ security.’

(Orbán 2015p, 20 November 2015)

This text shows that after the fence was built, thereby migrants’ route was diverted to avert Hungary, the quota proposal stepped in as a kind of mediator. In the Europe-wide context the primary focus was still on the better protection of other member states’ external borders (e.g. Orbán 2016l; 2016n), nonetheless, in the national context the quota embodied the threatening possibility that immigrants could again show up in the country and jeopardise the security of Hungarians. Thereby, even with very low numbers of submitted asylum claims, the question of keeping Hungary a safe place remained central to the discourse. As demonstrated in the extract below, the government managed to keep the issue on the agenda and campaigned on it even before the 2018 general election.

‘If we were to accept this proposal [the quota] … the consequence would be the immediate admittance of more than ten thousand immigrants. We shall prevent this proposal being mandatorily applied to Hungary. For this reason, … [in the future] Hungary must be represented [in European Council summits] by a prime minister who can defend our country against this plan.’

(Orbán 2018f, 30 March 2018)

This text clearly shows that by 2018 the focal point of the discourse altered. As large numbers of migrants have not been present in the country for two and a half years, the relocation proposal was used to maintain the feeling of imminent threat. It came to be referred to as an object that generates the feeling that the migration crisis is still not over, that is the security of Hungarians could still be threatened.
Table 3. The applied discursive strategies in texts relating to the micro-topic of public security

This section studied how the third Orbán government securitized migrants as people who pose a threat to the physical security of Hungarians. The applied discursive strategies are summarized in Table 3. Firstly, they were labelled with names (illegals, lawbreakers, terrorists etc.) that generated negative associations and were able to generate fear among the public. Moreover, these associations already characterized them as dangerous criminals or terrorists. The discourse stated that even those immigrants who migrated to Europe decades ago pose a security threat, thereby alluded that letting in more of them would make the criminal record even worse in European countries. Nevertheless, Hungary was depicted as a country which is protected by the government and its anti-immigrant policies. However, in the latter stages of the securitization process, this condition was argued to be threatened by the EU’s proposal on the permanent relocation scheme. Thereby, even without migrants’ presence in the country the discourse kept security considerations on the agenda.
5.3. Culture

The importance of the historical-cultural background of Hungary is given great emphasis in the Fundamental Law of the country. After the 2010 elections, Fidesz-KDNP made use of its two-thirds majority and adopted a new constitution, without the need to consult any opposition parties, thus without having to make compromises (Körösényi 2015b). As a result of the unilateral constitutionalization, the preamble of the new Fundamental Law was criticised for one-sided value representation and for over-emphasizing the role of Christianity (Jakab 2011). The preamble, for example, states that the country has been part of Christian Europe for more than a thousand years and that Christianity has a role in preserving the Hungarian nationhood. Moreover, it declares the commitment to preserve and protect the unique culture of the country (Fundamental Law 2011).

As the securitization of migration began, the mentioned characteristics were placed at the forefront. Accordingly, in the text that is seen as the securitization move, the government stated that the ethnic and cultural homogeneity is a value that should be preserved. The cabinet committed itself not to let people ‘with different cultural characteristics’ to settle in Hungary. Thereby, migrants were depicted as people who would not just disrupt the cultural uniformity but also destroy it and irreversibly alter the natural development of culture and demography within both Hungary and Europe.

Therefore, this section begins by presenting how the government described Hungarian and European cultural identity. Afterwards, that of the incoming migrants are introduced as well as the arguments whereby the discourse labelled them as threats. Finally, it is demonstrated how two separate Europes were constructed in the discourse and set against each other on whether to let in refugees or support the relocation mechanism.

5.3.1. The self: cultural framework of Hungary and Europe

Hungary was labelled as a Hungarian country or as the land of Hungarians several times in the texts (see e.g. Orbán 2015k; 2015a). Moreover, it was categorized as a Christian country, implying that every citizen is Christian. However, in this case, Christianity was understood not as a religion but as a cultural framework, a constituting and framing element of the national identity and culture (Orbán 2017t). The metaphor of house was applied frequently to indicate that within it, this cultural frame is the accepted and shared
norm. Thus, it generated a sense of safety, comfort and familiarity, which the ‘family of
Hungarians’, who populate the house, wants to maintain.

‘We must be firm in preserving the country’s culture … and its cultural
homogeneity. The fact that we are the way we are is based on the
traditions of a thousand years, on principles and day-to-day customs
which we continue to uphold and do not question, because for us they
are natural. They … create a sense of cultural homeland.’

