EVALUATING PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE REFUGEE PROTECTION SYSTEM:
A CRITIQUE OF REFUGE

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Chapter I - Introduction

1. Topic, purpose, and relevance

The topic of this thesis is the international refugee protection system. The beginning of this official regime dates back to the end of the Second World War when the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in response to the thousands of people forcibly displaced in Europe (Gallagher, 1989). If the UNHCR gave an official definition and status to refugees in the 1951 Convention, the protection of forcibly displaced populations is much older. The norms established within and by the UNHCR find their roots in the XVII and XVIII centuries. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia initiated “the right of jus emigrandi, or to leave a territory with one’s property if their religion differed from that of their prince”, under which people were considered different from other migrants as their states pushed them out (Orchard, 2015: 284). In 1685 the Huguenots - the first flow of refugees - came out of France “following Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes which made Protestantism illegal” (Ibid.). During the French Revolution of 1789, protection was extended to political refugees. While displacement was not new, the response of host states marked a shift. States recognized the right to leave one’s country if persecuted, and offered protection in law (Ibid.: 285). The extraordinary violence of the Second World War - during which thousands of people who had managed to escape Germany were sent back to their death (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.) - led states to come together as to create a “comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees at the international level”, with the aim of protecting human rights during exile (UNHCR, 2010: 3).

Today, the UNHCR, in concert with other international agencies, governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), continues its work in helping forcibly displaced populations. There are 68.5 million forcibly displaced people around the world (UNHCR, 2019a). This number includes 40 million internally displaced, people who leave their habitual place of residence but stay within the borders of their country; 25.4 million refugees, people who have crossed an international border and have received protection in a safe country; and 3.1 million asylum seekers, people who have asked for protection in a safe country (Ibid.). Currently, three countries generate 57 percent of the world’s displaced: South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria. And the top refugee-hosting countries are Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Uganda, and Turkey (Ibid.). The causes of displacement are numerous, and the hosting conditions vary according to countries and their capabilities.
If the international system tries to coordinate efforts and set standards, the living conditions and quality of protection are far from ideal for the majority of refugees. As a result, scholars are questioning the efficacy of the international protection regime. For example, according to Field (2010: 512), the problem is structural, the regime being unable to cope with refugee flows because it “contains a gap between the rights it promises and the responsibility it assigns to make those rights reality”. For Roberts (1998), responsibility for failures lies with states and their unwillingness to grant asylum. Extensive literature and criticism on refugee protection can be found. This thesis will focus on the book *Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World* (hereafter referred to as *Refuge*), written by Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, and published in 2017. The shortcomings of the international refugee protection system and possible remedies will be explored through the critique of this book. The purpose of this thesis is to review the book in order inform the broader conversation on policy changes in the protection regime.

Betts is an expert in forced migration and international affairs. He teaches at Oxford University, conducts research on “the international politics of asylum, migration and humanitarianism”, and contributed to numerous books in the field (Refuge Study Centre, 2019). Collier is an expert in economics and public policy who also teaches at Oxford University. “He researches the causes and consequences of civil war; the effects of aid; and the problems of democracy in low-income and natural-resource-rich societies” (International Growth Centre, 2019). Both Betts and Collier have worked with or for international organizations and governments. Their expertise and credentials makes their book *Refuge* influential among policy-makers and the general public.

The movement and protection of refugees has been a relevant policy and international law topic since the mid-twentieth century, and it has garnered considerable attention since the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe. As a matter of fact, *Refuge* was written in response to this ‘crisis’ as it spilled over to the Global North and exposed shortcomings in the system. This renewed attention led the United Nations (UN) to organize a Global Compact on Refugees in the fall of 2018, alongside another Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regulated Migration set-up under the 2016 New York Declaration (UNHCR, 2018a). These Compacts attempted to find collective solutions to topics that have become central in domestic politics and international relations. As the current High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi stated: “It affects and involves us all, and what it needs is understanding, compassion and political will to come together and find real answers for the refugee plight. This has become a defining challenge of our times” (UNHCR, 2016).
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I present the research question and methodology. The introduction is followed by a literature review chapter, in which I provide a summary of *Refuge* and introduce the reviews that criticize it. Next, in the theory chapter, I present five fields relevant to the analysis of the book. Then, the core of my argument is divided in three chapters. Chapter IV questions Betts and Collier’s criticism of the current protection regime, under which they focus the blame on humanitarianism and the UNHCR. Chapter V explores the limitations of the solutions offered by Betts and Collier. And Chapter VI is a critique of their narrow-minded perspective which exposes a Global North-centric approach too focused on the economy. Finally, in the conclusion I summarize the main points of criticism, include a discussion of human rights, and offer a few recommendations.

2. **Research question**

The research question guiding this thesis is formulated as follows:

Why the solutions presented by Betts and Collier in Part II of their book *Refuge* (2017) do not stand investigation?

To answer this question, I rely on sub-questions:

- Why are market-based and developmental solutions alone insufficient to fix the refugee problem?
- Why humanitarianism and the UNHCR are useful in the process of helping refugees?
- How could the book be better informed by experience, as well as social, political, and legal insights?

3. **Methodology**

I focus on a qualitative approach for my critique exercise. My main tools are the book *Refuge*, academic writings, newspaper articles to seek updates on Syria and various refugee situations, international organizations’ reports, international law documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and interviews with experts.

The interviewees are people who have an expert understanding of the complex refugee protection regime, and have worked personally with forcibly displaced people on the ground. The goal of these meetings was to better understand the gap between policy-making and the daily realities of displaced populations. I inquired about their specific training and expertise at the beginning of interviews, which durations ranged between 15 minutes and an hour. Dr. Rachel McGinnis specializes in acts of mass violence and forceful displacement. She has volunteered to
work in refugee camps in Greece, Palestine, and Lebanon. Dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins is an expert on humanitarian issues related to borders and movement of populations. She has worked with people helping refugees in Greece, Lebanon, and Italy. Next, Dr. Jeff Crisp worked for the UNHCR for 27 years before becoming a research associate at the Oxford Refugee Studies Centre. He has been to dozens of refugee camps all over the world. Finally, Dr. Dina Mansour-Ille has a doctorate degree on the political economy of human rights and social movements. She is now working for the Overseas Development Institute in London, and has worked for the UNHCR as a Refugee Status Determination officer in Egypt. I also sought the expertise of Dr. Maarten den Heijer, expert in international human right law, but this meeting was significantly shorter than the other interviews.

In the appendices section there is a table (Appendix 1.a) presenting general information about the interviews, followed by transcripts of relevant parts of the interviews with McGinnis (Appendix 1.b), Pallister-Wilkins (Appendix 1.c), Crisp (Appendix 1.d), and Mansour-Ille (Appendix 1.e). The last interview, with den Heijer, was not recorded but a couple of relevant notes are included in Appendix 1.f. Finally, two texts important to the conclusion can be found in Appendices 2.a and 2.b. The second text, in addition to a couple other sources in my thesis, was originally in French. For these sources, I translated the ideas or direct quotes into English, which I am capable of doing due to my being a native French speaker with fluency in English. The documents in question are noticeable in the bibliography from the titles, which I have kept in French.

Chapter II - Literature

1. Betts and Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World

In 2017, Betts and Collier published *Refuge*, a book addressed to the broader public, which aims to close the gap between academic writing and policy-making concerning the refugee protection system (Betts and Collier, 2017: XIII-XIV). In a first part they set out a description of the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ in Europe, and an explanation of why - according to them - the overall system is failing. Betts and Collier denounce a system too old to be relevant, where refugees are left with an “impossible choice” between “long-term encampment, urban destitution, or perilous journeys” (Ibid.: 8-9). Their plan to reform this model comes in the second part of the book - the focus of this thesis - and aims to restore refugees’ autonomy and dignity (Ibid.: 10). It holds four key ideas:
the right ethical focus is the duty to rescue the displaced from the disruption to normal life generated by their flight from home, …the best place for safe heaven are those that are easy for the displaced to reach, and rich countries should make it financially feasible for these haven countries to take them, …the best way to restore normality is for refugees to be able to work, so jobs should be brought to haven countries, …[and] the economic support needed for refuge can be used for the dual purpose of incubating the post-conflict recovery (Ibid.: 188-189).

In their ethics discussion at the beginning of Part II, Betts and Collier first argue that all states should be involved in rescuing refugees because we all share a common humanity and are capable of compassion and solidarity (Ibid.: 100-101). Then they use a thought experiment to show how cooperation, based on burden-sharing and the comparative advantage, will result in a better outcome for all. If a child falls in a pond and there are people around with different abilities they can coordinate to save the child while each ‘spending little’ (Ibid.: 103). For example, one passer-by can swim, another has a towel, and a third has a hot drink. Applied to refugee rescue, if all states get involved, they all carry less of the burden. The question then becomes who carries what part of the burden? According to Betts and Collier stable countries in the region of origin - usually developing states - should take-in high numbers of refugees, while rich - and often distant - states pick-up most of the financial burden. Their justification for keeping refugees in the region of origin is two-fold: they will be in more familiar environments with similar cultures and maybe the same language, plus it makes repatriation easier post-conflict (Ibid.: 133).

Then, Betts and Collier argue that the current system relies too much on humanitarianism, which “erodes human potential by focusing almost exclusively on people’s vulnerabilities” (Ibid.: 127). Their main critique concerns encampment, which separates economic markets (camp versus local) and limits job opportunities. They propose instead that refugees be considered as a development opportunity. A new system could help build their capabilities, while boosting the economy of host-states, by giving refugees the right to work and creating special economic zones (SEZs). They take the example of self-settled refugees in Uganda, who have more agency because they are given land and can work (Ibid.: 160). Additionally, they say that SEZs will create jobs for refugees, local populations, and boost the economy through foreign investments and international trade (Ibid.: 171-173). A first step towards this vision is the Jordan Compact, signed in 2016, which should secure work permits for 200,000 Syrian refugees in exchange for two billion dollars in investments (Ibid.: 174).

Next, Betts and Collier insist on ‘incubating recovery’ in countries of origin (Ibid.: 183). They use the example of Syria. They suggest encouraging return by offering training and jobs to
refugees who promise to go home at the end of the conflict. These jobs would be in the fields needed to rebuild the country, including construction, public service, medicine, and education (Ibid.: 195). They also propose that businesses in SEZs in host-countries should be easily expandable to the country of origin, and that rich states should strike trade deals with the post-conflict country of origin in order to boost the recovery of the economy, which will help stability (Ibid.: 190). In addition, Betts and Collier propose the invention of refuge for companies, so that they move rather than close for the time of conflict, as well as incubator cities in host-countries meant to host various flows of refugees (Ibid.: 194).

The last chapter in Part II suggests a ‘rethinking of governance’ by establishing objectives, allocating responsibilities, and having organizational structures that will ensure responsibilities are met (Ibid.: 203). Betts and Collier set two main objectives: rescue and autonomy (Ibid.). Under allocation of responsibilities they give international law a role as a “codifier of norms”, they suggest letting regions organize themselves according to capabilities and levels of cooperation, let partnerships be of various scales, and lastly they propose that solutions go beyond the state, multilateralism, and humanitarianism (Ibid.: 210-219).

2. Their critics

When Refuge was published in 2017 it received a lot of attention by scholars and experts in the field of refugee protection (Pascucci, 2017). Multiple points of criticism are recurrent, starting with the fact that Betts and Collier do not rely on experience. For example, while they present the right to work as an innovation in the refugee protection system, critics maintain that this is not a new idea (Pascucci, 2017; Newby, 2017). As a consequence of ignoring the value of experience, they avoid addressing the risks of their proposed solutions and the drawbacks of their examples (Pascucci, 2017; Crawley, 2017; Mason, 2017; Maxwell, 2017; Newby, 2017). Special economic zones receive numerous warnings because their outcomes “are often not as clean, orderly, and progressive as Betts and Collier’s book seems to assume” (Pascucci, 2017: 199).

Scholars have further criticized Betts and Collier for dismissing the ability of both humanitarianism and the UNHCR to help refugees. According to Pascucci (2017), the book ignored the employment opportunities the humanitarian sector offers. Furthermore, commentators insist on the usefulness of the UNHCR for several reasons, including the following: “it is useful to have collective action institutions when solving collective action problems” (Hargreaves Heap, 2017); the UNHCR is willing to reform (Mason, 2018); and “there remains a strong need for UNHCR to give legal advice to governments in light of the epidemic of immigration reform” (Bailliet, 2017).
This last point assigns the responsibility to states themselves, in contradiction with Betts and Collier, who place most of the blame for protection failures at the feet of the UNHCR. In addition, they seem to misunderstand - or be too optimistic concerning - the appeal of rescue for distant states. According to Hargreaves Heap (2017), the duty to rescue “is controversial, and worryingly so because, unless rich countries are moved to action, none of the other ‘big ideas’ will actually have much impact”. And if refugees stay in their region of origin, “rich countries will be less inclined to feel a moral imperative to help” (Ibid.).

Another point of criticism is the fact that Betts and Collier do not address the broader context of migration in which refugees fall. They take for granted the hard line separating refugees from other migrants, but the reality is much more complex, as noted by Pascucci (2017), Crawley (2017), and Bivand Erdal (2017). The status of a displaced person can change over time, and the reasons for moving are not as clear cut as legal definitions (P. Pallister-Wilkins 2019, personal communication, 25 Apr.). This simplification puts a distance from the daily realities of displaced populations. This goes along with a Eurocentric approach that ignores refugees’ aspirations. The problem is two-fold according to critics: 1) the authors show antipathy towards mass migration and diversity in the Global North (Bivand Erdal, 2017; Crawley, 2017; Birrell, 2017), causing them to 2) disregard refugees’ potential and wants as individuals (Pascucci, 2017; Newby, 2017).

As a result, in Betts and Collier’s plan, “refugees help capitalism at least as much as global capitalism helps refugees” (Pascucci, 2017: 200). Consequently, human rights are at best neglected if not violated (Crawley, 2017; Bailliet, 2017). By focusing solely on the right to work, other rights essential to the well-being of refugees are overlooked, such as freedom of movement and access to welfare (Newby, 2017). Furthermore, a large part of the refugee population is left out in this plan - the young, the elderly, the disabled (Ibid.). This is paradoxical for authors who argue that the basis of their plan is inspired by our common humanity.

All of these points of criticism were expressed in book reviews, which lack the word count for in-depth analyses and explanations. After establishing a theoretical framework, the core of the thesis will focus on expanding on the existing critiques, to show how Betts and Collier’s book is “a neat economic plan” that “works better on paper than it does in practice” (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.). The goal is not to completely dismiss Betts and Collier’s proposal but to question it in order to inform the broader conversation on ways to improve refugee protection.
Chapter III - Theory

Refugees fall under various fields of study and policy because their movement and claims for protection affect domestic migration policies, international relations, labor markets, allocation of humanitarian aid, international law etc. This section takes a step back to a broader understanding of refugees to set-up the five fields of theory that inform this thesis: international law, international relations, humanitarianism, political economy, and migration studies.