(Orbán 2016j, 20 May 2016)

This extract strengthens the arguments that Hungary has a strong historical cultural
heritage which plays an important role in the everyday lives of people. Based on this
sentiment, the discourse stated that Hungarians ‘insist on their own culture and way of
life’, therefore they ‘refuse to be dissolved in … a melting pot’, that is they refuse
multiculturalism (Orbán 2017q). In other words, the discourse assumed that Hungarians
are happy to live by their own rules and expect others coming to the country to observe
these as well (Orbán 2015m).

Apart from emphasizing the uniqueness of Hungarian culture, the discourse
pointed out the importance of common European values as well. It stated that being
Hungarian means being European (Orbán 2016m). The argument that the nations of
Europe have ‘shared roots, values and history’ assumed that all other European countries
are culturally linked together (Orbán 2016d). The bond that created the connection
between these countries was identified as Christianity. Similarly to the case of Hungary,
it was argued to be the organizing principle of all European citizens’ lives. The following
extract presents this argument in more detail.

‘The world in which we live is indeed built on the acceptance,
statements and life principles of the teachings of Christianity. We are
surrounded by it as a natural circumstance: in a cultural sense Christian
Europe is like the air that we need to live. It surrounds us like part of
nature. This is why we feel at home in Christian Europe and in Christian
Hungary … regardless of religious conviction.’

(Orbán 2018f, 30 March 2018)

With the text above, the discourse stated that for being a ‘true’ Hungarian, and
consequently true European, one needs not just to accept and respect the principles of
Christianity but to feel that as the natural order of life. However, as mentioned already,
acceptance was understood as being independent of religious conviction, thus indicating
a secularist position. Accordingly, the principles were thought of as ‘equality between the
sexes; freedom and responsibility; fair competition and solidarity; pride and humility; justice and mercy’ (Orbán 2016d). In all, these examples were presented as the cornerstones of the European way of life, that is the sense of being at home, developed as a thousand-year tradition, making Europe ‘our own continent’ (Orbán 2015l).

The discourse, described both Hungarian and European culture in a very exclusionist way, while at the same time it left most elements of those unspecified. On the one hand, it set strict criteria on who can be a real European citizen. For being accepted as such, it alluded that one’s lifestyle should fit the ‘European norm’, thus be based on values of Christianity’s cultural heritage. Nonetheless, on the other hand, apart from the general examples presented above, it failed to provide more specific characteristics of what makes the essence of European culture. Thereby, it was left open to different interpretations to determine its core elements, thus that who could be deemed a ‘real European’.

The discursively created ‘self’, that is Europe, was argued to be characterized by the following main features. It was referred to as the home of Europeans and as the community of free, independent, Christian nations. Its common historical and cultural identity was argued to be rooted in Christianity. However, it was pointed out that Christianity was rather a cultural framework than a matter of religious conviction. Thereby, this frame came to be the foundation of the current European lifestyle which makes Europe what it is, ‘the best place in the world’ (Orbán 2017e). In all, based on the discourse, European culture can be summarized as a specific way of life which generates a sense of familiarity for Europeans wherever they may be in the continent. This lifestyle is based on principles that are the results of historical development, rooted in the teachings of Christianity.

5.3.2. The other: migration as a cultural threat

The discourse created a conflicting ‘other’, that is migrants, threatening to disrupt the cultural homogeneity of the European self, thus jeopardising the usual way of life of its citizens. In this sub-section, I study the applied discursive practices through which asylum-seekers and immigrants were argued to pose a threat to the referent object of culture.

Right from the securitizing move, the cabinet emphasized that the arriving migrants were not merely seeking economic benefits or would reduce public safety but could destabilize the European lifestyle as well, which Hungarians are accustomed to.
The government sought to create a homogenous (cultural) image of migrants who pose a threat to European culture. The extracts in this section illustrate the most common arguments which portrayed them as dangerous, thus advocated for stopping their inward movement to the continent.

‘There is no reasonable argument why masses of people from different cultures and different civilisations … should be let into the country. The whole of Europe is ours, we [citizens of EU member states] inhabit it … whereas immigrants want to come here from outside our common European area.’

(Orbán 2015b, 30 January 2015)

This text securitized migrants through emphasizing that they are neither geographically, nor culturally European. This exclusionist argument stated that the gates of Europe should not be opened to non-Europeans, that is to people from different civilisations. Thereby, the topos of difference was mobilized to assume that most or even all migrants are culturally distinct – overlooking the fact that at the beginning of the crisis, Kosovars made up around half of the asylum-seekers. This perceived difference was highlighted in the discourse several times, for example by arguing that migrants ‘have no idea about Europe’ (Orbán 2017b).

However, this utterance and later the whole discourse was inconsistent regarding what it understood under being part of the European culture. Sometimes it was understood broadly and incorporated whole Europe in geographical terms, while in other instances it was reduced to include only EU member states. Either way, the main argument of the discourse was that the culture of Europe is existentially threatened by those who come from other civilizations. The following extracts present this central argument as well as others linked to it which sought to further dramatize the extent of the threat.

‘[Migrants] are unwilling to accept European culture, or [even] come here with the intent of destroying European culture. [They are] people from different cultures, with different customs, who are unable to integrate.’

(Orbán 2015d, 27 February 2015)

This extract assumes that cultural differences between Europeans and the arriving migrants will inevitably lead to confrontations. In other words, it concludes that no matter where one comes from but as long as from outside Europe, (s)he poses a threat to the culture. Thereby, the discourse applied the clash of civilizations topos to present
immigrants as a cultural threat. It alluded that different civilizations are not compatible with each other, but fight for superiority. By doing so, it drew on Huntington’s (1996 [2011]) famous thesis, that in the post-Cold War world cultural differences are the focal points of power struggles. In this understanding, the discourse spatialized European culture as being strictly restricted to either EU member states or the continent itself. Meanwhile, all other cultures were thought to be hostile or antagonistic, meaning that migrants were perceived as representatives and carriers of specific characteristics of those.

In order to make the clash of civilizations argument more credible, thus to make the perception of threat more palpable and urgent, the discourse applied several other topoi. Firstly, it utilized the *topos of numbers*. As already presented in the previous sections, many texts stated that tens of millions more people could set out towards Europe in the coming years (e.g. Orbán 2015k; 2016f). Through this topos, the threat posed by immigrants was exacerbated by diminishing the seriousness of the ongoing refugee crisis and stating that the worst is yet to come in the form of even bigger numbers of arrivals.

Secondly, the *topos of culture* was applied as well. The following extract presents how the cabinet compared immigrants who have been in Europe for decades to those newly arriving.

‘For a long time a world of parallel societies has been evolving … in a number of European countries. This is forcing back our world. Those coming here have no intention whatsoever of adopting our way of life, because they see their own as more valuable, stronger and more viable than ours.’

(Orbán 2016d, 28 February 2016)

This text states that the ‘occupation of territory’ by the ‘Muslim world’ (Orbán 2016f; 2016d) has already begun. Furthermore, it points out that despite immigrants have been coming to (mostly Western) Europe ‘ever since their colonies gained independence’, there is not a single example of successful integration (Orbán 2017n; 2017m). Thus, parallel societies are being formed, meaning that the European culture loses its ground or at least has to face a rival culture in particular places. The discourse alluded that the newly arriving immigrants are reluctant to integrate as well, thus it predicted the emergence of ever more parallel societies as a likely outcome if they were allowed into the continent.

The above extract also draws back to the clash of civilizations topos. It argues that the co-existence of native, ‘traditional indigenous Christians’ and the ‘incoming Muslim
communities’ is necessarily conflicted, based on the cultural divergence of the two groups (ibid.). Moreover, it emphasizes again, that the latter see their own culture superior, thus will not respect that of Europeans.

Thirdly, the discourse sought to prove that the European lifestyle was jeopardised by using the *topos of history*. It is exemplified by the text below which put the migration crisis into a historical context.

> ‘If things continue like this, our culture, our identity and our nations as we know them will cease to exist. The West will fall, as Europe is occupied without realising it. The Islamic civilisation … has always seen its mission as the conversion of Europe to the true faith.’

(Orbán 2018c, 18 February 2018)

In this extract, the influx of immigrants is understood as a cultural offensive. It alludes that the crisis is rather an orchestrated operation to occupy and conquer Europe. Thereby, the threat is being justified through drawing a parallel between the current ‘offensive’ and the expansion of the Ottoman Empire.

In summary, the discourse identified migrants as members of a distinct, hostile culture. It was argued that they are unable as well as unwilling to integrate into ‘our’ culture. Moreover, as people who deem their culture more valuable. As a result of these, they were depicted as seeking to invade and take over Europe, that is destroying the natural European lifestyle and install theirs instead.