1. Refugees under the law: The international protection system

The goal of Refuge is to ‘rethink’ refugee policy, which is established within the international refugee protection regime. It is important to understand the relations between actors and policies that make up this regime. The refugee protection system is a complex web of international and regional agreements, interpreted and implemented at the national level, influenced by various actors including governments, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and civil society. The official international definition of a refugee - giving people an official status for protection - came out of the Second World War when millions of people were displaced within Europe. In 1950, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees was created with the responsibility to “improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection” (UNHCR, 2010: 2), its mandate being “humanitarian and social and of an entirely non-political character” (Ibid.: 4). In 1951, the Convention relating to the status of refugees gave a precise definition of who could receive international protection. A refugee being a person who:

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Ibid.: 14).

Although Betts and Collier follow this definition in the book, I question its validity in Chapter IV. In addition to the refugee definition, the 1951 Convention established the principle of non-refoulement, reiterating people’s right to seek asylum, and protecting them from being returned to dangerous places. Furthermore, the Convention tries to ensure states’ cooperation with the UNHCR in order to provide basic standards for refugees everywhere, such as access to courts, work, welfare - including primary education and housing, as well as the provision of documentation and freedom
of movement (UNHCR, 2010). In principle, these rights should be granted to refugees everywhere, but international law, lacking enforcement power, leaves implementation to states and with it the possibility of interpretation and limitation of these rights.

The UNHCR was first created as a temporary institution, and the refugee status of 1951 was limited to victims in the European context. But in 1967 the Convention was amended, and the Protocol relating to the status of refugees “removed these limitations and thus gave the Convention universal coverage” (Ibid.: 2). While the coverage broadened, the legal definition of a refugee remained unchanged, and was not adaptable to various situations generating displacement around the world. So in 1969, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) created a regional agreement, with a definition more appropriate to the African context - conflicts due to decolonization at the time - offering protection for more people (Nicolosi, 2014: 319). The OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa added to the 1951 definition:

> every person who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (UNHCR, 2006a: 3).

A coalition of Latin American states also created an agreement to adapt the refugee status to the regional context, however, contrary to the OAU Convention the Cartagena Declaration is not legally binding (UNHCR, 2006a). Instead it recommends that the concept of a refugee,

> in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order (Ibid.: 36).

And Europe created the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the 1990s, not to adapt to regional conflicts and struggles, but out of necessity because of the open borders and common economic market policies. The European Union follows the 1951 definition of a refugee, and has created instruments to manage refugee flows and protection standards on a regional level with the Asylum Procedures Directive, Reception Conditions Directive, Qualification Directive, Dublin Regulation, and EURODAC Regulation (European Commission, 2019).

Other regions of the world have agreements smaller in scope or of lesser impact, such as the Bangkok Principles which is a non-binding document that simply aims “to inspire member states to adopt national legislation relating to the status and treatment of refugees and to provide a guide to dealing with refugee problems” (Taylor, 2018). This document was created by the African-Asian
Legal Consultative Organization, which comprises 47 member-states, including Egypt, Ghana, Japan, Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and India (AALCO, 2012). Another example is the Ashgabat Declaration created in 2012 under the International Ministerial Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on Refugees in The Muslim World. This document emphasizes the cultural and religious commitment of the Muslim community towards hospitality and refuge (Refworld, 2012). It reminds the international community of the importance of refugee situations in the Muslim World, including Palestine, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, and of the gratitude of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation member-states towards the UNHCR and host-states (Ibid.).

Whether these agreements are legally binding or not, their implementation still depends on national authorities and cannot be highly regulated as international law lacks enforcement power. As a result, refugees are rarely the priority for governments and their rights are not always secured. In order to remind states of their international obligations and the need for cooperation, the UNHCR organized the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees. Out of this conference came a framework which “provides a blueprint for governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders to ensure that host communities get the support they need and that refugees can lead productive lives” (UNHCR, 2018b). The four main objectives are to “ease the pressures on host-countries, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third country solutions, [and] support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity” (Ibid.). This document is representative of the willingness of the UNHCR to adapt its policies and expand its mandate. The institution is not only concerned for the protection of people who have crossed borders due to persecution anymore, it also cares for internally displaced and stateless people, and helps with a safe return home (UNHCR, 2019c).

While the UNHCR is often referenced as the central player in refugee protection, it falls in a broader context of international laws. Indeed, refugee law is complementary with human rights and humanitarian law as all three fields “share a common goal, the protection of the lives, health and dignity of persons” (ICRC, 2005). The 1951 Convention is grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, established in 1948, which states that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (UN, 2019). The rights established in the Convention also reflect other human rights or come in response to violations of these rights such as the right to life, liberty, and security in Article 3; recognition before the law in Article 6; and freedom of movement in Article 13 (Ibid.). Furthermore, refugee law stands as a back-up to humanitarian law which originally prohibits “parties to a conflict…from displacing civilians”, and offers “protection from the effects of hostilities in order to prevent displacement” (ICRC, 2005). As
a last resort, humanitarian law works alongside refugee law to protect people during displacement (Ibid.).

Because of the enforcement limitations of international law, norms and cooperation - established by international organizations - become central to protecting displaced populations. Furthermore, because of the complexities of displacement - in its causes and consequences - responsibilities to protect refugees do not lie in one place, hence there exists a need for multi-level governance. This leads us to international relations theories.

2. Refugees in international relations

As a cross-border issue, dealing with refugees requires international cooperation and coordination, which are currently organized under the UNHCR. Abbott and Snidal (1998) provide a comprehensive approach to international organizations (IOs) - like the UN agency for refugees - through a cross-theory framework by gaining insight from both rationalism and constructivism:

the role of IOs is best understood through a synthesis of rationalist (including realist) and constructivist approaches. States consciously use IOs both to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly, to create information, ideas, norms, and expectations; to carry out and encourage specific activities; to legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas and practices; and to enhance their capacities and power. These functions constitute IOs as agents, which, in turn, influence the interests, intersubjective understandings, and environment of states (Ibid.: 8).

Part of Chapter IV will focus on the agency of the UNHCR in promoting cooperation and coordinating efforts, therefore narrowing the framework to constructivism. The focal point will be the organization’s authority. According to Barnett and Finnemore (2005), IOs not only construct the “social world in which cooperation and choice takes place”, but also hold “power to influence world events” (Ibid.: 162). And this power comes from “their form (as rational-legal bureaucracies) and because of their (liberal) goals” (Ibid).

Not only does the UNHCR hold power in determining the needs and rights of refugees, it is a necessary agent in the implementation of these rights. Indeed, according to Betts (2011), the playing field of cooperation and burden-sharing is unequal between the Global North and Global South. He calls it a Suasion Game: where there are two players, one stronger than the other with little interest in the situation, who can impose a solution upon the weaker player because even if it is not optimal it is better than nothing (Ibid.: 59). Therefore, without the UNHCR as a mediator and
influencer, states in the Global North would contribute little to nothing for the protection of refugees - the majority of whom are hosted in the Global South (Ibid.: 77).

While the UNHCR oversees refugee protection, it is a colossal task requiring multi-level governance, which involves both vertical and horizontal policy-making. Governance can be understood as starting from the UNHCR, going to regional agreements, to national policies, down to local implementation. In addition, UNHCR seeks help from non-governmental organizations that can fill-in the gaps in humanitarian assistance, and the private sector which can help “maximizing sources of financial and other support” (Benz and Hasenclever, 2011: 190). The UNHCR also engages in “public-public partnerships” with other intergovernmental institutions within and outside of the United Nations (Ibid.:191). The web of governance attempts to implement the norms established at the international level. Chapter IV will explore the responsibility of various actors in order to better understand the shortcomings of the current system.

In the current system, the norm is that the first response to refugee needs be humanitarian assistance, often coordinated by the UNHCR. Unfortunately, it has become a long-term solution for some host-states in dealing with displaced populations, leading to criticism of the humanitarian approach. This takes us to humanitarianism theories.

3. Refugees in humanitarianism

As explained previously, refugee generating situations concern three fields of law, including humanitarian law. In addition to international legal protection, in practice humanitarianism offers emergency responses by getting people to safety, offering food and shelter as well as medical assistance. Humanitarianism has organized itself in specific ways to cater to refugees’ needs. While humanitarianism saves lives in direct response to the suffering body, it is not meant to fix root causes or set people up for a better life. However, significant responsibility and expectations are still put on humanitarian work, and as a consequence analysts find many shortcomings to the field. Relevant to this thesis are the violence of encampment, and humanitarian neophilia.

One of the main critiques of humanitarianism concerning refugee protection is the use of camps. If camps offer a space of safety for refugees, they are also “representative of ‘rituals of segregation’ where outcasts of the nation-state who are also presumed to be agents of insecurity are contained until repatriation” (Jaji, 2011: 227). Camps therefore become a form of structural violence by limiting freedom of movement and free speech, making the maintenance of order more important than individuals’ personal growth (Jaji, 2011). As a consequence, camps are restricted
from becoming political spaces even though refugees’ everyday practices challenge the structures imposed on them (Newhouse, 2015).

Next in the criticisms of humanitarianism is humanitarian neophilia, defined as the obsessive love of novelty (Scott-Smith, 2016). Scott-Smith (2016: 2232) explains how “[t]he innovation agenda presents a future for humanitarianism in which market forces, incentives to profit and entrepreneurial subjects generate a more efficient and emancipatory brand of relief”. An example of innovation catered to refugee needs is a flat-packed refugee house with photovoltaic panels and heat control system (Ibid.: 2231). The problems with using business strategies in humanitarianism is that 1) it “erodes the sense of shared human community”, 2) it reduces “complex humanitarian problems…to the provision of material goods”, and 3) it does not include the beneficiaries, leading to quick fixes rather than long-term effective help (Ibid). Theory on humanitarianism is relevant throughout the three core argument chapters.

Betts and Collier also criticize the humanitarian approach in Refuge, and propose solutions based on the economy instead. They try to move away from aid dependency by creating economic opportunities that will restore refugees’ autonomy and benefit host-countries. This leads us to political economy theories.

4. Refugees in political economy

Because Betts and Collier’s plan is primarily an economic one, the following section introduces two topics that will be useful in the core arguments. First, development aid dependency, which occurs when a state or community receives foreign assistance to alleviate poverty - in the form of funds, goods or expertise - that are used in a way that “inhibits development, progress, or reform” (Stanford, 2015). By wanting to correct the “imbalance of economic development seen across the globe”, donor-states create new problems (Ibid.). Not only do aid recipients lose incentive to strive, they often lose agency in their own country when donors are too involved in how aid is allocated. Concerning displaced populations, aid dependency can be approached on two levels. Refugees themselves are reliant on aid in multiple forms including safety, shelter, and food. And host-countries count on the international community to help them manage refugee flows. This bit of theory will be useful as an introduction to Chapter V.

Next, special economic zones (SEZs) need particular attention as they are the main innovation of the book. SEZs are spaces “in which the government provides preferential support, and greatly relaxes its regulations on business activities in order to attract international investment,
and foreign technology and expertise” (Park, 2005). They are used by developing countries in order to move from “a manufacturing-oriented to a service-oriented economy” (Ibid.). Successes of this strategy include South Korea, which in just a few decades moved from an agriculture-based economy to the eleventh world economy in 2016 (Santacreu, 2018). However, SEZs present significant drawbacks, such as risks of exploitation, low wages, and displacement of local populations (Crawley, 2015). While boosting the economy, these zones can also threaten individuals' rights. It seems that in the short-term, SEZs serve the market more than they serve populations. The issues with making refugees - an already vulnerable group - contributors to SEZs will be discussed at length in Chapter V.

The authors’ economic solutions depend on the right to work which is in turn dependent on a migrant’s status in a new country, and also has consequences on the country of origin. This leads us to the last field of theory, migration studies.

5. Refugees in migration studies

Migration studies try to understand the direction of human movement, its reasons, and its consequences on sending, transit, and receiving countries. In order to make sense of the complexities of migration scholars and policy-makers have adopted categorization strategies. The differentiation most relevant to this thesis is between refugees and economic migrants, a hard-line adopted by Betts and Collier in Refuge. A refugee, seen as a victim forced to move, is approached as someone living in fear, fleeing despair, and seeking protection in safe havens (Bivand Erdal, 2017). On the other hand, an economic migrant, seen as moving voluntarily, is considered someone choosing to take the risk to move in hopes of a better life in a honeypot country (Ibid.). “Whether an international migrant is labeled forced or voluntary defines access to protection and often to migration itself” (Ibid.). However, reality is not as clear-cut as legal definitions. First, the status of a migrant can change over time and according to his location (P. Pallister-Wilkins 2019, personal communication, 25 Apr.). And second, “policy and legal categories may appear fixed, neutral or objective even but are, in fact, constantly subject to challenge across different national and regional contexts, as lawyers, advocates and academics push at the boundaries of international law” (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018: 51). This will be relevant in Chapter IV.

Putting people in categories helps receiving states to let in ‘desired’ foreigners, or keep out others. Indeed, “[e]very state faces the dilemma between facilitating the cross-border flow of people for its own economic and political benefit on the one hand and monitoring, controlling and limiting
that same flow for its perceived security interest on the other hand” (Neumayer, 2006: 74). As a consequence, mobility is unequal between passport holders from Organization of Economic Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) countries, seen as “ideal global citizens”, and those from “poor, authoritarian countries with a history of violent political conflict [for whom] travel is and remains severely restricted” (Ibid.: 81). Unequal mobility will be useful in Chapter VI.

One of the consequences of migration for sending countries is the concept of brain drain, which relates back to the economic field. The overall principle of brain drain is the phenomenon of high-skilled workers leaving developing countries to work in developed regions (Castles et al., 2014: 71). This drain in human capital can also have positive consequences thanks to remittances and the possibility of return (Ibid.: 74). The case of refugees is particular because not only do the highly-skilled leave, a larger part of the population does. Furthermore, the conditions in the country of origin are not stagnating but declining because of conflict. Plus, refugees do not necessarily gain new skills during their exile because their working and education rights are limited in many host-countries. This is relevant in Chapter V under the section on repatriation.

The theories introduced above follow major themes addressed in Betts and Collier’s book. They either help understand the authors’ reasoning or contribute to the questioning of their solutions in the following three chapters.

Chapter IV - Putting the blame where it belongs

This chapter starts with Betts and Collier’s criticism of humanitarianism and the UNHCR, explaining why the approach and institution cannot be dismissed. Then, three other actors contributing to the system’s shortcomings are introduced as to give a better account of the layered factors leading to weaknesses in refugee protection.

1. Humanitarianism

Betts and Collier propose a move away from the humanitarian approach to refugee protection to switch to a focus on developmental solutions. According to them, humanitarianism puts too much emphasis on refugees’ vulnerabilities rather than their capacities (Betts and Collier, 2017: 157). They blame the international refugee protection system for choosing humanitarianism as a long-term solution. I argue that while humanitarianism presents shortcomings, it cannot be
undermined in its efforts to protect lives. Furthermore, the blame for violations of refugee rights is not on humanitarianism but on states’ reluctance - if not plain refusal - to transition people out of humanitarian protection.