5.3.3. Europe split in two: differing understandings of cultural threat in Eastern and Western Europe

In this sub-section, I would like to briefly summarize the different perceptions of the cultural threat in different parts of Europe, as understood in the discourse. In the same way as presented in the previous section on public security, the discourse on culture also assumed that a division exists among European states. On the one hand, it identified Central Eastern European countries as those who still protect their own culture, thus also the European way of life, by not accepting asylum-seekers. On the other hand, Western European countries were labelled immigrant countries where migrants are already present. This entails that their culture has also appeared there, however, these countries were depicted as not intent to protect the European lifestyle.

The discourse argued that Central Europe has a different worldview because of its historical experiences. It was assumed that these countries retained a ‘sharp and cold
sense of reality’ because they have been occupied by foreign powers before (Orbán 2016d). In other words, the texts stated that countries in this region were ‘wise enough to protect themselves’, that is they did not let in migrants and with them their culture.

Central Eastern Europe, thus managed to remain a ‘migrant-free zone’ (Orbán 2017r). Because of its historical experiences, countries of the region prevented to be occupied again, thereby ‘prevented the Muslim world from inundating’ them (Orbán 2018c). The discourse emphasized the role of the fence built by the Hungarian government in this process, as exemplified below.

‘Every country is obliged to protect its own borders. Hungary … fulfils its obligations … even to the whole of the European Union. So, while protecting Hungary, we protect the European Union as well. This is not unprecedented at all in Hungarian history, we are used to it, we will fulfil our obligation, and by doing so we are also protecting them [other European countries].’

(Orbán 2015j, 3 July 2015)

This excerpt applied the topos of history, by drawing on the history of the country. It evoked the image of Hungary as the defender of Europe, a reference to the 15th-16th century Kingdom of Hungary that built a so-called fortress system along its southern border in order to halt the advance of the expanding Ottoman Empire. The discourse likened this historical example to the present-day fence, arguing that it protected the whole of Europe. Thereby, it assumed that the modern-day fence has similar historical significance in protecting Europe from being overrun by an alien culture and preserving its traditional lifestyle.

Meanwhile, Western Europe was identified with open societies and ‘welcome culture’. Moreover, because of their colonial past, they were argued to have ‘moral and political obligations’ towards people coming from the former colonies (Orbán 2017n). Thereby, the ‘great old European nations in Western Europe have become immigrant countries’ with multicultural societies (Orbán 2018c). The mixing of populations and the emergence of parallel societies, however, resulted in the loss of Christian Europe and at the same time in the Islamisation of Europe.

Because of their different attitude towards immigrants, Western European countries saw their arrival as a positive thing as they could help to solve Europe’s demographic problems or provide cheap labour, according to the discourse. Therefore, these countries advocated for the permanent relocation mechanism. However, in the
understanding of the cabinet, that would mean the spreading of multiculturalism throughout the continent and the decline of the European way of life as a consequence. Thereby, on the one hand, Western European states were referred to as examples not to be followed, and on the other hand, the quota system appeared as an indirect threat in the cultural context as well.

5.3.4. Conclusion

In this section, I presented how immigrants were portrayed as a threat jeopardising Hungarian and European culture in the third Orbán government’s discourse. The applied discursive strategies are summarized in Table 4. Firstly, the texts created an image of culturally distinct, what is more, rival migrants. Then, through referring to the clash of civilizations narrative, their influx was depicted as bearing the possibility to seriously disrupt the European way of life. This claim was further strengthened by citing information from unspecified sources about the numbers of those who would also come in the future, moreover by referring to their unsuccessful integration, however without clarifying what would have counted as success. Lastly, it was alluded that migrants fulfil a historical mission by evading Europe and converting it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Examples of the utilized devices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referential/nomination</td>
<td>Muslim/Islamic people/communities/world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predication</td>
<td>from different cultures, civilizations and backgrounds, with different customs, characteristics, religion and worldview unable to integrate or co-exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>topos of difference; numbers; culture; history, clash of civilizations topos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivization</td>
<td>having a sharp and cold sense of reality</td>
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<td>‘defender of Europe’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>migrant-free zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intensification/mitigation</td>
<td>millions more will come</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>immigrants already established parallel societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamisation/de-Christianization of Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4. The applied discursive strategies in texts relating to the micro-topic of culture*

The rejection of migrants by Central Eastern European states were highlighted as a way to protect Europe’s traditional culture. Hungary’s role in this process was emphasized by drawing a historical parallel between its present-day anti-migrant measures and wars that the country fought with the Ottomans centuries ago.
On the contrary, Western Europe was portrayed as the possible deterring future for the whole of Europe, if it fails to halt immigration. It was argued that the de-Christianization of that part of the continent has already begun. These countries were set as illustrations of what the European Commission’s resettlement proposal could result in. Therefore, that proposal was again depicted as posing an indirect threat, in this case to Hungarian’s natural way of life.

5.4. National sovereignty

At the beginning of the securitization move, the government argued that the EU’s immigration policy is not working and laid part of the blame on that for the terrorist attacks in Paris (Orbán 2015a). It was just in texts produced later that the discourse specified why the policy was failing. Two main concerns related to national sovereignty can be identified in the discourse. On the one hand, the government feared losing its ability to control its borders, that is to oversee the inward movement of migrants. On the other hand, the EU’s proposal of the permanent relocation mechanism was seen as a major infringement on member states’ authority to decide on who they want to let into their territory and live together with.

This section studies how the European Union and its policies were portrayed to be contributing to the appearance of migration, thus failed to protect Europe from the associated threats, or even facilitated the emergence of those. Firstly, the government’s perception of EU rules is presented. Then it is studied how it linked those to the migration crisis and related threats. Finally, this section highlights how the permanent relocation mechanism was linked to other aspects of threat and depicted as a major indirect threat.

As already mentioned, Hungary was faced with an unprecedented number of asylum-seekers from the beginning of 2015. The large number of migrants placed such a burden on Greece, through which the Western Balkan route leads, that its authorities failed to register all asylum-seekers who then continued towards Western Europe. Thereby, Hungary became a front country where tens of thousands of asylum-seekers applied for refugee status. Somewhat controversially, the cabinet declared that it wants to observe EU rules, meanwhile complained that other EU regulations are making it harder to defend against the alleged threat posed by immigrants.

On the one hand, it emphasized that it was abiding by the Schengen Agreement. This agreement guaranteed the freedom of movement across EU member states, providing that every one of them adequately screen third-country nationals entering the
common area. On the other hand, it highlighted the weaknesses of the Dublin Regulation. In line with that regulation, Hungary came to be the country responsible for examining asylum-seekers’ applications, despite they passed through another EU member state (i.e. Greece) before. The discourse pointed out that since migrants do not want to remain in Hungary as refugees, they leave the country taking advantage of the failing immigration policy of the EU.

‘Everyone who crosses the border illegally … must be immediately taken into custody … when they enter Hungary … and they must remain in custody while the relevant proceedings are conducted. This is not an option today. According to current EU regulations … they cannot be taken into custody immediately, but must be allowed freedom to move anywhere in Europe.’

(Orbán 2015g, 8 May 2015)

Through labelling immigrants as illegal, they were depicted as dangerous, thus were securitized. The EU’s regulations were portrayed as providing loopholes for them. Firstly, those allowed migrants to submit their asylum claims even if they entered the EU illegally. Secondly, the migrants, portrayed as a threat, were allowed to move freely after submitting their claim. The cabinet concluded that because of these weaknesses as well as because of the threat images attached to migrants – as explained in the previous sections – stricter border controls and enforcement of laws should be prioritised over solidarity. Therefore, it was argued that managing immigration should be a national competence instead of regulating it on the EU-level.

‘Silly rules currently in force in the EU … are paralysing the member states. The common European refugee policy is rather an obstacle than help. It would be better if member states themselves could decide … how they want to curb waves of refugees. If we get this opportunity, then we Hungarians will solve our own problems.’

(Orbán 2015f, 24 April 2015)

First of all, this excerpt presented the arrival of migrants as a problem that should be halted or at least restrained. The influx of masses was compared to waves (and in other instances to flood), thus dehumanising migrants and referring to them as a natural disaster. Presenting them as such while criticising the EU’s related policies alluded that the Union was hindering the supposedly necessary defence efforts.

The cabinet argued that apart from not helping member states to control their borders, EU rules were even constraining them in doing so. Two major obstacles were
identified in the discourse. On the one hand, the cabinet objected that member states could not detain even those who entered their territory not through designated border crossing points but illegally, trying to evade being registered by authorities. On the other hand, the regulation which prescribed that those who submitted asylum claims must be accommodated in open reception centres until their claims are being examined was also problematic according to the government. It understood the latter rule as granting the right of free movement for aliens without knowing their background and intentions.