First, humanitarianism should be judged for what it aims to do, which is save lives in emergency situations. The humanitarian principle came out of a particular understanding of human connection: the suffering body. The goal of a humanitarian intervention is to “alleviate suffering and provide the basic conditions for life” such as food, shelter, or medical care to suffering populations in situations of emergency like war, displacement due to natural disaster, famine etc (Pallister-Wilkins, 2017: 21; Sphere Standards, 2018). Common agents of humanitarianism are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but international organizations and governments themselves also engage in this practice. As a first response to displacement, humanitarianism is a logical strategy putting people out of danger. However, Betts and Collier are right as it is not enough to secure a dignified life for refugees. But humanitarianism does not function in an isolated context.

If Betts and Collier wish to focus on economic empowerment of refugees in order to make them agents of development, there are ways to do that within the humanitarian framework, which might be a good transition towards more developmental solutions. For example, it is impossible to fully suppress repurposing and exchanges of humanitarian goods in refugee camps. Thus instead of suppressing creativity, humanitarians could adapt policies. In the refugee camp of Kakuma, Kenya, Newhouse (2015: 2302) observed refugees “sell[ing] their rations or repurpos[ing] food aid into alcohol or prepared food items to earn enough to buy meat or a school uniform”. Rather than imposing restrictions and punishment, policies could embrace these practices. According to two experts who have worked with refugees, a constructive move has been to give refugees cash allowances or snap cards instead of goods. In Beirut, Lebanon, McGinnis saw a positive switch from second-hand goods like clothing items to snap cards, which are more cost-effective and give independence to refugees in choosing what they need (R. McGinnis 2019, personal communication, 9 Apr.). In a more general view point, Crisp saw this move away from “care and relief” programs as a way for the UNHCR and NGOs to save money, and for displaced populations to be less dependent (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.). There exists resilience within the humanitarian framework that could be tapped into.

Betts and Collier’s biggest concern with the humanitarian approach is the use of camps, because “over time, if camp life endures for too long it may lead to long-time reliance upon aid, exacerbate vulnerability, and erode people’s capacities for independence” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 137). It is important to note, however, that these camps are not the preferred solution. The UNHCR
states clearly that “camps should be the exception and only a temporary measure in response to forced displacement” (UNHCR, 2019b). Camps exist as long-term solutions because of states’ wariness towards integrating refugees. Betts and Collier (2017: 137) recognize that: “Because many host societies perceive the long-term presence of refugee as a source of competition for scarce resources or a threat to security”. But in continuation with this understanding, Betts and Collier should also recognize that humanitarians have to adapt in order to have access to populations in danger, leading to not ideal solutions like camps. Their work is “affected by factors such as culture, legislation and national policies” that might restrict a move away from aid and segregation (UNHCR, 2019b). This is not to undermine humanitarians’ shortcomings, but to put their work in the broader context where states have interests - which they do not perceive as taking-in and integrating thousands of refugees. As a result, the UNHCR and NGOs provide aid to refugees for years - sometimes even decades, which is better than abandoning people.

2. The UNHCR

States’ interests and priorities can change according to the historical context, as well as the influence of other states or international organizations, like the UNHCR. Betts and Collier have a paradoxical way of considering the UNHCR: they take a liberalist approach according to which states are the primary actors in international relations but can also cooperate, while also putting the blame for failures at the feet of the UNHCR suggesting a constructivist understanding of the institution. They undermine the power of the UNHCR in its ability as an independent actor to influence states’ behavior, and call for solutions that better align with states’ interests. In the following section, I argue that the institution not only does not hold all the responsibility for shortcomings, it is needed to encourage cooperation and better serve refugees.

The UNHCR was created by states, but it also holds its own power. International organizations (IOs) have authority in so far as states delegate it to them. The UNHCR has moral and expert authority concerning refugees (Loescher, 2014). Authority is defined as the “ability of one actor to deploy discursive and institutional resources in order to get other actors to defer judgement to them” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005: 169). Moral because the UNHCR represents the international community, and expert because it focuses solely on displaced populations. At the same time, IOs gain influential power derived from their authority. They can use normative resources to shape the behavior of state and non-state actors; they get to set the agenda and classify objects or actors; and they define the problems, craft solutions, and assign responsibilities (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005). Furthermore, IOs encourage cooperation by providing a neutral discussion
forum, and coordination by playing an organizational role (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). Betts and Collier want to promote the duty to rescue, and the UNHCR has that capacity. And even if the legitimacy of the UNHCR is declining because of its shortcomings and the general negative attitude of states towards migration, the institution still communicates and convinces states of the importance of refugee norms and regime (Loescher, 2014).

If the institution is not perfect, it does not need to be replaced, as suggested by Betts and Collier. They say that their “model would require a very different kind of UNHCR”; one that is not “the guardian of an anachronistic regime” but a “facilitator” setting the agenda by being more political (Betts and Collier, 2017: 220-221). Describing the UNHCR as anachronistic is a misunderstanding of the institution and its willingness to reform. Many of the solutions presented by Betts and Collier would find support in the already existing 1951 Convention if it were better upheld by states. Freedom of movement and the right to work are stated respectively in Article 26, and in Articles 17, 18 and 19 (UNHCR, 2010). Plus, the UNHCR has evolved by expanding its mandate with the protection of internally displaced people (IDPs), stateless people, and the provision of help for safe return (UNHCR, 2019c). And as a representative of the international community, it is willing to further improve, as the Global Compact on Refugees shows by renewing its commitment to protection and presenting new initiatives (M. den Heijer 2019, personal communication, 9 May). What it needs, however, is political will from member-states. As much as it can influence, the UNHCR cannot impose anything.

3. Other factors holding responsibility for failures
   a) Definition and categorization

   Although Betts and Collier see the current tools of refugee protection as anachronistic, they do not offer an extended discussion of how these tools could be changed to better fit current situations. Instead they propose to bypass the legal tools and impose practicality. For example, they assert that “[t]oday, the refugee problem is global, [and] driven not just by persecution, but by conflict and fragility” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 202). But they fail to properly acknowledge the willingness of the refugee protection system to adapt to these evolutions, seen especially in regional agreements. Plus, the short section on the reworking of the refugee definition is contradictory to an expansion as “ ‘fear of serious physical harm’ does not expand the scope of refugee status, but rather pushes in a fundamentally conservative direction” (Hathaway, 2018: 176). Furthermore, in Part II of the book, Betts and Collier take an easy way out by following the dichotomy between refugees and economic migrants.
Political philosophers have proposed new and broader definitions of a refugee. For example, Andrew E. Shacknove proposes that refugees be “persons whose basic needs are unprotected by their country of origin, who have no remaining recourse other than to seek international restitution of their needs, and who are so situated that international assistance is possible.” David Miller argues that we should understand refugees as persons who cannot meet their basic needs in their countries of origin, and that recipient states have a duty of assistance to open their borders to those who find themselves in such dire circumstances. And finally, Matthew J. Gibney contends that refugees are those individuals in need of a new place of residence due to the inadequacy or brutality of their state of citizenship, and that they are owed such assistance on pure humanitarian grounds (Ferracioli, 2014: 124).

The risk with proposing a reform of the 1951 Convention in the current context - negative views on migration and policies closing borders - is to facilitate the opposite response, to narrow the definition and the rights of refugees (Ibid.).

If reworking the definition is not easy, following categorizations is not representative. Betts and Collier take for granted the hard line between a refugee and an economic migrant. According to them, “refugees are not migrants” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 30). “Migrants are lured by hope; refugees are fleeing fear. Migrants hope for honey pots; refugees need havens” (Ibid.). The reality is that individuals cross borders for mixed reasons, reasons that can change over time and place. For instance, while violence and fear were the main drivers for leaving the country of origin for many people hosted in Greece, economic insecurity due to instability was also an important decision factor (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018: 55-56). And after reaching a first safe country many did not want to stay there because of discrimination and a lack of rights, like Afghans in Iran or Syrians in Turkey, leading them to Europe (Ibid.). One can be both or oscillate between, and categorization is not representative of that reality. It is also not a neutral process, “rather it reflects ‘subjective perceptions of how people fit into different spaces in the social order and of the terms on which society should engage with them in varying contexts and at different points in time’…creat[ing] hierarchical systems of rights” (Ibid.: 51). Following this false dichotomy is unfair to all migrants, turning ‘refugees’ back into passive victims who are perceived as not having aspirations like economic migrants. And vice versa, it turns ‘economic migrants’ into illegitimate asylum seekers trying to take advantage of the system.

b) Other international organizations

Next, according to Betts and Collier (2017: 219), “[w]ithin the United Nations system, refugees are seen primarily as a humanitarian issue, and the UNHCR is treated as though it is the
lead agency on refugees”. As a remedy, they propose to seek input from organizations like the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in their model. This is nothing new, the institution is already sharing information and responsibilities with other international organizations, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Bank (Nicholson and Kumin, 2017: 45-46). Therefore, while Betts and Collier want to distribute responsibilities, these agencies are already picking-up part of the burden to balance out the shortcomings in helping displaced populations. For example, “[t]he World Bank has been a leader in responding to the fact that the traditional humanitarian system was not designed to meet medium or longer-term needs, and has begun to play a significant role by providing multiyear financing and engaging in policy dialogue on refugee rights and opportunities” (Charles et al., 2018). Another example is the work of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in providing assistance for resettlement. They offer services to host countries such as “Case processing, Health Assessments, Pre-Departure Orientation and Movement” (IOM, 2019).

The UNHCR is not responsible for all displaced populations, nor can it handle all aspects of refugee protection, therefore a multi-level governance and cross-field strategy is needed. This is well articulated in Refuge as refugees “lie at the intersection of…humanitarianism, development, migration, human rights, post-conflict reconstruction, disaster risk reduction, and state-building”, and therefore “cannot simply be seen as a ‘UNHCR issue’ ” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 219). However, Betts and Collier want to revolutionize the system by completely changing the leading role of the UNHCR, when reemphasizing already existing mechanisms and documents could be enough to further cooperation. The UNHCR already “works with a wide range of partners – over 900 in 2016 – including governments, intergovernmental and UN organizations, other international bodies, and NGOs” (Nicholson and Kumin, 2017). Reinforcing the use of the inter-agency platform by allocating responsibilities could improve efficiency of the system. It would create a web of horizontal cooperation, and vertical delegation of tasks. What the UNHCR needs to fully take the lead on is the reenforcement of all the rights included in the 1951 Convention by reminding signatory states of their commitments.

c) States

Failures one level down from UNHCR, in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), have to be addressed, and Betts and Collier do so in the first part of their book. According to them the CEAS was “dysfunctional from the start”, agreed (Betts and Collier, 2017: 63). But they seem to
think that if Germany had followed the rules, the European ‘crisis’ might not have escalated. In September 2015, Chancellor Merkel decided to reject the Dublin Regulation and offered safe transit to and protection in Germany, which according to the authors led to a calculus of migration bringing to Europe three new groups of people: Syrians in neighboring havens (Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan); new waves from Syria; and refugees and migrants from all around the world (Ibid.: 85-86). First, a study questions the causal relationship between Germany’s shift in policy and new flows of refugees (Faigle et al., 2016). The refugee wave started in the spring and people started to move into northern Europe in the summer, not after September. Furthermore, “[t]he trigger for people to leave their homes was much more powerful than a few tweets, selfies or photos of cheering Munich residents. The flight of millions of people had four essential causes” (Ibid.). In summer 2015 the war in Syria worsened. Then aid groups cut food rations because the World Food Programme had insufficient funding to supply refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. At the same time these havens could not offer visas or work. Finally, Afghans joined the wave because the security situation was worsening for them too (Ibid.). Plus, even if there was a correlation, Betts and Collier’s angle misses the main issue: the 2015 ‘crisis’ was not exacerbated because Germany acted as a “headless heart” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 108), but because other European states violated their commitment to refugee and human rights law by imposing deterrence strategies (further discussed in Chapter VI).

As explained by Crisp, “states are not living out to the principles, standard, and approaches they signed” (J.Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.). Governments are ignoring their commitments, for some even withdrawing from the system like the United States. Trump’s administration is not upholding the American tradition of supporting refugee protection efforts - through financing and resettlement - but instead taking a number of different actions against the principle of asylum “in the travel ban, a serious reduction in the number of refugee resettlement places, redefining asylum to make it more difficult, the whole business on the southern border and the intention to build a wall, and then complete withdrawal from the Palestinian refugee agency” (Ibid.). Importantly, the United States are only a signatory to the 1967 Protocol. And some states simply have not signed either the Convention nor the Protocol. In which case they offer at best a charity-like version of protection like in Jordan and Lebanon (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). Staying out of the official legal protection system keeps states from being accountable on the international stage.
The definition of a problem shapes its solutions. In the case of *Refuge*, the hyper focus on humanitarianism and denunciation of the UNHCR will lead to solutions outside the existing framework. Instead, the existing positive foundations could be built upon. For example, while in theory humanitarianism is an emergency response, in practice its role has expanded and this expansion can be shaped into more developmental strategies. Then, constructivism has important insights on the role of the UNHCR which acknowledge the influence of the institution as it sets-up norms and provides a forum of coordination. Furthermore, a broader understanding of the actors at play in refugee protection includes a reflection on the drawbacks of definitions and categorization, which should be less strictly interpreted; an emphasis on the role of other international organizations; and a recognition of states’ failure to pick-up their responsibilities and implement the standards they sign-up to.

**Chapter V - Betts and Collier’s solutions are flawed**

This chapter evaluates the major changes proposed by Betts and Collier, namely the development of special economic zones (SEZs) and the possibility to employ refugees in them, a heightened focus on the right to work, the suggestion to help the economy in the country of origin, and the encouragement for return. All these changes are underlined by economic strategies. Even if it is not discussed clearly in the book, it appears that Betts and Collier’s goal is to move away from a system that creates aid dependency by promoting refugee self-reliance and pushing the potential of developing states.

1. **Special economic zones**
   a) …present major drawbacks

   Special economic zones have been described as the main innovation in *Refuge*, implementing Betts and Collier’s vision of how refugees can contribute to development (Crawley, 2017). “The core of the idea would be to allow economic zoning that create geographical spaces within which refugees receive access to a set of entitlements and capabilities” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 173). Host countries would receive foreign investments in these zones in exchange for the guarantee of work for refugees (Ibid.: 172). According to the authors, this strategy could kill two birds with one stone: enhance refugee choice and autonomy through work, and boost economic development. However, SEZs present major drawbacks, which are brushed off in *Refuge*. 
First, SEZs are known to be zones of exploitation, which is highly concerning for a population who is already vulnerable (D. Mansour-Ille, personal communication, 8 May). Existing SEZs have shown how they can compromise labor rights because of the reduced regulations, leading to low wages and long hours (Crawley, 2017). Furthermore, the work in these zones often requires little skill, making workers disposable (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). In addition, SEZs are often located in empty areas, making them “a no man’s land within a no man’s land”, isolating workers and imposing a long commute after long days of work (Ibid.).