Instead of these detrimental rules, the government advocated for ‘taking back control’, that is taking the issue under the competence of national authorities. The cabinet argued that in order to do so current regulation of the Union needs to be amended. The *topos of disadvantage* was applied to justify that the current unrealistic, paralysing immigration policies, specifically the Reception Conditions Directive, were not working but were being taken advantage of by asylum-seekers.

‘European regulations are unreasonable and are tempting for evasion. Whoever crosses the border illegally for whatever reason, must be detained immediately. Hungary did this before but the Union barred us from doing so. Now we have to take back the initiative. If we act forcefully … it will be clear that it is not worth coming to Hungary because [migrants] will be arrested, detained, deported.’

(Orbán 2015c, 13 February 2015)

In this extract, it is emphasized again that EU rules are responsible for enabling masses of people to enter European territory, that is for the appearance of migration-related problems and threats in countries of the continent, thus in Hungary as well. The government stated that it would be capable of managing the increased number of asylum-seekers if it was not for EU rules. It applied the *topos of advantage* to emphasize that before those were ‘forced on’ the country, Hungary successfully coped with migration on its own (Orbán 2015h). Thus, with a restrictive immigration policy in place, the country was protected from the different threats associated with migrants. Afterwards, however, Hungary had to modify its rules in order to align with EU regulations (Gallai et al. 2017, 91-93.), that was portrayed to be a major obstacle in handling the crisis adequately.

In all, the government argued that EU rules did not allow it to decide who can enter the territory of Hungary as well as keeping track of their movement once they were let in. In other words, it portrayed the EU as reducing national sovereignty on a security-
related issue. Therefore, it advocated for taking back the regulation of immigration under the competence of national authorities.

‘In our view, the question of whom I let into my house, my country and my homeland is the most elementary question of self-defence. Who decides whom I let in? We, Hungarians decide it, or somewhere in an imperial or international centrum? We, Hungarians should stick to the first principle of self-defence: only we, Hungarians could decide whom we let into our house, our homeland, our country.’

(Orbán 2015j, 3 July 2015)

This extract implies that deciding on who can enter Hungary have serious security-related consequences. Bearing in mind that migrants were presented as a threat to several sectors, management and supervision of their movements were deemed crucial in guaranteeing the security of Europeans. Thus, disadvantageous EU rules, which were unable to adequately control and oversee them, were portrayed as a threat. The text assumed that the security of the previously presented sectors cannot be guaranteed unless national authorities have full command over immigration. The topos of national sovereignty was applied in order to substantiate the claim that the best interest of national security requires to ‘take back control’ from the EU.

Moreover, the extract compares the Union to an imperial centrum. This is an implicit reference to the history of Hungary and draws on a common argument of the national sovereignty discourse. The latter portrays Hungary’s history as a constant fight for preserving national sovereignty. Previously, oppressing powers were identified as the Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union and in the government’s narrative this time it was the EU. Often these became synonymous with the imperial centrum, Vienna, Moscow and Brussels. Therefore, the discourse very rarely referred to the EU by name, but instead used the word ‘Brussels’.

After the permanent relocation proposal of the Commission was published, the government turned against the EU even more strongly. It accused Brussels of trying to reduce national sovereignty by enticing even more migrants to the Union and distribute them among member states.

Initially, the resettlement mechanism was labelled as an irrational, unlawful and dangerous proposal. Firstly, the discourse stated that it will not halt the influx of migrants, but on the contrary, it would be seen as a ‘letter of invitation’ (Orbán 2017k). Secondly, it was argued to be unlawful because the EU had no mandate to pursue a permissive
immigration policy (Orbán 2015o). Lastly, it was thought to be dangerous as the distribution of asylum-seekers was seen as being equal to the distribution of problems identified with them, as presented in the previous sections.

‘We cannot afford to allow Brussels to place itself above the law. We cannot afford to allow them to force us … to import the bitter fruits of their misguided policies. We do not want to … import crime, terrorism, homophobia and anti-Semitism to Hungary.’

(Orbán 2016d, 28 February 2016)

This text demonstrates that the EU was depicted as an actor whose proposal would contribute to the spreading of migration-related threats to Hungary. In this extract again, migrants were associated with criminality, terrorism and cultural difference. Therefore, the EU itself came to be securitized by being linked to these threats and because of it allegedly wanted even more immigrants let into Europe contrary to the will of its member states, that would result in even bigger threat. Even a new word was devised in order to describe the EU’s alleged machinations to reduce national sovereignty. The following extract presents how the essence of ‘Brusselism’ was formulated in the discourse.

‘Whenever a problem emerges, the first reflex is that they immediately say we need a European solution: we must withdraw powers, and we must create a common European migration policy, instead of leaving each state to perform its duty and protect its own external borders. Immediately declaring every issue a Brussels issue is not a good reflex. This is Brusselism: the stealthy withdrawal of powers from the nation states’

(Orbán 2016a, 8 January 2016)

Thereby, the discourse created a new topos as well: the *topos of Brusselism*. Through applying it, texts argued that the EU was not looking for the good solution, but the European solution that would strengthen its position and powers vis-à-vis member states. In the case of immigration, this would entail taking away member states’ rights to decide whom they would like to let into their territory. According to the government, the quota proposal took a step even further: it would deprive nations of their right to decide whom it wants to live together with.

‘If we do not stand up for ourselves and do not protest against this proposal … then people in Brussels, rather than in Hungary, will tell us whom we must let into Hungary and whom we may not let in. They will tell us whom we must live alongside. We must not give Brussels the
The discourse alluded that if the EU was to implement the permanent relocation mechanism then all threats related to migrants would become a reality in Hungary. Therefore, the quota was depicted as an indirect threat to the economy, public security and culture of the country – as exemplified in each of the previous sections. In other words, the relocation system came to be a source of Euroscepticism. Hungary was portrayed as an advocate for the ‘Europe of free nations’ as well as a defender of the status quo, that is the current division of powers between Brussels and member states (Orbán 2018a; 2017i).

In all, the government presented the European Union as an actor that is incapable of protecting its member states because of granting too many rights to arriving migrants. The applied discursive strategies are summarized in Table 5. The EU’s open-doors policy with unreasonable rules was depicted as an obstacle for member states in better protecting themselves or was even made responsible for enticing migrants, thus for their growing numbers. Thereby, the Union was blamed not just for bringing immigrants to Hungary and the continent, but also for importing the threats assumed to be inseparable from those people. As presented in the previous sections, in each domain at least one EU-related threat was identified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Examples of the utilized devices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referential/nomination</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European empire (United States of Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predication</td>
<td>silly, bad, unrealistic, unreasonable rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paralysing member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>irrational, unlawful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reducing national sovereignty, infringes on member states’ rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>topos of disadvantage; advantage; national sovereignty; Brusselism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivization</td>
<td>‘we’ were able to manage migration successfully, would be able to do so again in the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensification/mitigation</td>
<td>quotas would immediately bring all threats associated with migration to Hungary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. The applied discursive strategies in texts relating to the micro-topic of national sovereignty

In the economic sector, the Union was accused of leaving Hungary alone in the protection of the whole of Europe, thus placing too heavy a financial burden on the country. The
idea of a ‘solidarity contribution’ was seen as even more burden to the budget, moreover as treating ‘others’ (refugees) more preferably than ‘our’ native European citizens (Hungarians).

In the field of public security, the proposal of the relocation system was used to keep the presence of threat credible, even in the absence of large number of migrants. Thus, the quota was portrayed as a policy that would be able to flood Hungary with migrants at any moment, that is to bring the associated threats to the country.

Lastly, in the cultural sector, the resettlement system was once again portrayed as an indirect threat. Western European ‘immigrant countries’ were set as examples to which Hungary could be turned to as well if the EU’s proposal gets approved.

Regarding sovereignty, disadvantageous EU rules were highlighted. According to the government, these hampered the successful handling of the crisis, that is the halting of all arrivals. The cabinet advocated for taking the issue back to member states’ competence. Moreover, it accused the EU that with the quota system it wants to infringe on national sovereignty even more by deciding who would reside in Hungary and with that to spread the above-mentioned threat across all Europe.

6. Conclusions

In the previous chapter, I presented and analysed how the third Orbán government discursively portrayed immigration as a threat to different sectors as well as how it linked the EU to the issue. This chapter summarizes the main findings of the analysis and answers the research questions of the thesis.

The government initiated the securitizing move in the wake of a terrorist attack. The timing of the beginning of the securitization process thus already presumed that there is a link between security and immigration. In the first text of the securitization discourse, the cabinet already pointed out the four main topics that are threatened by the influx of asylum seekers. These were the economy, public security, culture and national sovereignty.