Employing refugees in SEZs - usually located at the fringes of cities, even the fringes of countries - can turn into a strategy to keep them from moving inland, reaching urban areas, and integrating. This strategy is used in Thailand where the government created SEZs on the border with Myanmar, where numerous Burmese migrants, including refugees, often cross the border for work (Thame, 2014). These drawbacks about SEZs are well documented, and even clearly stated in the source given by Betts and Collier concerning Thailand: 1) “a major objective of the National Council for Peace and Order is to more effectively restrict the movement of migrants”; 2) “it may be wishful thinking to hope for a progressive and inclusive solution, especially given the persistence of slavery and forced labour in industries reliant on migrant labour” (Ibid.). Yet “the authors do not address how to actually avoid exploitation, when employing people so obviously open to abuse as refugees, indicating a troublingly naïve expectation of the measures necessary to protect refugee rights to work” (Newby, 2017).

Second, Betts and Collier present SEZs as an opportunity for both refugees and nationals. However, SEZs can hinder the local population’s livelihood because of land grabbing and environmental degradation (Crawley, 2017). When using the Thai-Burma border SEZs as an example of how refugees can be employed alongside nationals, Betts and Collier forget to mention is that “the Thai government seized more than 3.2 square kilometres of land in Mae Sot, including farms and homes” for the implementation of a special economic zone (Su Wai, 2015). And this particular “SEZ could pollute the Thaung Rin River, whose waters are used on both sides of the border” (Ibid.). In addition, there is no guarantee of work in the SEZ for the local population because many “have poor education and no ID card”, and Burmese migrants might accept lower wages (Ibid.).

Next, if this plan were to be implemented, Betts and Collier forget to explain how life in these zones would be organized. They heavily criticize encampment, yet they fail to provide a concrete alternative. There is no indication of where refugees who work in SEZs should live, nor a clear procedure on how to secure their rights. Having a job in an SEZ would force refugees to live
close by, which might infringe on their freedom of movement. It might also make them dependent on one employer, or at least one type of employment. The only way to prevent harsh working conditions might be to introduce conditional clauses in the agreements under which rich states and companies invest in host-countries’ SEZs. However, imposing reasonable working hours, a minimum wage, and safety regulations might hinder the economic efficiency - and therefore attractiveness - of SEZs.

They also forget to talk about the politics behind these zones, which strive under trade agreements. In Jordan, the Aqaba Special Economic Zone is combined as a Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) (Kardoosh, 2004). The QIZ initiative was created by the United States in 1996 as a strategy to support peace in the Middle East (International Trade Organization, 2019). It “allows Egypt and Jordan to export products to the United States duty-free, as long as these products contain inputs from Israel” (Ibid.). If the zones where refugees are offered employment were to be a combination of SEZ and QIZ like Aqaba, Syrian refugees - in the current crisis, but also other displaced people from member-states of the Arab League - might refuse to work in these zones out of principle (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). Creating jobs that people do not want because one has forgotten to assess the political context could be a blow to Betts and Collier’s big idea.

The biggest problem with special economic zones is that their implementation is more about development than about people. If Betts and Collier’s goal is really the empowerment of refugees, then they would explore their entrepreneurship rather than try to turn them into “cheap labor for multi-national corporations” (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.). If humanitarianism gave refugees the role of victims, Betts and Collier made them tools of capitalism. In 2018, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UNHCR, and the IOM put together a Policy Guide on Entrepreneurship for Migrants and Refugees (UNCTAD, 2018). “Such efforts have the potential to deliver shared benefits for countries of residence and countries of origin, for foreign-born and native-born populations alike”, while actually respecting refugees’ capabilities and aspirations (Ibid.). For instance, the Business Development Center in Jordan, implemented by the UNDP “offers life skills and technical and vocational training” to both Syrian refugees and Jordanians (Ibid.: 125). This program uses highly-skilled Syrians to train vulnerable Jordanians, and more broadly facilitates skill exchanges. The goal is not only to “support socioeconomic development”, but also to “strengthen social cohesion” (Ibid.: 125-126).
b) The Jordan Compact example

As a sort of experiment of giving refugees the right to work in combination with developing SEZs, Betts and Collier proudly introduce their contribution to the Jordan Compact. This 2016 deal between rich states - along with companies - and the Jordanian government guaranteed Jordan two billion dollars in assistance and investments in exchange for the distribution of 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees (Betts and Collier, 2017: 174). “One of the main vehicles for this would be through a series of five new SEZs in which refugees would be employed alongside nationals” (Ibid.). A year after the start of this strategy, the ILO put out a report that is not as positive as the expectations.

There are over 1.2 million Syrian refugees in Jordan; among them about 322,000 are of working age and 44,900 have a work permit, the rest are not working or work in the informal economy (ILO, 2017: 9). The Jordan Compact led to an increase in the number of work permits, from 4,000 in December 2015 to 40,000 in December 2016. This increase did not occur because jobs were created, but rather because many Syrian workers were regulated (Ibid.: 8). The goal of work permits is to secure employment and the protection of rights, and there is room for improvement. Among Syrians with work permits, only a third have a written contract, the majority are not covered by social security, most of them work excessive hours, and their work places do not enforce occupational safety and health regulations (Ibid.). When there are inspections, they focus on work permits but not working conditions. Therefore work permits are perceived as being related to a sense of safety and stability rather than tangible benefits (Ibid.).

Other shortcomings of the Jordan Compact include the failure to create jobs attractive for Jordanians. Indeed, an increase in work permits for Syrian refugees “correlates directly with…a lack of social protection requirements…[which] could actually drive down working conditions in the sector where Syrians are being employed, and ultimately dissuade Jordanian workers from entering” (Ibid.: 10). There is also a failure to include women in the work force. This is due to multiple reasons, including family responsibilities preventing them from working, and a lack of targeted campaigns to build trust and encourage them to apply for work permits (Ibid.: 51). Finally, there needs to be a simplification of administrative procedures to secure more permits and reach the 200,000 promised. The current system creates misconceptions on the refugee side, and hurdles on the employer side (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May; ILO, 2017: 40). As Crisp put it:

Given that the book is very much based on the idea that you can take that model - the Jordan Compact model - and export it to other parts of the world, if it has not worked
very well in Jordan then you have to ask whether it would also not work in other parts of the world (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.).

2. The right to work
a) …is not enough

Betts and Collier’s model focuses almost exclusively on giving refugees the right to work. According to them it is the best way for refugees “to regain a sense of dignity, enhance their quality of life, and improve their skills” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 157). While I agree that the right to work is important, I would like to emphasize that it should not be the only focus. It is important to note that giving the right to work to refugees is not new, it even has its own chapter in the 1951 Convention titled ‘Gainful Employment’ (UNHCR, 2010: 22-23). And the right to work alone does not guarantee a dignified life, yet “[t]he argument appears to be that if refugees have an income, other dimensions of their well-being will resolve themselves” (Mason, 2018).

Problem number one: heightened focus on the right to work neglects a large part of the refugee population. Over half of the refugee population are children, and another portion cannot work for various reasons such as suffering from trauma, having a disability, or being elderly (UNHCR, 2019d; ILO, 2017). There needs to be a good education system in place for children before entering the labor market. While the UNHCR tries to “assist, protect and find solutions for displaced children…[t]hrough psychosocial support activities and education” (UNHCR, 2019d), the system and infrastructure are not good enough to accommodate them. For example, Mansour-Ille reported that refugee children in Lebanon “used to walk to the schools and stand at the windows in order to hear the lessons because they cannot enter” due to the classroom being too small (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). Betts and Collier (2017: 171 and 195) mention education, but their focus is on refugee teachers and professional training for adults.

Problem number two: focusing on income alone risks undermining other rights, some ‘basic’ such as proper shelter, sustainable food and water, and security - especially for women; others ‘psychological’ as refugees do not only complain about not having economic rights, they also regret not having freedom of speech, freedom of movement, and transparency (McLeod, 2018; Jaji, 2011). If we follow the assumption that once people have an income they will regain autonomy and dignity, then they will receive less assistance in other important fields, which will lead to an independent but still difficult life. Undermining other rights goes against refugee protection law, as the 1951 Convention includes all of the rights mentioned above, and more broadly it erodes international human rights law.
The following paragraph introduces a need that is not only ignored in *Refuge*, it is also not listed in any legal refugee protection document. Yet one interviewee insisted on the need for access to mental health assistance among refugee populations. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety among refugees and asylum seekers (WHO, 2019). McGinnis talked about a lack of mental health facilities in the camps where she volunteered (R. McGinnis 2019, personal communication, 9 Apr.). Combating anxiety or depression cause by the trauma of displacement and various forms of violence is addressed on a small scale by some NGOs through sport, art, or music therapy. In her view, not only is this shortcoming negative for refugees, it becomes a risk for global security as people suffering from anxiety or depression are more vulnerable to radicalization by violent organizations (Ibid).

b) The Ugandan example

Betts and Collier use Uganda as an example of how refugees can be empowered through self-reliance policies. However, this example can also be used to emphasize the drawbacks of this kind of policy. Uganda’s Self-Reliance Policy “aims to provide refugees the means to economically support themselves while at the same time lessening their dependence on humanitarian assistance” (Svedberg, 2014: 7). Refugees are given a plot of land for subsistence agriculture along with food rations, which are scaled down over time, and they are allowed to engage in commercial activities (Ibid.).

Yet refugees still struggle to become self-reliant for numerous reasons, including: the plots of land are inadequate to their needs and limits their right of movement; all refugees do not want to be farmers; other options for business are limited; they have difficulties reaching services; and their lives are put on hold because the Ugandan government still expects them to return or resettle (Ibid.: 29-40). Being given a little independence, one option for work, and less assistance is not a satisfying solution. And Betts and Collier’s model - based on SEZs - risks recreating these weaknesses. Because of these shortcomings, many refugees in Uganda choose to self-settle, and therefore do not receive any form of assistance. Hovil (2007) argues that self-settlement would be a more effective strategy if it were legalized. While the Self-Reliance Policy “has generally failed to ensure security and economic development for both refugees and their hosts”, refugees who integrate/self-settle actually work, pay taxes, and contribute to the local economy, and many still plan on returning home when possible (Ibid.: 618). Hovil adds that in this model, assistance should be “channelled to both the refugees and the hosts aside from the settlement structure” (Ibid.). This
consideration of the hosts leads to another issue with Betts and Collier’s model: it ignores local context.

The Ugandan example exposes how focusing on refugees without analyzing the host country and population’s needs can lead to non-feasible or non-effective policies. Seeing refugees as an opportunity is impossible when nationals are not even considered as an opportunity, and when there is no infrastructure to support the system (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). In the case of Uganda, most of the financial burden to accommodate refugees remains on the government, which does not have the resources, nor are refugees the priority as it already struggles to provide services for its nationals (Svedberg, 2014: 14 and 28). As a result, the Self-Reliance Policy is more about alleviating the burden for the state, than making refugees independent. In Egypt, the government is dealing with issues such as high levels of poverty and illiteracy, the slumification of Cairo, and a large informal economy (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). Because there is no encampment policy in Egypt, the one million Syrian refugees living there are entangled in these struggles (Ibid.). A one-size fits all model based on the right to work does not align with the realities of host-countries, nor the needs of refugees.

Betts and Collier ignore the possible drawbacks of the solutions presented above, and they fail to answer important questions concerning the implementation of the following two solutions.

3. Promoting stability by incubating recovery in the country of origin

Betts and Collier suggest that to avoid a relapse in instability, the economy should be a priority in the post-conflict country of origin. The economy will need firms as “they are what lifts a society rapidly out of poverty” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 186). In their example, because Syria will be short of these firms directly post-conflict, external actors should be involved (Ibid). For instance, foreign states or companies could invest in SEZs in the country of origin.

Ideally, many of the businesses developed within such spaces [SEZs in host countries] would be footloose, enabling them to follow refugees back to Syria when the security situation allows…The model would not depend upon the end of insecurity within Syria but could be premised upon the idea that it is working towards an eventual post-conflict reconstruction (Ibid.: 173).

With this solution, Betts and Collier do not explain who would oversee the transition back to the country of origin, which involves different jurisdictions (D. Mansour-Ille, personal communication, 8 May). They do not explain how rights would be guaranteed either, as people who
had a job in the host-country’s SEZ would want at least the same job, wage, and benefits moving back home. And the next question would be, what interest do external actors have in investing in a fragile state? They address this by suggesting that international public money be used to compensate firms for the public benefit that they generate by operating in post-conflict countries (Ibid.: 188). This solution remains experimental and the authors fail to present a concrete way to convince political actors to trust it. The war in Syria is now over, and the environment is unfavorable to trade deals or economic boost. Assad is still in power and “[d]etermined not to bolster the regime, western countries are tightening sanctions and withholding major reconstruction funding”, while Syria’s allies (Iran and Russia) “are not committing resources to resuscitate the country” either (Cornish et al., 2019). Water, gas, and electricity are scarce; infrastructure and housing have been destroyed; tourism is dead; the government is almost bankrupt; and the costs for reconstruction are estimated between 200 and 400 billion dollars (Barthe, 2019). When the country suffers such damages and remains under authoritarian rule, business could help but does not seem nearly sufficient.

Then, in their quest for innovation, Betts and Collier (2017: 194) suggest creating “incubator cities” in host countries “that could serve each influx of refugees as need arose”. A step further than SEZs, these cities would be regulated spaces meant to accommodate different influxes of refugees, set-up in countries like Lebanon or Jordan who regularly have to take people in. “They would be advantageous for the host country, serve the needs of refugees, and prepare the recovery of the post-conflict economy of the country of origin” (Ibid.). These would come along with a right of refuge for businesses, allowing them to move rather than close. Once again, the implementation steps of these innovations, requiring cooperation between jurisdictions remain unanswered in Refuge.

If any of these solutions were to work - which is not guaranteed as they sound more theoretical than doable - economic success would only be a bandage on a situation that is more complex than development. Instability in Syria, and more generally in developing regions comes from a combination of economic and political problems. It is possible that Betts and Collier ignored the political context because intervention outside of the economy would be intrusive and tricky, but it does not alleviate the need for long-term solutions that address the root causes of displacement. Betts and Collier’s practicality leads to a certain level of pessimism. Their version of a long-term solution is to have a viable haven system that could accommodate temporary influxes of refugees (Ibid.). This solution suggests that some regions are simply doomed to be unstable.
4. **Repatriation**

To help reestablishing stability, reverse brain drain, and in line with many refugees’ desire, Betts and Collier insist on encouraging return to the country of origin. They believe that “self-reliance [during exile] can increase the likelihood of sustainable repatriation” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 153). However, return is not so simple because of the instability of peace in modern conflicts. Plus, people might not want to return, and encouraging premature repatriation would go against refugee law (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.). And the alternatives presented by Betts and Collier (integration or resettlement) offer nothing new.

Sustainable return is not only dependent on refugees’ resilience, but also on the stability of peace. Unfortunately, the “conflict relapse rate has increased” in the XXI century as “60 percent of conflicts in the early 2000s relapsed within five years” (von Einsiedel et al., 2017), and this could happen to Syria. Plus, if - fragile - stability returns, when people consider going home they want safety nets. Syrian refugees who have reached Europe are not too keen on returning for two main reasons. Some want to have their host country’s nationality before visiting Syria so that they have the option of leaving in case their safety is threatened again (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). Others, who were involved in the uprisings cannot return as they would be persecuted - if not executed. Indeed, Assad has been cracking down on political opponents and people involved in the uprisings of 2011. Multiple Syrians who found asylum in Europe or Turkey reported fellow activists or family members disappearing or being tortured back in Syria (Hennion, 2019). For them it is impossible to return home as long as Assad is in power. Impossible to talk freely as well because it might put acquaintances who are still in Syria in danger (Ibid.). As for people who stayed close to Syria and might choose to return - if the government is not after them - dire conditions await them. The UNHCR reports issues related to identification documents, property rights, and “mines and unexploded ordnance” in “agricultural and civilian areas” (Aljazeera, 2018). Betts and Collier cannot ask people to return in these conditions, and their economic plan is not enough to improve them.