In the first few months of the securitization, the discourse mainly focused on the possible economic consequences. It did so because of the context: in the first four months, people from Kosovo made up around half of all asylum applications. Since it was evident that they did not come from a country which is at war, the cabinet came up with the term ‘welfare-seeking immigrant’. Nevertheless, the discourse did not differentiate between asylum-seekers according to their country of origin and labelled all arriving migrants as
such. It argued that even if they fled for their lives originally, by the time that asylum applicants arrive in Hungary they have passed through a number of safe countries. Thereby, the cabinet assumed that since they did not apply for asylum there but continued their journey, they were seeking economic benefits instead of refuge.

Later the discourse started to use the term ‘economic immigrant’, despite it was used to describe people coming from the same countries as those labelled welfare-seeking immigrants before. Thereby, the texts broadened the scope of threat: it was assumed that migrants did not just jeopardise welfare allowances of Hungarians but their jobs, thus livelihoods as well.

During the summer of 2015, the country experienced an even greater increase in the number of arriving refugees. As a consequence, threats to the economic sector were overshadowed in the discourse by emphasizing the possible consequences for the public security and the cultural traditions of Hungary.

The physical safety of Hungarians was portrayed to be threatened by labelling immigrants as criminals, terrorists and invaders or aggressors. The texts drew on unspecified statistics of Western European countries to justify the trope of criminal migrant. The violent scenes at the borders of Hungary after the border was sealed were applied in the discourse to depict all migrants as aggressive.

Later, when migrants were not present in great numbers, the discourse emphasized that they pose a threat to public security whenever a terrorist attack happened in Europe (e.g. November 2015, Paris; March 2016, Brussels). Thereby, the discourse alluded that the influx of migrants into Europe was causing semi-war conditions in the Western part of the continent. Meanwhile, it referred to Hungary and more broadly Central Eastern Europe as the part of Europe which remained safe because of the border fence and strict policies.

Securitization of the cultural sector followed a similar pattern than that of public security. Migrants were labelled as Muslims or Islamic people who are not belonging to Europe. Again, Western European data were cited to argue that they cannot be integrated, while co-existence is not possible between cultures because of the aggressive nature of the Muslim world. Western European countries were often referred to as examples that should not be followed in Hungary. In other words, multiculturalism and alleged parallel societies were presented as dangerous consequences of letting in people from other cultural backgrounds.
In all, the government’s discourse labelled migrants differently in each sector in order to generate a sense of fear among the audience through name-interpretation. In the economic sector, they were identified as welfare-seekers and economic immigrants. That is, they were argued to pose a threat to Hungarians’ welfare allowances and to their jobs, thus to the security of their livelihood. In the domain of public security, the texts depicted migrants as criminals, terrorists and aggressive invaders. Again, these predications alluded that the arriving people are physical security of Hungarian citizens. In the cultural sector, they were accused of trying to invade Europe and convert it to Islam. Thereby, it was argued that the traditional Christian roots of Europe and the lifestyle based on that would be lost.

The discourse on sovereignty touched upon all three of these sectors. From the beginning of the securitization process, the government stated that the EU’s policies were not adequate to handle the crisis. However, this discourse gained even more prominence after the proposal of a permanent relocation mechanism was published. It nearly happened simultaneously with the closing of the southern border of Hungary. Thereby, as the perceived direct threat, that is the presence of large numbers of migrants in Hungary diminished because of the fence, the focus of the texts altered. The quota proposal was highlighted as an indirect threat, the application of which would bring all threats associated with migration to Hungary.

In all, the third Orbán government did not ‘reinvent’ the process of securitization. It referred to topics as being threatened that have been already applied in other instances of securitization (see e.g. Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Bourbeau 2011; Karyotis 2012). However, the social context enabled the government to credibly implement previously utilized threat images into the Hungarian reality. The public’s relatively high level of xenophobia in itself gave ground for stereotypes about others. As the arriving asylum-seekers arrived from different cultures and had a different religion, they were easy targets for othering and the creation of threat images.

Nonetheless, the cabinet still brought a new element to the securitization. After claiming that it protected the country from the threats associated with migrants, it still kept the issue on the agenda. It depicted the EU and one of its policy proposals as a mediating object to maintain the perception of imminent threat. Thereby dangers previously linked to immigrants came to be thought of as a possible consequence of the realisation of the relocation proposal. In other words, those who carried or represented the threat were overshadowed to an extent by a single piece of proposal.
This thesis sought to analyse merely the language use of the third Orbán government on the issue of migration. Nevertheless, it could be an aim of further studies to uncover whether and how it affected public perception of the issue. Moreover, it would be interesting to study whether it had influence on the work routines of those (e.g. border guards, police officers, asylum and immigration office authorities) who encounter with asylum-seekers on a daily basis.
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