The authors suggest that, in general, if the situation at home does not improve after five to ten years of displacement then people should be able to integrate in their host-country or be resettled. This solution raises numerous questions. First, **where do people go for resettlement?** There are already not enough countries offering spots for resettlement, and the trend is declining further (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.). Then, **how can states’ minds be changed about integration?** As mentioned previously, the main reason for encampment and the lack of rights is that host-states do not want to integrate refugees. Finally, if this five to ten year plan could work, it
would only accommodate ‘new’ refugees, what would happen to people who have been in protracted situations for decades or even generations? Alternatives to return will be further discussed in Chapter VI.

Theoretically, the proposed solutions have potential to alleviate aid dependency, but in practice their implementation remains uncertain, and in general Betts and Collier’s plan presents shortcomings in the rights department. The use of SEZs as a strategy to employ refugees creates a risk of exploitation for the displaced and important drawbacks for the locals. The focus on the right to work only caters to part of the refugee population, and does not - alone - provide a dignified life because “reducing people to having to help themselves still leaves them in this position of looking for the right to have rights” (P. Pallister-Wilkins, personal communication, 25 Apr.). Plus, the implementation of neoliberal developmental solutions might not align with the needs of host countries. Finally, incubating recovery remains a theoretical plan, therefore repatriation might not be as easy as suggested. And the solutions introduced concerning repatriation ignore international law, according to which there should be no unsafe return, and the authors offer nothing new concerning protracted situations.

Chapter VI - Betts and Collier’s narrow perspective

This chapter focuses on issues caused by the author’s narrow perspective: their position in the world, their focus on economics, and their goal. First, Betts and Collier’s Global North-centric approach maintains the status quo of unequal burden sharing. Then, economic rights need to be accompanied by social and political considerations. And lastly, Betts and Collier ignore refugee’s personal aspirations by aiming for stability and efficiency.

1. Their approach maintains the status quo

Betts and Collier propose a rethinking of refugee policy, but their plan maintains the status quo because their take on burden-sharing is not satisfactory. They apply an economic principle to a human matter by using the comparative advantage. According to them, “all states can be better off if there is a degree of specialization” and developing states in the region take-in high numbers of refugees, while rich distant states offer development assistance (Betts and Collier, 2017: 208). First, this solution reduces the responsibility of rich distant states to a budget, which seems to be a small
gesture to honor our common humanity. Plus, it exposes an “internal contradiction” in Betts and Collier’s big ideas (Hargreaves Heap, 2017). “[I]n so far as refugees do remain (as per ‘big idea 2’ or, courtesy of the prevailing humanitarianism, warehoused) in havens like those in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, then ‘rich’ countries will be less inclined to feel a moral imperative to help” (Ibid.). As a result, developing states near refugee generating countries still carry most of the burden. This inequality does not change the Suasion game described by Betts, in which Northern states have few obligations or incentives to contribute to refugee protection in the South because of the power asymmetry (Betts, 2011).

Then, this version of burden-sharing reflects a Global North-centric perspective that seeks to “keep people in place” (P. Pallister-Wilkins 2019, personal communication, 25 Apr.). Indeed, the authors see diversity as a problem and do not want masses to reach Europe (Bivand Erdal, 2017). This has been observed by critics in Collier’s book Exodus, which reflects his “antipathy for mass migration and diversity in developed countries” (Birrell, 2017). The following statement in Refuge hints at this opinion as well: “Enhancing opportunities for refugee self-reliance may also reduce the need for onward migration to Europe” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 154). Betts and Collier seem to regret the polarization of politics and with it the rise of the far right: “Liberal democratic states around the world are facing a socio-political crisis…Across the entire political spectrum, there has been a lurch towards nativism, as populist nationalism has become a common currency of democratic politics” (Ibid.: 134). But their plan still follows the populist outlook on migration considering it a ‘boogeyman’ and wanting people to ‘stay where they belong’, which is concerning in a book written for a “generalist audience” and “policy-makers” (Ibid.: XIV).

Trying to keep people in place reinforces the already existing unequal instituted mobility, by which states choose who can enter their territory (P. Pallister-Wilkins 2019, personal communication, 25 Apr.). “Nation-states have successfully managed over time to monopolize and usurp the authority to determine who may enter their external borders” (Neumayer, 2006: 72). They have used this monopoly to impose restrictions “unevenly distributed across people with different nationalities” as they see some people - mostly from poor and unstable countries - as undesirable visitors who might overstay their welcome (Ibid.: 73). For example, the European Union, when creating the Schengen area “enhanced freedom of movement for insiders…at the expense of decreased mobility for certain outsiders” leading to what has been named ‘Fortress Europe’ (Ibid.: 75). In relations with forced migrants, the strict European border controls have led to violations of people’s right to ask for protection, and to deaths in the Mediterranean. Indeed, Fortress Europe “restrict[s] access to refugee status,…prevent[s] people without adequate documentation from
entering Western Europe”, and uses externalization policies (Castles et al., 2014: 226). These policies try to deter people from even getting close to Europe. And when legal routes are too complicated or busy, people take the dangerous ones, walking through countries and/or boarding makeshift vessels. “The biggest failure right now is the actions of states themselves, in denying safe and legal routes, safe passage for people who are fleeing conflicts, human rights abuses, and endemic poverty” (P. Pallister-Wilkins, personal communication, 25 Apr.). It might be time for a different approach, one that actually protects human life not by trying to keep people in place, but by better managing flows. It is important to note that all people do not want to come to Europe, and that the numbers that arrive are manageable.

The conditions under which people reach safe countries - whether made more difficult by host-states or not - exposes another weakness of the refugee protection system: people are left with nothing until they reach a safe country (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). Betts and Collier (2017: 212) propose to “use the EU embassies that are already present in host countries as the route by which applications for asylum and related matters of visas for work and family reunification, and humanitarian visas, could be processed”. This would allow people to quickly reach and remain in safety while still having a chance to apply for asylum outside of their region. However, the long lines and dire living conditions in hotspots at the fringes of Europe (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018) are an indicator of how difficult it might be to process all asylum seekers in limited, concentrated places. This plan would require great numbers in financing and workers, which is already difficult to come by on the continent.

One of the authors’ arguments for keeping people close to their country of origin is that they will experience less of a culture shock. “There are often historic ethnic and linguistic overlaps and cultural affinities” in proximate host countries (Betts and Collier, 2017: 135). But are cultural differences really more challenging for, for instance, a Syrian in Germany than in Lebanon? Germany puts forth great efforts to integrate Syrian refugees. For example, by giving children access to public schooling, offering vocational training (language and skills) to adults in order to facilitate access to the labor market, and encouraging enrollment in higher education (Hindy, 2018). Obstacles to integration remain, mainly discrimination by the general population due to fear and cultural differences. But there are also civil society programs trying to counter-balance hostile behaviors by helping refugees (Ibid.). Even if refugees suffer discrimination in Germany, the country has the legal framework to protect them, and the infrastructure to help their integration which is not guaranteed in developing host-states. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, the flow of Syrian refugees risks destabilizing the country. Indeed, “[i]n a country of just four million people, one in
five people is a Syrian refugee”, a number that could change the culture and politics (CARE, 2017). After eight years of conflict fear is growing “that the presence of a large number of mostly Sunni Syrian refugees could be permanent, and that this will alter the demographic balance against the interests of Christian and Shia political groups in Lebanon and challenge the existing political order” (Ibid.). Lebanese authorities, following public opinion, are pushing for the return of Syrians rather than their integration. Would someone want to adapt to a rather welcoming foreign country with opportunities, or stay close to home in difficult living conditions - even if somewhat improved by development? The answer has been clear in the last five years, people do not walk through countries and get on boats with the risk of dying without reason. Between January 2014 and the beginning of June 2019, about 1.9 million migrants and refugees have reached Europe, and an estimated 18,300 who attempted the journey are dead or missing (UNHCR, 2019e).

2. Economic solutions are not enough

As explained previously, development can only go so far in countries without sufficient infrastructure and where the local population already struggles. Development for all countries is a long-term goal, and currently making refugees a part of it remains a challenging opportunity (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). Plus, “no amount of neoliberal work is going to be able to tackle the human rights abuses or the violent armed conflicts that many are fleeing” (P. Pallister-Wilkins, personal communication, 2 Apr.). Which is why resettlement should be emphasized. The majority of refugees who are resettled in ‘rich’ countries do well because they have the infrastructure and protection system in place. Mansour-Ille reported the story of Syrian refugee who reached the United Kingdom after a boat journey and has received asylum (D. Mansour-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May). He is now working for the government’s resettlement program (Ibid). This kind of success story should be an inspiration for the possibility and benefits of onward movement and integration. As introduced in the previous chapter, the challenge is a declining openness to this refuge solution. However, according to Ferracioli (2014) the decreasing trend could be reversed by presenting resettlement as a fair burden-sharing solution. States could “better distribute numbers in accordance with their capacity to assist, thereby addressing public concern about distributive concern” (Ibid.: 138). Plus, “the possibility of resettlement in a third country would arguably discourage bona fide refugees from targeting their country of choice with the help of smugglers, thereby alleviating public concern about procedural fairness” (Ibid.). One way to encourage resettlement policies is for states to “collectively and progressively increase their quotas for refugees coming from a country of processing, while
decreasing their quota for those seeking integration directly in their territory” (Ibid.: 139). Of course countries with better capacities to resettle refugees cannot host millions, but they could take-in more than the current numbers, alleviating the pressure on integration in struggling host-countries and preserving people from unsafe return.

If refugees were to stay in the region of origin as per Betts and Collier’s plan, then alongside development should come help to improve social and political relations between refugees and host-communities. Betts and Collier only touch on integration through the economy. According to them developmental solutions that benefit both refugees and hosts are enough to maintain good relations for the time of exile. However, current tensions point to the opposite. Refugees suffer from discrimination even where they contribute to the economy. In Jordan, when some administrative hurdles were removed to facilitate access to work permits, new ones were improvised by Jordanians. For example, “the employers sometimes can convince [refugees] that if they got the permit they would lose their jobs because they would be more expensive for the employer” (D. Mansour-Illle 2019, personal communication, 8 May). In Uganda, refugees are given plots of land in the middle of nowhere, where the soil might not even be productive (Sverberg, 2014). And when refugees cannot contribute the situation is even worse, evidenced by cases like Kenya. For example, tensions are high around Kakuma camp because refugees and locals have to share limited resources and services (Ali et al., 2017).

3. Stability and efficiency over refugee’s aspirations

In Betts and Collier’s system refugees are not asked what they want but rather told what to do. Their plan imposes one path to the majority of refugees: stay close to the country of origin, work and specialize in what will be useful for reconstruction, and go home. The focus on having to do what is right for the country of origin trumps personal aspirations. This is illustrated in the following quote:

But young people should not be put into the position of choosing between self-interest and their obligations to their less fortunate compatriots. The international provision of these opportunities should come as a package with the obligation of return should the society revert to peace within a reasonable time-frame (Betts and Collier, 2017: 195).

What if one does not want to return, or cannot? Because “there is nothing that says you have to have a commitment to your country of birth, or country of origin” (P. Pallister-Wilkins, personal communication, 25 Apr.). And it is possible that refugees “want an opportunity to help build” their host-country (Ibid.). The refugee camp’s homogenization of assistance, insensitive to culture,
gender, and age, is currently seen as a form of structural violence because it aims to maintain order (Jaji, 2011). The limited choice of fields for training and the imposition of conditions, insensitive to refugee’s individual aspirations and circumstances, would constitute a new form of structural violence.

With their macro-level approach, Betts and Collier see only the practical for groups (refugees or hosts) and the global community. However, at the individual level, priorities might be different, and paths are not as clearly defined as the authors assume. Which is why beneficiaries of help should have a voice as they are directly affected by policy changes, and have a first hand experience on what is needed and what works. The critique on humanitarian neophilia done by Scott-Smith (2016) can be applied to Betts and Collier’s plan; both are too focused on innovation and forget to be in touch with the people they are trying to help. Scott-Smith uses the example of a humanitarian innovation in food assistance called Sprinkles. This product is “a sachet of pale powder that can be sprinkled over a meal to improve its micronutrient content”, used in emergency situations to combat under-nutrition of children (Scott-Smith, 2016: 2238). It has been welcomed as an innovation with a revolutionary impact. However,

[i]n the end, all this product can do is to improve the nutrient content of a poor meal. It may prevent deficiency diseases in the short term but it cannot tackle chronic malnutrition, nor can it change the poverty that causes so many people to eat an inadequate diet in the first place – or even provide a good meal to people who need it (Ibid.: 2239).

The same type of comment can be made about Betts and Collier’s focus on the right to work. Having an income might make daily life a bit more acceptable, but it still leaves refugees in difficult living conditions, with limited rights in general.

Betts and Collier also have a tendency to write statements insensitive to refugees’ experience. The respect the authors have for the displaced is questionable in Refuge because of certain quotes that show a misunderstanding - if not plain disregard - for individuals’ realities. When talking about the possibility of boosting the economy by having manufacturing sites in host countries, Betts and Collier explain how new sites cannot be too far from the ‘mother’ factory. In their example, Germany could offshore to Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon because they are reachable. Indeed, “[i]f refugees can walk it, German managers can certainly fly it” (Betts and Collier, 2017: 177). Another insensitive comment, generalizing people’s story, is found on page 199: “The small minority of Syrians, around one in twenty, who moved to Europe had chosen to become migrants”. As explained previously, the circumstances under which people reached Europe are as numerous as the number of individuals. This statement undermines their struggles, from violence to
discrimination passing by exhausting journeys. Plus, for many their claims for asylum were accepted, undermining the authors’ assumptions about their intentions. In 2015 and 2016, at the peak of the ‘crisis’, positive decisions for protection were respectively 52 percent and 60 percent in Europe, either by granting refugee status or at least offering humanitarian protection (MPI, 2018).

Betts and Collier’s solutions only reinforce the status quo of unequal burden sharing - as described in the Suasion game theory - in a segregated world that is constructed by unequal mobility regulations. Global North states are keen on keeping people in place in the Global South - including refugees, and as a result “the right to seek asylum in another country is in jeopardy” (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.). The authors’ perspective aligns with - even strengthens - this Eurocentric line of policies, which undermines individual rights, going against refugee law and human rights law in general. Solutions that support exchange and diversity should be explored like finding ways to encourage resettlement, or introducing social and political initiatives alongside economic ones in order to improve social cohesion. Central to any proposed improvement should be refugees themselves by including them in the policy-making process. This would prevent mistakes like those seen with humanitarian neophilia.

Chapter VII - Conclusion

1. Summary of the critique

The guiding research question was: Why the solutions presented by Betts and Collier in Part II of their book Refuge (2017) do not stand investigation? Chapters IV through VI presented numerous points of criticism, exploring the author’s condemnation of central actors in the refugee protection system, the limitations of their propositions for change, and their narrow-minded perspective on the matter. The critique of humanitarianism and the UNHCR is unfair as it puts most of the blame for current failures on them. While the approach and institution present shortcomings, they are apart of a bigger system which involves numerous actors, including states. Betts and Collier’s approach of the refugee protection system as broken and anachronistic is not representative. The protection regime is not fixed and has adapted over time. If the framework in place has the tools to better manage flows and protect displaced populations, it remains dependent on cooperation. What is needed is not a brand new system but a renewed willingness from states. But instead of pushing for openness, the author’s pragmatic plan supports - if not facilitates - the
current trend of ‘keeping people out’ of the Global North. Putting aside the focus on Fortress Europe, the innovations for the developing countries generating or hosting refugees are flawed. Special economic zones would put refugees at risk of exploitation, a one-size fits all model might not be implementable, and a heightened focus on the right to work might undermine other essential rights. And even when the ideas are interesting, a lot of questions remain unanswered.

2. Discussion of human rights

The problem underlying the shortcomings of Betts and Collier’s plan is the lack of consideration for human rights. The refugee protection system is anchored in the defense of human rights. These include the right to life, protection from discrimination, freedom of movement, free choice of employment etc (UN, 2019). Refugee is mainly focused on economic rights that can contribute to development and stability in the region of origin in order to prevent onward movement, and refugees become tools rather than beneficiaries of the ‘new’ system. Their aspirations are trumped by the needs of host countries and those of the country of origin. But as Pallister-Wilkins put it, refugees need “statehood and rights, not a job to make furniture for Ikea” (P. Pallister-Wilkins 2019, personal communication, 25 Apr.). The issue is that securing these rights is “difficult, if not impossible at the international level” (M. den Heijer, personal communication, 9 May) because “human rights law has no teeth” (D. Mansur-Ille 2019, personal communication, 8 May).

But weaknesses in human rights law do not only come from a lack of enforcement power. There exist regional inequalities leading to a hierarchy of nationalities. Countries most capable of helping, through financial contributions and resettlement programs, do not do their most because of the North-South divide. Expectations of what people are entitled to seem to differ according to one’s origin. The Western/Northern construction of differences with the rest of the world (different culture and higher quality of life) leads to the following reasoning: a little help is better than what they had before. But this does not hold when compared with human rights principles, which are not about minimal standards but human dignity. Breaking down the hierarchy and seeing human rights as equality could lead to more global solidarity.

3. Recommendations

Betts and Collier’s book does nothing to challenge restrictive migration policies. But “who does protect and where protection happens matters” (P. Pallister-Wilkins, personal communication,
25 Apr.). If their plan encourages more financial contributions in the Global South, the allocation of funds ignores universal rights and focuses on maintaining stability to prevent ‘spill-overs’. Instead of accepting a segregated world as per Betts and Collier’s plan, I would like to introduce recommendations on how to promote our common humanity in order to generate more solidarity for forcibly displaced populations - wherever they come from and wherever they find asylum. The humanitarian frameworks “are - as a base-line - important to defend” (Ibid.), but we also need to improve the political context around migration, with a priority on displacement. The international refugee protection system is useful to set-up norms and standards, as well as to manage coordination. But because it is dependent on the willingness of states to provide assistance and asylum, an additional bottom-up approach could help boost social understanding and political will for helping refugees.

a) Top-down: Promoting human rights

If enforcement of human rights is impossible at the international level (M. den Heijer, personal communication, 9 May), international institutions like the UNHCR should not give up on their promotion. The UNHCR can keep refugee rights in the international conversation through discussion forums like the Global Compact on Refugees. Additionally, it can attempt to pull states towards more open asylum policies through legal advice and by reemphasizing the list of rights established in the 1951 Convention. In parallel, the regional level has more potential for defending human rights, under which refugee rights fall (Ibid.). Using the example of Europe, currently the CEAS enforces a prohibition approach to asylum, which “is both unrealistic (refugees are bound to seek safety, whether we like it or not), and it is illegitimate morally (Art. 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants everyone the right to seek asylum) as well as legally (the principle of non-refoulement)” (den Heijer et al., 2016). While this approach is regrettable, the important point is ‘enforcement’ as it means that the regional strategy could be different - more open - and still enforceable.

b) Bottom-up: Informing individuals

From the bottom-up, ways to generate compassion for and good relations with refugees are numerous, and civil society has a central role to play. This role is two-fold: to improve social cohesion and to create a politically active base capable of influencing national and regional policies. It is important to note that a couple of interviewees in this research emphasized the role of bottom-up practices in shaping the future of a better refugee protection system. Crisp talked of an exciting
time when “[t]here is going to be much more emphasis in the future on small, local organizations and volunteers, and civil society” (J. Crisp 2019, personal communication, 26 Apr.). And McGinnis proposed to not leave all local responsibilities to NGOs and governments, but to encourage individuals to contribute through their time or money (R. McGinnis 2019, personal communication, 9 Apr.).

The following initiatives are examples of good practices, and reminders that individual actions have the potential to contribute to changes. First, there are artistic initiatives such as the poem Home (Appendix 2.a) by Warsaw Shire (2019). It was published in 2015, and the author is “a Kenyan-born Somali poet” who lives in London (Bausells and Shearlaw, 2015). This poem was inspired by her encounter with African refugees from Somalia, Eritrea, Congo, and Sudan (Ibid.). It is a hard read as it shares dark realities. It has the strength to pull our heart strings and awaken a sense of indignation mixed with compassion. Next, in 2018, 30 authors and artists published essays and drawings in a book called Osons la fraternité! with the goal to show support to displaced populations through writing, and by donating all sales’ benefits to the Groupe d’information et de soutien au immigrés (Chamoiseau and Le Bris, 2018). The writings are a mix of poems, short stories, testimonies, and imaginative pieces (a letter showing the unspoken thoughts behind a rejection of asylum, an essay on the poverty of the French language without foreign words and influences). An example of one of these touching essays, from the perspective of a ‘foreigner’, can be found in Appendix 2.b.

Other initiatives focus on teaching such as the Red Cross classroom tool called ‘Brothers Across Borders’ (IFRC, 2019). It is described as “a powerful interactive classroom tool to help European students understand and empathise with the dangers and difficult choices faced by young Syrian refugees and their families” (Ibid.). In the game students become a young Syrian refugee who has fled Aleppo to look for his brother in Turkey, while the rest of his family stays behind. “The teaching materials include a range of discussion topics and exercises on the Syria conflict, regional geography, culture, family life and language and on themes such as displacement, refugees and asylum” (Ibid). Finally, the online platform ‘Migrations and Questions’ is a good example of teaching tailored for adults (Pascual, 2019). It was created by Yves Pascouau, a French expert on public law (Ibid.). On the website the general public can ask questions about migration and asylum, and the answers are given in the form of two-minute videos, each narrated by a person with expertise in the specific field of inquiry (Migration en Questions, 2019). Examples of questions include: What are the rights of asylum seekers? How many refugees are there in the world? What are the risks for a French person hosting an irregular migrant? (Ibid.). This initiative was inspired by
a survey done by the European Commission, which revealed that seven out of ten French nationals consider themselves ill-informed about immigration and integration (Pascual, 2019). “This observation shows a paradox: the omnipresence of the topic in the political debate contrasts with the lack of knowledge that it suffers” (Ibid.). The diversity of initiatives helps reach more people as some will enjoy stories more than factual materials - and vice versa, fostering a pool of informed citizens.

This thesis reviewed the book *Refuge*, revealing shortcomings in its attempt to improve the international refugee protection system. Questioning Betts and Collier’s ideas was important because as influential academics their book can inspire policy-makers and the general public. The proposed ‘improvements’ would only reinforce a segregated world, in which refugee rights are fading. The conclusion pushed for a revival of human rights promotion through a combination of top-down and bottom-up strategies. While I propose to revive what already exists, it is also important to build upon it and push for even more. In recent years, positive advances for minority groups have been shaped by social and political contexts which led to expansions in the understanding of human rights, to include for example needs specific to women and rights focused on sexual orientation (Howard and Donnelly, 2013: 138). If in certain cases these groups find tailored protection, in the near future these rights need to be more globally addressed in the field of refugee protection.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDICES

1. Interviews

a) General information

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<td>Pallister-Wilkins</td>
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b) Relevant parts of interview with McGinnis

[14 minutes 15]

Cousin: Did you hear…in your interactions with refugees did most people tell you ‘I want to go home when I can’?

McGinnis: Absolutely! I would say almost everyone that was their constant thing. I think it’s very hard for a lot of them, they honestly think that things will get better and they try to stay as close to the homeland as they can. Because that is what they want, that’s who they are, that’s what’s going to make them happy. Unless…there are some that know that they can never go home again, like they know that they will be killed if they do. And I think those are the only individuals that I see…I have several boys and young men who had been out in the Greek community and were very concerned about other people within their own community seeing that and then them going home and things happening. Or we had other individuals whose families were very politically involved back home and knew that they would never be able to go home again. But those were exceptions, almost everyone else was like…everybody from Kurds, to Iraqis, to Syrians, that was the end goal.

[21 minutes 40]

Cousin: You talked earlier about a public health epidemic…I guess the trauma will probably show up as some kind of mental illness or depression or suicidal thoughts and so on. Is that addressed in any way in the camps? Or is that not even a question?

McGinnis: I don’t think it is, and I think it’s even more…I’m not saying it’s a causation, but I do think there is a correlation between the impact on your mental health and your ability to be radicalized. That to me is a public health concern, a very very big concern. My thoughts there are
simple, if you look at at least the camps that have been established over time…and I don’t know how much you know, but I’ll go back to Lebanon for example. In Lebanon, if you are not in the camps your basically in Hamara, which is the red light district there, and your best hope…is either you’re being trafficked, or you're begging, or you’re stealing, and eventually you get picked up by the police. The police take you in front of the judge, the judge basically will slap your hand so many times and then if you’re youthful, there is one facility called the Home of Hope, and they send the kids there. They’re there until they’re 18. The problem is, once you’re 18 in Lebanon, you’re done, if you’re out there there is no help. The best thing you can hope for is if you’re a girl you can marry a Lebanese man and…which you know, I don’t know if I would want to be forced to marry someone else. But regardless, then your children will take on Lebanese nationality and that’s a solution. For boys there is nothing, you’re Palestinian, or you’re Syrian, or whatever, if you’re not Lebanese you’re never going to be Lebanese, you can never get citizenship, nothing. So they often are left with no way to really get a job, so they end up being picked up by Hammas or Esbola. They welcome them in, say that they’ll give them employment. I think that is something we need to really think about, on how we approach these kinds of situations, because there is some evidence out there suggesting that people that suffer from depression, anxiety, different things from that, often these individuals who are in these camps are more susceptible to being…it’s no different than the gangs here in the United States. If you don’t have family structure, if yo don’t have any prospects, if you feel like society has marginalized you or your people your entire life, it’s and open space for you to be more willing to kind of fit into the rhetoric that comes out of some of these organizations. I think the other thing is that there is no formal, at least in the camps that I see, mental health facilities. So we do a lot through different organizations. I work with Peace Players, Northern Ireland, that’s where we put Catholic and Protestant kids together through sports and put them on the same teams together. I don't know how much you, I mean I’m sure you’re familiar, but anywhere from 93 to 95 percent of the schools in Northern Ireland are still segregated, so they’re still…even though they’re at peace, because of course they’re apart of the West so we can’t have any problems in our own backyard. They still have a broken-down mentality with the older generation, so the schools are still segregated. So we put them on sports teams together, we put them on basketball because let’s face it as Irish we don't tend to be very tall, and so basketball is not a very big thing over there. So we use that, and then we take them off the court and then we talk about what does this flag mean, what does it mean to be Protestant, what do these things mean. And it’s amazing what you hear out of the mouths of babes, because these are anywhere from six, seven, eight, nine year-old kids, all they don is regurgitate what they hear from their parents, right? And so I’ve used that in Norther Ireland and
in Palestine, we’ve used art therapy in Greece, Syria, the Turk-Syrian border, Lebanon, and we used music and drama plays also. I haven’t used that as much, a lot of it is traditional art therapy and sports therapy. But those kind of things are very Western ideas, and so there not necessarily incorporated a lot in the camps. Again, they are at a very basic level of providing the basic things, and so they don’t really grasp the idea of the bigger picture: What does it look like for these kids growing up long term in these camps for 20 years?

[28 minutes 45]

Cousin: If you want a little more information, their idea is very Global North-centric. A lot of it is keep people as close as possible to the region of origin, and the Global South countries will take most of the people, and the Global North will give most of the money. And then, they still say everyone should do a little bit of everything, but mostly it’s divided by ‘you take in the refugees, we’ll give you money’.

McGinnis: I think in theory that has merit, but there are a lot of things we need to be cautious of. For one, we’re not all on the same playing field. For Italy and Greece to be put…there is a lot of anger and resentment, and I have been to both of them since this happened, and they’re very angry that they were put into this position to take these individuals. Because quite simply they were already in a fiscal crisis, they were already on a melt-down, and so when the money came in, it did not necessarily translate to the refugees, it automatically went to get them to a point where they could just kind of function. It wasn’t really born of assistance and they felt like because they were in this financial crisis they were forced to take the deal they did not want. When you start out having that right out of the box, I think it is problematic in and of itself because you have to have buy-in because people want to do this, everybody has to see the advantage, and the Greeks and Italians - at least the ones I interacted with - did not feel this way at all. And then with the coupling of Brexit, people were framing, they were like…I can’t even. Understanding that we all need to carry the burden we have to be kind of mindful of what each country’s burden to begin with. And I think there is different ways, it doesn’t have to just be fiscal either, in terms of currency, like I tell people here in the US: if you don’t want refugees in this country then you have a responsibility to go out, wether you do it through your pay, wether you do it through your man-hours, wether you do it through supporting some kind of organization, if that is your stance that’s fine, but you still have a responsibility as a member of the global community. That is a big part of the solution piece. We only think that the only way we can share the burden is through money, and I think that’s not
necessarily correct, we need nurses over there, we need doctors, we need mental health, we need all of these things. Give your time, give up your vacation and do this instead.

[34 minutes 22]

**Cousin:** Yeah, they barely touch on people displaced because of environmental issues in the book, and their biggest solution is economic solutions, so they say of you give an income, a job to refugees and you secure the right to work, then people will be better off. That’s the main point, which is lacking a lot about what is happening at home, when can you return, will the population accept that you work, how do you ensure that this right is protected? It brings up a lot of questions.

**Dr. McGinnis:** There is merit there, if you look at the studies, and I go back to Beirut just because they have been doing this forever. I mean people look at Beirut as a failure, but if you look at it they had the number one water filtration system in the world at one point, they had amazing sanitation, and now all that has pretty much collapsed, but again that’s because a third to half of their workforce is not working, they’re taking care of such a great amount of people. But they have so many interesting things in place that I think are really powerful, like they were one of the first ones instead of giving…you know we donate all our hand-offs to these organizations, Boat House refugees or Light House or whatever, and it takes man power to sort through those things, then to have people pick through these second-hand goods. And a lot of times the goods are ripped, stained, there’s stuff that should never have been donated, it should have been thrown out. In Lebanon they moved away from that model and gave them basically snap cards to let them decide, let them go into the grocery stores. They were like you know it’s the same mentality we have here in America about welfare: ‘they’re gonna blow their money, they’re not gonna do this, they’re never gonna wanna go back home’ and actually it is incredibly cost effective. They end up having…they’re resourceful, they’re able to do more, their money goes further, they tend to be able to have a sense of maybe pride is the wrong word, but they have a feeling of being members of society again.

c) Relevant parts of interview with Pallister-Wilkins

[1 minute 57]

**Cousin:** In your opinion, what are the current failures of the protection regime? You can name just a few.

**Pallister-Wilkins:** Along with colleagues here at the UvA and elsewhere we have a large European Union funding to rise a 2020 project exactly on issues of protection. I think some of the biggest failures are an inability to… I think the biggest failure currently is the actions of states themselves, in denying safe and legal routes, safe passage for people who are fleeing conflicts, human rights
abuses, and endemic poverty. The unequal mobility regime which we have instituted and consolidated over the last 50 or 60 years is I think the biggest failure. And then some of the solutions that have been put into place in response to that are very restrictive, based on strategies to keep people in place, and that only leads to greater levels of issues of protection. There are also a whole lot of others, failing to understand the different contextual sites. The fact that we have known for 20-30 years that for example women have different protection needs during displacement crises, and that’s still a problem not being addressed. Countries just not wanting to take responsibility for displaced populations, or only in a very basic needs kind of way and not allowing refugees to achieve full legal personhood. A one size fits all model is also problematic.

Cousin: Do you mean concerning the definition?

Pallister-Wilkins: I mean we can talk about the problem of defining refugees and migrants, and the fact that one of those labels does not necessarily define you for your entire migratory journey, and that migrants can themselves become refugees like we have seen in Libya. When you attach a certain set of rights and obligations to some people it causes problems, and can lead to a form of bureaucratic violence. Not just the legal definitions, but also the way in which, as people make their migratory journey, the issues and problems change. For example, issues in Niger are not the same as issues in Lebanon, or in Turkey, or in Greece, or Italy, or the Netherlands. The political context matters. Having said that, there are international humanitarian frameworks, as set-out in the various conventions, and those are - as a base-line - important things to defend. But in terms of the every day practice of protecting refugees, we have to think beyond even what it says in the Global Compact. What we are talking about is highly political, and who does protect and where protection happens matters.

[7 minutes 28]

Cousin: Did you see recurring difficulties, or examples on the contrary of resilience?

Pallister-Wilkins: This is a tricky one because for a long time people working on refugee issues have argued - and rightly so - that refugees have agency. And that we should not reduce them to this suffering body that is abject, and needs to be protected, and we shouldn’t infantilize them in this sort of paternalistic way. But at the same time, emerges this discussion on resilience and resilient communities, and the agency of people can be used as a way to deal with future possible crises. But scholars will argue that there is a problem with resilience in this way because it actually fails to address the root causes of why communities, or why there are people displaced in the first instance. It simply seeks to help them cope with displacement in a way that removes responsibility from the
international community, removes responsibility from host states, affectively undermines international humanitarian law. Reducing people to having to help themselves still leaves them in this position looking for the right to have rights.

[11 minutes 50]

Cousin: Ok, could we dive into the solutions? What you think is a good take away and what will not work.

Pallister-Wilkins: I think first of all it’s important to understand that how they set-up the problem is deeply problematic. And a lot of scholars of the UNHCR and refugee protection system are incredibly angry about it, they see it as an unfair… I mean you know it’s very easy to critique UNHCR, but it is an unfair critique and a misunderstanding of the history of UNHCR, and really a way of placing all blame for failures in the refugee regime at the feet of UNHCR when UNHCR is not a sovereign organization. It is entirely dependent on states for its funding, in fact many of us have critiqued UNHCR for not being an agency for refugees but actually for state security that focuses on refugees. But that said, it’s not sovereign, it’s navigating a highly complex political field. The policy problem itself is already set-up in problematic and erroneous terms, so then any solutions are also logically deeply problematic. I think it’s important to note that what they are proposing is actually in some ways already happening. Not necessarily under the auspices of UNHCR but under the IOM. Now that the IOM is a UN agency, and it’s focusing on migration, it’s firmly planting migration as the global problem of the day, within which problems of refugees and refugee rights to protection and asylum are somewhat getting lost. IOM is really good at collapsing all problems into a migration problem. So public health crises, the potential drivers of migration and ‘blablabla’, I mean it’s true but also problematic. You turn migration into this big boogeyman, which we see leads to different political changes in countries like here. But IOM is already doing this kind of developmental work, so it’s already focused on trying to deal with the root causes of migration through particular forms of neoliberal development. I don’t know if you have seen this, but I have a colleague who is now based in Canada, called Philip Fraud, who works on this. He has an article on the IOM and developmental border work. It focuses on you know saving and rescuing and protection is not enough, because it’s true it is not, you would need to focus on the structural causes, and the structural causes are under development. Yes and no. A lot of people argue that actually the more developed countries are, the more migration there will be. People will be able to move and afford to move. Aspirations change, and I mean the people who are moving are not the poorest of these countries, they are already middle-class people. The amount of money they have to
pay to smugglers is obscene, we’re talking you could fly around the world four times first class with the amount of money it will cost you to get from Nigeria to Italy. So setting this up as a solely economic problem that can be dealt with the imposition of particular neoliberal market developmental mechanisms, without recognizing that this is also a problem of politics, it’s also problem of how we make space for non-citizens in our states. Because it’s not like states don’t allow mobility, they allow and facilitate mobility of certain groups of people, privileged white people. So to recognize that there are mobility regimes, which is a political issue; to recognize that many of the risks that people on the move face are related to the types of restrictive forms of mobility that we have enacted; to recognize that no amount of neoliberal developmental work is going to be able to tackle the human rights abuses or the violent armed conflicts that many of these people are fleeing. In fact it may well simply exacerbate, prolong, and introduce new forms of violence. We are already seeing that, for example, in the types of assistance being given to countries like Niger, where this money is going into arming militias which are actually making the situation more insecure and ore violent, not just for people moving through Niger, but for Nigerians themselves. We’re seeing the European Union taking on board this developmental idea, with its European trust fund for Africa. Which suggests that we have moved from…you know 20 years ago it was argued that we can develop Africa - so paternalistic - and Africa can catch up with the rest of the world. What is now happening with these types of developmental projects, because they are really tied to keeping people in place, is to suggest that actually there has been a realization among Western policy-makers that Africa can’t catch up, it’s a lost cause. And therefore, Africa needs to be removed from the rest of the world’s space and time, to be sort of excised. Certain policies, neoliberal developmental policies, the imposition of export processing zones, that will keep people in place will give people work - but not necessarily the type of work they want - will generate profit for the Global North. That will work in conjunction with other forms of security mechanisms to effectively place Africa, and the whole population of Africa, under a type of neoliberal, humanitarian, biopolitical regime, where everyone in Africa is potentially mobile because of these problems. As a way to sort of keep Africa as this space generative of all kinds of problems. But the solutions are not about fixing these problems, they are not the way to tackle endemic poverty, they give people some jobs but that’s it. Especially already displaced populations, what displaced populations in for example Kakuma or Dadaab need are statehood and rights, not a job to make furniture for Ikea. They already work, they already have strategies to generate income for themselves, they already are able to exercise some form of agency in this restrictive regime. Newhouse has a really interesting article on how people in Kakuma generate profits for themselves
and new markets. This is already happening, but not in the way that these proposed top-down, one size fits all models…And the argument is it worked for the Asian Tigers, this form of export industrialization. Yeah, but the people who worked in those industries were not refugees, and it was states based.

[24 minutes 04]

Cousin: Yeah, page 195 it drove me crazy, there is this quote that says something along the lines of: refugees should not be given a choice about what kind of work they do, they should be dedicated to the reconstruction of the home land so they can return. It’s appalling.

Pallister-Wilkins: This is such a poor understanding of so many things. It’s so paternalistic in and of itself. How dare you say what refugees should do? But also, returning home? I mean right now the average time somebody spends as a refugee is something like 30 years, and it’s only likely to get worse. People are born refugees and they die refugees. What do you mean by home? If you are born in Dadaab, that is your home, you don’t know Somalia. And again, it’s such a false…I mean I come from a refugee background, my grand parents were refugees in Britain in the 1930s, so to go home? What, to Germany? You would have to go back and rebuild everything. It’s also just incredibly racist. There is nothing that says you have to have a commitment to your country of birth, or country of origin. Maybe they would also like the opportunity to help build the country that they are currently in.

d) Relevant parts of interview with Crisp

[3 minutes 08]

Cousin: My next question is very broad. What is your opinion on what the failures of the current refugee protection regime are? And if you have thought of remedies?

Crisp: The important thing to remember about the international refugee protection regime is that it was established by states because they firstly wanted to avoid a repetition of the situation in the 1930s and 40s when Jewish people tried to escape Germany and were unable to, had to return to Germany to their death. So there was a great desire to set-up a system that would unable people that needed to leave their own country to find protection elsewhere. But states also wanted to deal with refugee issue in a kind of consistent, coherent, and predictable manner. Therefore they thought that to have the international convention of 1951 would provide a guideline, so that all states would act in a similar way when confronted with refugee situations, and that there would be a great deal of cooperation between states. So the whole point was to say that it’s not the responsibility of the state
that receive refugees, but refugees are really a global responsibility. What we have seen in recent years, despite the fact that we now have the Global Compact on Refugees, increasingly states are not cooperating on refugees issues, or if they do cooperate, it’s more to keep refugees out and stop them from fleeing, and to stop them from getting asylum in another country. Increasingly we see governments act in a very unilateral way, rather than multilateral, cooperative way. So really I think the problem at the moment is states are not living out to the principles, standards, and approaches that they signed up to when they signed the 1951 Convention. What recent years have exposed is the fact that there is no enforcement mechanism within the regime. So UNHCR can issue a press statement, it can have a cool-out word with governments to try and get them to change their policies, it can name and shame the states if it wants to, but non of these things oblige the states to take note of what UNHCR says. So it’s the lack of kind of real compliance or enforcement mechanism, at the same time states are disregarding the principles that they signed up to. Now something I have written about the refugee protection regime being weakened by the election of Donald Trump in the US. Because the US has always been a major supporter of the refugee regime, it’s always been a bipartisan agreement, Republicans and Democrats agreed that refugee protection was important. Since the election of Trump he has taken a number of different actions in the travel ban, a serious reduction in the number of refugee resettlement places, redefining asylum to make it more difficult, the whole business on the southern border and the intention to build a wall, and then complete withdrawal from the Palestinian Refugee Agency.

[8 minutes 10]
Cousin: The next thing I wanted to get to is did you see recurring difficulties for people, things not addressed under the Convention or by states’ implementations?
Crisp: I have been to dozens, if not hundreds of refugee camps and settlements. One of the main difficulties is the existence of what we call protracted refugee situations. Where no solutions are available to refugees. Solutions are voluntary repatriation to the country where people came from, local integration in the country where they have been given asylum so that they can eventually become citizens of that country, or thirdly resettlement to a third country. And for large numbers of refugees around the world, non of those solutions are available, and essentially people are getting stuck. So we find that for example with Afghan refugees in Pakistan, with Somali refugees in Kenya, and other populations around the world. The fact that no solutions are available is a big recurring problem. And the whole regime was based on the idea that people would be able to find solutions quickly. Now of course they are getting trapped. So that’s a big problem. Another
recurring problem, is when repatriation takes place, it’s supposed to be on a fully voluntary basis, not because people are forced or induced to leave. But what we see increasingly is attempts to repatriate refugees prematurely, when conditions are not safe in the country of origin, and when refugees have not fully agreed to it themselves. And again we have seen that with Afghans in Pakistan, Somalis in Kenya, there is now a very big push on Syrian refugees in Lebanon. And you might recall, a couple of years ago, when the big exodus of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh took place, even while people were still leaving Myanmar to seek refuge, the international community was talking about getting these people home as quickly as possible. That’s not proven possible because the conditions inside Myanmar have not changed what so ever. Long-term refugee situations are one recurrent problem, secondly, violation of voluntary repatriation, and I guess thirdly the ability of people to exercise the right to seek asylum in another state is in jeopardy.

[12 minutes 55]

Cousin: The last question is what do you think of Betts and Collier’s solutions, being the positive, the negative?

Crisp: I think it is not entirely coincidental that both Betts and Collier are economists. I think what they have produced is a very neat economic plan, but it kind of works better on paper that it does in practice. The main critiques, which I am sure you are familiar with, firstly the notion of keeping people as close to the country of origin as possible, whereas the international refugee protection system was based on...[Skype connection issue] The whole notion of keeping refugees as close to their country of origin as possible is one that European governments find very attractive but it violates the principle that refugees are a shared responsibility, and ideally refugees should not have to be concentrated in one part of the world which is the developing countries. A lot of people find the idea that refugees can set-up businesses in their country of asylum and then as soon as possible go back and take those businesses back to the country of origin a lot more difficult in practice than it is seems to be explained in the book. There is a very strange part of the book that basically says that they recognize there are these protracted refugee situations, and says after five or ten years if people haven’t found a solution then they should be resettled elsewhere. But this is taking place at a time when resettlement numbers are really going down because of Trump’s administration. And so there is not coherent plan as to where these people should go and who would take them in.

Cousin: There was also no plan for people who are already in protracted situations. It was saying new refugees will be resettled, but what about people who have been in camps for 25 years?
Crisp: Yes, exactly. That is a good point. And then the whole kind of emphasis on the special economic zones, and the concern is that this is simply a way of turning refugees into cheap labor for multinational corporations. As we know, I don’t know how much you have read of the literature, but in Jordan the special economic zones have not been as successful as expected. Very few people have found employment in them, in general Syrian refugees would rather do other kinds of job which give them more freedom and flexibility and actually pay better. Given that the book is very much based on the idea that you can take that model - the Jordan Compact model - and export it to other parts of the world, if it has not worked very well in Jordan then you have to ask whether it would also not work in other parts of the world.

[18 minutes 15]

Clementine: I think on its own it is problematic, because in Kenya I read a couple articles by Newhouse explaining the tensions between the local population and refugees, and a solution that helps a refugee is always going to be approach as a negative thing. And so having a conversation is also necessary, not just an income.

Dr. Crisp: Moving away from the book and looking at refugee situation generally, there is a lot of negative things happening in the area of refugee protection and solutions, but at the same time there have been positive developments in the last 10 to 15 years. I think we have been moving toward a new paradigm of refugee assistance, which is much more constructive than in the past. The main elements are firstly a move away from refugee camps, for many years it was the norm that refugees should be put in camps, and confined to camps, and not allowed out of camps. Over the last 10 years there has been a much greater recognition of the need for refugees to exercise freedom of movement, to take up residence outside of camps, and particularly to move to towns and cities. And that’s an issue I have worked a lot on the past 10-15 years. There is now much more general recognition of the need to approach refugee situations that doesn’t depend on refugee camps.

Secondly, there has been a movement away from giving out relief, like sheets and blankets and tents and cooking pots, to moving towards giving refugees cash, and of course this is a much more efficient way of giving people assistance. You don’t have to spend lots of money on logistics, you can just basically hand in the cash through ATM cards, and it’s also better for the refugees as it enables them to make choices about how they spend their money. That’s the movement from relief items to cash, which I think is a really positive one. Thirdly there has been a movement away from just providing assistance to people to actually encourage livelihood and self-reliance. When I started at UNHCR it was very common to talk about ‘Care and Maintenance programs’, basically you just
keep refugees in camps, give them a monthly food ration, and provide all of the basic needs, but you don’t encourage them or allow them to set-up their own livelihood. There is now much greater emphasis on refugee self-reliance, which I think is a positive thing. And then finally, there is also much greater awareness of the fact that refugees are often mobile and find their own solutions through means of mobility, either mobility to the country where they sought asylum, or by moving on to other countries. And there is a great awareness of the fact that refugees often adopt what we call transnational strategies. So for example, Afghan refugees in Pakistan don’t necessarily stay in Pakistan all the time, they move backward and forward across the border according to the economic opportunities, according to the security situation. And Afghan refugees, for example, also have a worldwide network through their diaspora, which is very important in supporting their livelihoods and supporting their own efforts to find solutions to their plight. So the whole recognition of refugee mobility is another positive thing. So despite a generally negative environment for refugee protection and solutions, I think we do see some positive things. And the I guess finally I would say that whereas UNHCR and the very big international NGOs have become somewhat discredited in recent times, there is going to be much more emphasis in the future on small local organizations, and volunteers, and civil society. I think amazing and exciting developments are happening in that area. Whereas getting real change from the UNHCR and the bog international NGOs is much more difficult.

e) Relevant parts of interview with Mansour-Ille

[2 minutes 28]

Cousin: Since you have a first hand experience, could you tell me about your opinion on what the failures of that system might be?

Mansour-Ille: Okay, I mean to be very honest I agree with Betts and Collier that the system is a little outdated. Also it entails its own failures in the definition of a refugee basically by saying that a refugee is someone outside of their country of origin, so assuming that that person has to leave. It pushes them out of their country of origin, when maybe they just need protection and might have stayed in their country of origin, at the fringes of the country of origin. Legally speaking, if your state is unwilling or unable to avail your protection, it’s definitely difficult to then give that person international protection within their own country. So I do understand the failures of the legal system itself. The biggest failure of course is then, after the person has left their own country, they are left with nothing until they reach another country, and there they have to go through a hassle of a system, being encamped most of the time. So of course they lose they human dignity along the way.
There is no international protection mechanism that offers that person protection the moment they leave their country. They have to go through the hassle, then they reach a country that respects human rights or has signed the document. If not they have to move on, again. It’s really difficult, because for example if you have Lebanon or Jordan as your neighboring countries, both did not sign the 1951 Convention, and hence they come under local, national law that sees them as asylum seekers, however does not grant them permanent protection. It’s a sort of charitable protection. It’s very difficult, but I do understand the limitations and where they are coming from, it’s not like me criticizing it right now means I have a solution. There are particular solutions in place. One thing is - as mentioned by Betts and Collier - is the idea of encampment, and trying to look at refugees as an opportunity. Now that has its own limitations because looking a them as an opportunity without the proper infrastructure might not render its potential. It’s theoretically feasible but not practically.

[8 minutes 38]

Cousin: In my opinion the book also does not rely enough on laws, and especially human rights law. But it becomes the same issue: how to enforce anything?

Mansour-Ille: Yeah, I was just going to say, the problem with international human rights law - and I actually teach international human rights law quite a bit - it does not have any teeth. It’s a very nice system, framework of rights, and glorious ideals, but where are the teeth of enforcement? There is none. Usually students always say: what about sanctions? Yeah, you can do sanctions but you cannot imagine a world where each and every country do sanctions against each other, because there are a lot of interests at stake. You only see sanctions when nobody really cares about that country. Otherwise, most of the time there are a lot of political and economic interests that would hinder any real enforcement. Even international law itself has very little teeth. It was formed by states for states, so no state will take another state to jail. It’s all about negotiation, shame and blame, lobbying. For me international law has a little bit of teeth but not much, and international human rights law even less.

[10 minutes 48]

Cousin: Could we go back to your work with refugees? I am trying to bridge the gap between policy-making and daily realities, because Betts and Collier already address the academic writing to policy-making gap. The goal with these interviews is to get people who have been on the ground to share the recurrent difficulties or things that work well.
Mansour-Ille: It really depends from one country to another. There are a lot of discrepancies between countries. For example, the UK takes maybe 2000 refugees a year, I don’t know but a very small number. But despite the small number, on the ground refugees are doing quite well. I met a Syrian refugee, who came by boat - you know the boat stories that you hear all the time - and now he is working for the government in the resettlement program. This is a success story, but because it’s a small number it won’t happen to most. There is also the infrastructure in place to try to integrate these people, and make the best out of them. But then you go to a country like Lebanon, and you see what is happening to these refugees. They are typically in no man’s land. The history of Lebanon is also forged with the Palestinian plight, right? Basically some Palestinians are also living in camps, together now with the Syrians, and the government does not have enough in order to sustain them. What ends up happening is that they work informally, they take some assistance from UNHCR, and I don’t want to make up a number, but to help your imagination I think they get something close to 16 dollars a month, a really small number, but don’t quote me on it because I don’t know exactly. And refugees will tell you a lot, and you can see if they are living in deplorable conditions, and maybe they exaggerate a little bit, but it’s not a good number. And they have to rent the land on which they put their tent, which is something like 150,000 Lebanese pounds, which something like 75 dollars a month. And there is no health care, there is a little bit of access to health care but not really. And a little bit of educational support to children, but a lot of children will tell you that they used to walk to the schools and stand at the windows in order to hear the lessons because they cannot enter. Stuff like this where in reality the infrastructure cannot support that many people who are not citizens. And a lot of people are glorifying the fact that Lebanon has taken one point something million, but the big question for me is how are these people living? It’s not about quantity but quality. Obviously on the ground the biggest gap between policy making and reality is beyond taking-in people you need to explore the living conditions under which they are living. You are taking-in this amount of people and giving them whatever status, but you are giving them nothing. That for me is the biggest question. Now if you go to a country like Egypt for example, there is no encampment policy so people are not living in camps. I don’t know if you have ever been to Egypt, but it has a lot of problems around slums. The slumification of Cairo is one of the biggest problems challenging the government. Those who live in the slums are the poorest of the poor, right? So the lower class of society. Cairo is a hub where everybody who migrates - even internally - goes. Those who come from upper Egypt, who are not doing well, mostly farmers usually end up in the slums in Cairo because it’s Cairo, it’s very difficult, it’s 23 million people. And so there is a ring around Cairo made of slums. Now it’s even penetrating central Cairo. So I’m
talking about economic problems in those countries. I’m not even talking about political problems because we don’t care about those. Actually the biggest problem that touches the lives of refugees are economic problems. And given those, come and tell me who is living in the slums in Cairo with dignity and access to all kinds of services that allow people to have a humane, basic life that I would say is acceptable. In Cairo it’s one of the biggest policy challenges. Without an encampment policy, the refugees or asylum seekers form another small slum somewhere. And they end up working informal jobs, where they have no protection, women can easily be subjected to sexual harassment and exploitation. That happened in Lebanon quite a bit, Syrian refugees being forced into prostitution. So you know, once you go to informality you basically lose the protection. And unfortunately, in many of these countries you don’t get the right to work from being there. And even if you get the right to work, theoretically, there are still a lot of administrative hurdles put on the ground in order to prevent you from getting the permit. For example, making the employer pay a lot of money for the permit. They removed this, but there was a bit in the past about showing ID, when a lot of Syrians do not have it. Even when you remove these hurdles, new ones are improvised. And even if you have the work permit, a lot of Syrians actually said they would rather do without it for two reasons: 1) a misconception, thinking that they would not get the UNHCR assistance, 2) they think it’s more expensive for them.

Cousin: So there is not very good communication?

Mansour-Ille: Not even that, sometimes it’s just putting extra hurdles on them. The employers sometimes can convince them that if they got the permit they would lose their jobs because they would be more expensive for the employer.

[22 minutes 02]

Cousin: I just wanted to know, from the summary that I gave you then, what you think of the solutions. What could be positive and what might not work?

Mansour-Ille: I mean I read what you sent, which was a nice summary of everything. I think they are very nice theoretical solutions, but I’m not entirely sure. For example, the special economic zones? Those are very problematic, right? You know they were glorifying them more or less in the book, and they are a success story that should be expanded on, and there is the Jordan Compact ect. But the special economic zones are zones of exploitation. A lot of refugees talk about working hours and hours there, like 14 hours a day, 12 hours a day. They are at the end of the world, when it comes to commute it’s extremely difficult for a lot of refugees to get there. And what are the conditions under which those guys are working? Who is controlling that? They seem for me to be no man’s
lands within a no man’s land. They are at the fringes of cities, and in Jordan you’re literally in the 
desert. The living conditions…I have not been to one, but I have heard from refugees, it’s very very 
difficult for someone to be living in a city and having to go all the way to those zones and be 
exploited. Because the hours and the way employers are handling these people, treating them as 
very dispensable, their skill set is not unique because you just need to do very automated kind of 
work. So they’re not like “we need that doctor with that skill set”, or “we’re gonna do everything to 
keep them”, no they don’t care. There is no guarantee of protection, so I’m not of a very positive 
view on special economic zones. Especially what is being done in those zones? A lot of the textile 
and stuff that is being produced is part of those QIZ agreements, and there is a lot of politics behind 
it. And a lot of Syrians would not want to do that work out of principle.

[33 minutes 42]
Cousin: So a Syrian refugee who worked in a SEZ in a host country, once the conflict is over that 
SEZ could be moved back to Syria with the Syrian workers. They also suggest giving investments 
from richer regions to encourage economic development in Syria to help with reconstruction and 
stability.
Mansour-Ille: Not sure if that worked in Iraq, but okay. I mean theoretically, if there was no Iraqi 
example, I would have told you “sounds good”. But somehow it didn’t work in Iraq, partly because 
Iraq has a very deeply rooted sectarian problem, beyond everyone else’s understanding. It can be 
partly the political context of Iraq that didn’t make it work. That solution seems interesting from a 
thoretical point of view, however I always ask “why is the money coming in?”. And how many 
workers would be going with a job? Who would be responsible for guaranteeing the job? We’re 
talking about transferring jurisdiction from one place to the other. Who is overlooking that this 
person working in Syria would get their rights?

[37 minutes 34]
Cousin: The idea was that there would be some trade deal between Syria and the EU for example. 
Mansour-Ille: That’s exactly my biggest question, if there is a trade deal, for that investing country 
to get a benefit out of that, within that trade deal the rights of workers need to be guaranteed. And 
another important point, a lot of Syrian refugees who went to Europe, would not want to go back, 
and risking to lose the right to nationality in the new country where they have spent years.
f) Notes on interview with den Heijer

The Global Compact on Refugees shows the UNHCR’s willingness to improve and adapt.

“At the international level it might be difficult - if not impossible - to find solutions. The regional level has more potential.”

2. Texts (examples of good practices)
   a) Poem by Warsaw Shire (2019): Home

   no one leaves home unless
   home is the mouth of a shark
   you only run for the border
   when you see the whole city running as well

   your neighbors running faster than you
   breath bloody in their throats
   the boy you went to school with
   who kissed you dizzy behind the old tin factory
   is holding a gun bigger than his body
   you only leave home
   when home won’t let you stay.

   no one leaves home unless home chases you
   fire under feet
   hot blood in your belly
   it’s not something you ever thought of doing
   until the blade burnt threats into
   your neck
   and even then you carried the anthem under
   your breath
   only tearing up your passport in an airport toilet
   sobbing as each mouthful of paper
   made it clear that you wouldn’t be going back.

   you have to understand,
   that no one puts their children in a boat
   unless the water is safer than the land
   no one burns their palms
   under trains
   beneath carriages
   no one spends days and nights in the stomach of a truck
   feeding on newspaper unless the miles travelled
   means something more than journey.

   no one crawls under fences
   no one wants to be beaten
   pitied
no one chooses refugee camps
or strip searches where your
body is left aching
or prison,
because prison is safer
than a city of fire
and one prison guard
in the night
is better than a truckload
of men who look like your father
no one could take it
no one could stomach it
no one skin would be tough enough

the
go home blacks
refugees
dirty immigrants
asylum seekers
sucking our country dry
niggers with their hands out
they smell strange
savage
messed up their country and now they want
to mess ours up
how do the words
the dirty looks
roll off your backs
maybe because the blow is softer
than a limb torn off

or the words are more tender
than fourteen men between
your legs
or the insults are easier
to swallow
than rubble
than bone
than your child body
in pieces.
i want to go home,
but home is the mouth of a shark
home is the barrel of the gun
and no one would leave home
unless home chased you to the shore
unless home told you
to quicken your legs
leave your clothes behind
crawl through the desert  
wade through the oceans  
drown  
save  
be hunger  
beg  
forget pride  
your survival is more important  

no one leaves home until home is a sweaty voice in your ear  
saying-  
leave,  
run away from me now  
i don’t know what i’ve become  
but i know that anywhere  
is safer than here  

b) Excerpt from an essay by Velibor Čolić (2018): L’exile c’est avoir un accent partout, y compris chez soi  
Exile, according to Anthony Burgess, is a negative state of being: the exiled is “rejected by natives as by his compatriots”. To leave, is also to arrive a little. For already twenty three years, for me leaving is like a second skin, a long-term subscription to France. A badly tailored suit that makes me a foreigner. I feel like I am perpetually between two train stations, two platforms, that I am waiting for something, somewhere. And yet nothing to do. Exile is like dust, exile is like the wet sponge of forgetting; exile is having an accent everywhere, including at home. Exile is leaving then staying, being invited then staying, inventing things, a brand new life, then staying…  

Ultimately, exile is staying.  

*  
Sometimes, the story is funny. Because true. It is touching as well. With a little curiosity, we notice that the refugee looks like us. And that we are like him. Nothing to do, our fortresses are weak and artificial. Our borders too.  

Even whispered, a word can become a scream. Questions without answers too. Consciously, or not, the exiled interrogates us. What is our relationship to other, but the real other who is different? Why this fear? And this hatred?  

Such is life. Probably. Humanity forgotten, fraternity chosen, our world that preaches nomadism and at the same time hates the nomads.  

A Bosnian proverb says: “Better a good neighbor than a bad brother”.
Rare thing nowadays: to take the time and listen to others. Not all but many. A cumbersome exercise, downright difficult, countercurrent: to give the last and first names and make room for the stranger. For the other. Only one obvious thing. If we want to build bridges between people, between us and others, we evidently end up a great winner. And a great builder in the end. A story remains true. Liberty is not at the beginning, but at the end.

Extremism is a beast that feeds off of fear and emptiness. What to do? Let us be creative and brave. And we will win this war.